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ABSTRACT
The internet-based business (e-business) activities have become a new technological
challenge to the container shipping industry (CSI) in recent years. Despite the growing
importance of e-business in the CSI, little systematic and theoretical research on e-
business has been undertaken so far. This research therefore attempts to understand the
potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry and to provide carriers
with the managerial recommendations responding to the impacts of e-business.
An integrated system dynamics model is developed to simulate the potential impacts of e-
business on the container shipping industry and to explore the successful managerial
strategies for carriers with regard to e-business. In order to increase the confidence of the
model, the general business dynamics in the CSI are reviewed and the historical impacts
of new technologies on the container shipping industry are analyzed using the framework
of technological evolution. Furthermore, the technology strategies of six different e-
business models in the CSI are evaluated using the proposed three frameworks to identify
the most promising e-business model.
The research finds that the profitability of carriers will be improved in the long term if
they successfully develop the logistics service offering (LSO) with e-business in a cost
efficient way. However, despite the improved profitability from the LSO and e-business,
the container shipping service could be commoditized further unless changes are made to
the current practice of expanding the containership capacity. In addition, the improved
profits from the LSO and e-business will drive the structural changes in the container
shipping industry. In order to improve the carriers' profitability over a long period of
time, it is recommended that carriers continue to add new services on top of the container
shipping service while expanding the containership capacity more wisely and
conservatively.
Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus
Professor of Marine Systems
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Purpose
The container shipping industry (called "CSI" hereafter), in which carriers transport
containers having cargo inside from port to port, has been growing since its inception in
the mid 1950s. Competing with traditional break bulk cargo shipping, in which cargo is
shipped in the raw forms with different sizes and standards, the container shipping
industry has expanded its market share due to its efficient, reliable, and timely service.
During the developments of container shipping service, the CSI has experienced several
technological evolutions posing new challenges, such as containerization, intermodalism,
the double stack train system, EDI (Electronic Data Interchange), etc. The market
participants in the CSI such as carriers, shippers, and intermediaries had to reinvent
themselves to adopt the new technologies into their business operations.
Besides the historical evolutions of the technologies, the container shipping industry must
deal with another technological challenge in recent years - the internet technology. The
internet technology, which provides the low cost, flexible, and reliable telecommunication
system, has started to impact the daily operations of business since the mid 1990s. Many
small new ventures utilizing the benefits of internet technology have launched new
business models to upgrade the current business operations in almost every industry. The
container shipping industry was no exception to this new trend. More than 100 internet-
based new ventures were founded in the container shipping industry, trying to establish
new business models in this traditional industry. Even though some new ventures could
not survive the sudden "bursting of the bubble of the stock market since the year of 2000,
many internet-based new ventures are still operating and becoming an integral part of the
container shipping industry. The internet-based business (called "e-business" hereafter)
activities become a "must" that carriers, shippers, and intermediaries in the container
shipping industry have to deal with. Particularly, carriers' business could be substantially
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influenced by the new e-business activities because many new ventures for the e-business
have focused on close interactions with carriers.
Despite the growing importance of the e-business in the container shipping industry, very
little research on e-business has been undertaken in the maritime research community,
particularly in the academic research field. Only a few research projects have been
performed to describe and classify the current e-business activities in the container
shipping industry (Armstrong, 2000; Cargo Systems, 1999a, 1999b; Drewry Shipping
Consultants, 2000; Stopford, 2000a, 2000b). Few systematic and theoretical analyses on
the e-business activities in the container shipping industry have been published.
Part of the reasons for few research projects on the e-business in the container shipping
industry is that the e-business activities have just started and have been an ongoing
process; hence, it is hard to perform the academic or theoretical research. In particular,
the empirical testing of managerial hypotheses is difficult due to the limited amount of
data to be used for analysis.
Accordingly, this dissertation is motivated by both the strategic importance of the e-
business and the difficulties of researching the e-business in the CSI. Even though it is
hard to analyze the e-business in the CSI systematically, it is yet very critical to
understand the potential impacts of e-business on the CSI and to develop the appropriate
strategic measures responding to the challenges posed by e-business. In other words, the
main purpose of this dissertation is to measure the impacts of this internet-based
technological evolution on the CSI and to understand how to respond to any potential
impacts.
Therefore, this dissertation tries to find the answers to two research questions:
* How could the e-business change the market dynamics in the container shipping
industry?
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* What are the successful strategies of carriers responding to the new e-business
activities?
1.2 Methodology and Overview
Analyzing the impacts of e-business on any industry is not an easy task at this
developmental stage of e-business because it is quite a recent phenomenon to amass the
extensively reliable historical data. The container shipping industry, in particular, has
been later in adopting the e-business activities than other industries so that research
relying on the empirical data to investigate the impacts of e-business on the CSI may not
be feasible.
Given the methodological difficulties of research on e-business in the CSI, this research
adopts a computer simulation methodology to analyze e-business in the CSI. Since a
computer simulation model could help users of the model easily implement the potential
scenarios in a computer, familiarizing themselves with the dynamic situations of interest,
and test the different strategies to cope with the potential challenges, the computer
simulation methodology must be suitable for the research on e-business in the CSI. In
other words, the computer simulation model for the impacts of e-business on the CSI can
be a useful learning tool for the model users to be successful in responding to the new
challenges posed by e-business activities.
Among the several computer simulation methodologies, a system dynamics modeling
methodology is chosen for this research. System dynamics modeling is a computer
simulation methodology that enhances the understanding of complex systems, which can
be dynamic industry systems, engineering process systems, dynamic urban development
systems, or corporate strategy development systems, using the causal relationships among
the variables that substantially affect the systems performance. The methodology is
particularly useful when the internal dynamics of a system are too complex to be
described with other traditional mathematical modeling methodologies. In addition, the
system dynamics methodology provides a flexible modeling tool so that it could
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effectively simulate managerial decisions of the system's participants. Since the internal
dynamics of the container shipping industry is already very complex and many managerial
decisions are involved with e-business activities, the system dynamics approach is very
useful in explaining the relationships of industry variables and e-business variables.
In addition, in order to increase the confidence in the system dynamics model for
analyzing the impacts of e-business on the CSI, a historical analysis of the technological
impacts in the container shipping industry using the framework of technological evolution
is also performed in this research. E-business itself cannot be separated from the ongoing
technological evolutions in the container shipping industry. The characteristics of e-
business in the CSI can be better understood within the context of "containerization,"
which is a major technological evolution in the maritime industry and helps form the
container shipping industry itself. Containerization has undergone several technological
evolutionary challenges such as intermodalism, double-stack train operation, and EDI
connections, etc. After these evolutionary processes, the container shipping industry is
now confronted with a new challenge: internet-based business activities. Therefore, it is
valuable to analyze the internet-based business activities in the container shipping
industry by applying the framework of technological evolution to the containerization
context.
This historical analysis provides a broader perspective to understand the relationships
between the e-business activities and the potential structural changes in the container
shipping industry; hence, the outcome of this analysis is used as the inputs to the system
dynamics model for the impacts of e-business on the CSI.
Furthermore, the e-business models in the container shipping industry are evaluated using
three frameworks (which are described in later chapters) - the "Appropriability -
Complementary Assets" (A-CA) framework, the "Network Externality - Customer Lock-
in" (NE-CL) framework, and the "Market Type - Customer Focus" (MT-CF)" framework
- developed from the perspective of technology strategy. This evaluation presents which
e-business models are most likely to succeed based on their technology strategy. The
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results of this evaluation are also used as the inputs to the system dynamics modeling so
that the most potentially successful e-business model is simulated for analyzing the
potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry.
In summary, this dissertation can be divided into two parts: the technological evolutionary
part (Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5) and the system dynamics modeling part (Chapter 6, 7, 8, and
9). The technological evolutionary part first explains the general business dynamics in the
container shipping industry deriving the strategic challenges of carriers (Chapter 2);
analyzes the historical impacts of technological evolutions in the container shipping
industry (Chapter 3); reviews the impacts of EDI, which is the most recent technological
evolution in the CSI and is similar to the internet technology (Chapter 4); finally,
delineates the characteristics of the e-business activities in the container shipping industry
(Chapter 5). The technological evolutionary part provides the overall insights into the
impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry and is used for the inputs to the
system dynamics model in the second part.
Meanwhile, the system dynamics modeling part is composed of four chapters: Chapter 6
explains a model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping
industry, which is used as a reference system to analyze the potential impacts of e-
business on the CSI. Chapter 7 describes the model for the diffusion dynamics of EDI in
the container shipping industry, which is used as a proxy for the potential diffusion of e-
business in the CSI. Chapter 8 presents the system dynamics model for the potential
impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry by synthesizing all analyses and
models discussed in the previous chapters. Finally, the overall conclusions and
managerial implications regarding e-business in the container shipping industry are
provided in the Chapter 9.
To summarize, Figure 1-1 describes the methodology and overview used in this research.
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1.3 Contributions
The work presented in this dissertation provides several contributions to the maritime
research community.
First, this research proposes a methodology to analyze the impacts of a new technology on
the industry by integrating the technological evolutionary framework and the system
dynamics modeling methodology. Since research on the potential impacts of a new
technology on the industry should investigate the future changes due to the technological
impacts on the industry, the research could be subjective by nature as opposed to being
objective. Unless the research adopts the rigorous methodologies, it cannot be regarded as
an acceptable work in the research community. Despite the uncertain nature of the e-
business research, the methodology adopted in this research presents a new approach how
to analyze the potential impacts of e-business on the industry in a more rigorous way.
This approach, therefore, can be extended to the research of analyzing the potential
impacts of a new technology on any industry of interest.
Second, this research also proposes three frameworks for evaluating the success potential
of the e-business models from the perspective of technology strategy. These frameworks
are useful tools for anticipating the potential success of any technology-based new
ventures. They can be applied to evaluate other e-business models in any industry.
Third, a system dynamics model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container
shipping industry is developed. Although it is based on the previous model for other
industries (Weil, 1998), it is extensively updated to accommodate the industry-specific
characteristics in the container shipping industry and is the first system dynamics model to
simulate the container shipping industry. The model developed in this research can be
used for other purposes relating to the container shipping industry, e.g., how to decrease
the cyclicality of the container shipping business, etc.
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Fourth, this research constructs a system dynamics model for investigating the impacts of
e-business on the container shipping industry and, using the model, identifies the crucial
managerial variables that should be carefully managed to respond to the potential impacts
of e-business. Using this model, the managers in the container shipping industry could
have better insights into how to effectively manage the new technological challenge - i.e.,
e-business activities.
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Chapter 2 General Dynamics in the Container Shipping Industry
Chapter 2 General Business Dynamics in the
Container Shipping Industry
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores general business trends of the CSI, focusing on ocean container
movement. The discussion includes industry factors, key players, industry value chain,
and key business drivers. Finally, strategic challenges of the CSI from the carriers'
perspective are provided in the end. The information in this chapter serves as the starting
point for further discussion on internet-based business strategy for the CSI.
2.2 Industry Factors
Five major factors have been dynamically affecting the CSI; world fleet and ports for
supply, waterborne cargo for demand, technology for support, finance for purchase of
capital resources, and policy and regulation for the overall framework.
World Fleet and Port works as a supply source for the CSI. It includes shipbuilding
activities, ship capacities in the world, port facility capacity lifting on or off the
containers, and intermodal connection facilities that transfer the containers from one
transportation mode to another. Meanwhile, Waterborne Cargo serves as the demand role
in the CSI, requesting container movement service from the carriers. The volume of
waterborne cargo characterizes the demand and it is affected by the world trade patterns.
Technology, such as automated cargo handling system, internet, or wireless
communication technology, provides the supporting roles that could make the industry
process more efficient and reliable. The Finance community gives the monetary medium
that expedites the ship procurement, protection and indemnity insurance. In general, these
two factors are lubricants smoothing the container shipping industry processes.
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Finally, Policy and Regulation rule the business framework throughout the CSI. Among
the most noticeable regulations are the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) and
import/export regulations.
Although all the above factors are very important in understanding the industry dynamics
of the CSI, the role of technology has been dramatically increased as in other industries.
More specifically, recent applications of internet and wireless communication technology
to the CSI have changed the industry pictures. This phenomenon evokes difficult strategic
questions to the current players in the CSI.
2.3 Industry Players
Three different players are critical in the global container shipping business: carriers as
sellers, shippers as buyers, and intermediaries. Each player has slightly different market
interests, but basically has the same goal - optimizing its own role in the logistics value
chain.
2.3.1 Carriers
In the carrier segment, the players include ocean carriers, port terminal operators, truckers,
and railroad companies. Their primary job is to provide container transportation services
for the shippers so that the containers move smoothly from shippers to the final
consignees.
2.3.2 Shippers
Shippers, or owners of cargo, are the buyers of container transportation services.
Although every company, which has to deliver its product to the customers, could be a
shipper, the shippers are generally composed of manufacturing companies, large retailers,
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and shippers' associations, etc. The shippers market is so fragmented that no single large
company can control the substantial portion of container capacity on a certain trade route.
Quite recently, shippers have become very aggressive in improving supply chain
management with new technology, which provides serious innovation pressure to carriers.
Given the era of borderless international business, logistics needs have been increasing
over time and the efficient management of the supply chain is very important for firm-
wide strategy setting. In addition, long and complex supply chains from the suppliers to
the final customers provide numerous opportunities to be efficiently improved by
innovative technologies. Even a small improvement of the supply chain may provide
enormous cost savings and profitability gain to the shippers.
2.3.3 Intermediaries
Intermediaries perform a matching function by finding carriers for shippers and vice
versa: for example, a coordinating function by arranging transportation service across
different transportation modes; consolidating shipments for shippers; or customs clearance
function. The intermediaries include freight forwarders, 3 rd party logistics companies
(3PLs), non-vessel-operating common carriers (NVOCCs), customs brokers, and so forth.
Basically, they arrange and manage the movement of goods without owning the freight or
the transportation equipment.
2.3.3.1 Freight Forwarders, NVOCCs
Freight forwarders arrange transportation services with ocean carriers on behalf of
shippers, which could be one or more companies. They usually handle international cargo
transported by containerships and cooperate with customs brokers to expedite the
international container movements.
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Meanwhile, the NVOCCs were originally container capacity resellers for ocean carriers;
i.e. ocean carriers sell their extra capacity, which may not be marketed by them
effectively, to the NVOCCs, and then the NVOCCs resell the container capacity to the
shippers. The NVOCCs market themselves to the shippers as if they own real
containerships by issuing bills of lading and publishing tariffs.
Although they started to target small shippers, which cannot receive favorable freight rates
from the major container carriers because of the small freight volume, NVOCCs now try
to market to the large shippers to directly compete with container carriers. Therefore, the
container carriers have recently tried to give the NVOCCs less favorable rates than their
largest customers receive.
Many of these freight forwarders and NVOCCs arrange door-to-door service for shippers,
i.e. ocean transportation and inland transportation by truck or rail from the origin to the
destination. Forwarders usually provide the necessary documentation for importing or
exporting goods. Typically, they operate container depots and provide consolidation
functions for less-than-container (LTC) load shipments.
2.3.3.2 Customs Brokers
Customs brokers are licensed by the US Department of Treasury to handle all types of
international shipments. These brokers prepare customs entries, determine applicable
customs tariff rates and shipment values, as well as file other necessary customs
documentation. In addition to the Treasury, more than 40 other government agencies
administer non-tariff requirements in the US. Customs brokers handle more than 90
percent of all US imports, and also often arrange the transportation service of these
shipments (Boyle, 2000).
2.3.3.3 3rd Party Logistics Companies (3PL)
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3PLs offer a wide range of services including warehousing, carrier management,
dedicated fleet operations, distribution and inventory management. The 3PLs are marked
by a high degree of integration with shippers' operations. They perform value-added
activities such as packaging, setting up, and stocking retail store displays. In other words,
their service offerings are not limited to arranging ocean-related transportation services for
shippers.
During the 1990s, many shippers outsourced their transportation management functions to
3PLs; the industry growth rate for 1998 was 21 percent. Gross revenues for the 3PL
industry grew by 15 percent to nearly $40 billion in 1998. Net profitability ranged from 5
to 7 percent (Armstrong, 1999). Armstrong (1999) observes that only half of the Fortune
500 companies are using 3PLs. His analysis of shippers indicates that major opportunities
are available in companies of all sizes especially mid-sized and smaller companies.
2.4 Industry Value Chain
Porter (1980) has developed the value chain concept as a useful framework to analyze an
industry. The value chain provides a structural view of the industry so that a market
researcher can better understand the industry dynamics. There are two different value
chains in the CSI: One is an 'asset management' value chain; the other is a 'service
delivery' transaction-based value chain.
2.4.1 'Asset Management' Value Chain of the Container Shipping
Industry
As shown in Figure 2-1, the 'asset management' value chain of the container shipping
industry is composed of 6 activities: container service demand (CSD), transportation
network planning (TNP), marketing sales and negotiation (MSN), contracting and
documenting (CD), container movement (CM), and finally customer support (CS).
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Each player in the market has provided valuable functions to the industry for each value
chain. For example, the shippers play an important role in CSD, MSN, and CD value
chain and the intermediaries provide values to the chains of MSN and CD. Unlike
shippers and intermediaries, the carriers cover all the activities of value chain except CSD
role. An interesting point from this 'asset management' value chain is that all three
players participate in the MSN and CD activities. In other words, the MSN and CD
activities are the most important functions in this industry and generate value-added
service to the industry. This is why recent internet-based new companies try to penetrate
these segments.
Container Capacity & Marketing, Contracting & Container CustomerValue erie Transportation Sales, & Documenting Movement Support
Chain Service Network NegotiatingDemand ) inn
Role of Key Players
Shippers
Intermediar
ies
Carriers P
Figure 2-1 Value Chain of Container Shipping Industry - 'Asset Management'
Perspective
2.4.2 'Service Delivery' Value Chain of the Container Shipping
Industry
If we re-focus on the transaction processes between shippers, who buy the container
shipping service, and carriers, who sell the container shipping service, the container
shipping value chain in Figure 2-1 can be reconfigured as shown in Figure 2-2. The
'service delivery' value chain is composed of three steps between shippers and
30
Chapter 2 General Dynamics in the Container Shipping Industry
consignees: "processing market information," "negotiation for transportation service," and
"transaction & movement."
The 'service delivery' value chain is very useful for analyzing internet-based business
activities in the CSI. The internet-based businesses in the CSI have developed unique
business functions with internet technology corresponding to each specific value chain
activity. Those functions are "portal" for processing market information, "e-marketplace"
for the negotiation for transportation service, and "Collaborative Tool Provider (CTP)" for
the transaction & movement activity. The activities of internet-based business in the CSI
will be explored in detail in the later chapters.
Processing Negotiation Transaction
Shipper Market for Service & Movement Consignee
Information
"Portal" "E-Marketplaces" "Collaborative Tool Provider"
Figure 2-2 Value Chain of the Container Shipping Industry - 'Service Delivery'
Perspective
2.5 Competitive Drivers of the Container Shipping Industry
Many factors drive the internal dynamics of the container shipping industry. Eight
competitive drivers of the container shipping industry are identified to analyze the
structural dynamics in the CSI. The drivers can be categorized into three types: demand-
side drivers, supply-side drivers, and environmental drivers. Table 2-1 shows the
complete list of drivers of the container shipping industry.
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Table 2-1 Competitive Drivers of the Container Shipping Industry
Demand-side Drivers
* Increasing Demand for Container Shipping
Service
* Increasing Demand for Logistics Service
* Trade Imbalance and Empty Container
Movements
" Chronic Overcapacity
Supply-side Drivers e Upsizing of the Containerships
* Continuing Consolidation of Carriers
Environmental Drivers Deregulation
* Technological Evolution
2.5.1 Demand-side Drivers
Three competitive drivers affect the demand side of the container shipping industry:
Increasing demand for container shipping service, increasing demand for logistics service,
and trade imbalance and empty container movements
2.5.1.1 Increasing demand for container shipping service
Demand for container shipping service has increased dramatically since the first container
shipping service in 1956. Figure 2-3 reveals that the number of containers transported,
measured by million TEUs of port handling, has substantially increased over time. On
average, the container shipping service has grown at 10.3% per year from 1975 to 2000.
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Figure 2-3 Number of Containers Transported over Time
Three factors might affect this phenomenal demand growth of the container shipping
service. First, a global outsourcing strategy boosts the demand for container shipping
service. In the 1980s and 1990s, many companies in the developed countries outsourced
their manufacturing capabilities to the Asian manufacturers in order to utilize lower factor
costs from the Asian countries. This outsourcing strategy decoupled the end consumers in
the developed countries from the manufacturing sources. So the products manufactured in
Asia should be transported to the developed regions such as Europe and the US via
containerships.
Second, increasing containerization rate (CR) drove the increasing demand for container
shipping service. Containerization rate, the ratio of the containerized cargo to total
general cargo that could potentially be containerized, has increased historically, thereby
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driving the demand for container shipping service. Figure 2-4 shows that the CR has
increased rapidly and reached around 50% of total general cargo in terms of weight in
1998.
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Figure 2-4 Historical Containerization Rate
Third, the international policy of free trade, which has been exemplified by the launch of
WTO (World Trade Organization) and NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement),
also spurred the demand for container shipping service. In other words, the policy of free
trade lowered trade barriers such as customs, allowing low costs of shipping raw materials
and final products, thereby attracting more demand for container shipping service.
This increasing demand for container shipping service presents a tough challenge for
carriers. Although the increasing demand could provide ever-increasing revenue to
carriers, they have to endure severe competition among themselves. Particularly,
deploying the container shipping capacity on time to meet the increasing demand is
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critical to be successful. However, it turned out to be challenging for carriers to optimally
procure the shipping capacity. In reality, carriers have always suffered overcapacity
problems over time.
In addition, the increasing demand for container shipping service requires carriers to deal
with increasing information overload. In order to deliver containers to the right
destination on time, carriers should manage container-specific information efficiently.
Otherwise, containers might be transported to wrong customers and carriers will lose the
business. Accordingly, as the number of containers to be transported increases, carriers'
capability of dealing with information overload becomes one of the important barometers
of carriers' success.
2.5.1.2 Increasing Demand for Logistics Service
As global outsourcing strategy progressed, the supply chain of shippers became much
longer, more international, and more complex. So shippers needed a more sophisticated
system of logistics management. Rather than just moving containers from the contract
manufacturers to the final customers, shippers need to manage advanced logistics
functions such as shipment tracking, just-in-time (JIT) inventory management,
collaborative planning, and management of international trade documents, etc.
An industry survey (Reeve, 2001) also confirmed this increasing demand for logistics
service: Improving global supply chain management is one of top priorities of CEO's
chief concerns over the next three to five years. In order to meet this demand, shippers
started to outsource their logistical functions to the logistics-specialized companies, such
as 3 rd party logistics companies (3PLs).
Because the logistics-related service is not an asset-based, but an information-based
business, the logistics service is more profitable than the traditional carriers' business -
just moving containers from port to port. Realizing high profit margin potential from the
demand for logistics service, several major carriers started to offer the logistics service
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through their subsidiaries. For example, American President Line (APL), a premier global
container shipping company, launched the sophisticated logistics service through its
subsidiary, APL Logistics. Therefore, this increasing demand for logistics service will be
a competitive driver of the container shipping industry over the next several years to
come.
2.5.1.3 Trade Imbalance and Empty Container Movements
As many Asian countries, such as China, Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore,
Malaysia, etc., became sourcing partners of the developed regions (i.e., Europe and North
America), severe trade imbalance occurred: The container volume transported from Asia
to Europe and North America substantially outnumbered the container volume from
Europe and North America to Asia. Particularly, the trade imbalance was exacerbated as
the US economy was booming in the late 1990s. Figure 2-5 shows the development of
container imbalances on main trade routes and the imbalances have increased over time.
The trade imbalance provoked the serious problem of empty containers in the container
shipping industry. For example, because the number of containers eastbound in the
transpacific trade route (i.e., from Asia to the US) is always larger than the number of
containers westbound, carriers should reposition the large number of empty containers
from the US to Asia. Figure 2-6 shows the development of global empty container
throughputs. The empty containers have contributed on average 20% of total global
container throughput.
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Since the empty container movements are not revenue-generating, the profitability of
carriers may deteriorate as the number of empty containers increases. In fact,
repositioning the empty containers turned out to be costly to carriers. Drewry Shipping
Consultantsi estimated that in 1997 there were around 15 million TEUs of empty
container movements and the total cost for repositioning the empty containers amounted
to $10.5 billion. More specifically, P&O Nedlloyd reported $10 million in equipment
repositioning costs in the first quarter of 1998, while Hapag Lloyd estimated its additional
repositioning costs at around $5.5 million for the same quarter of 1998.
Therefore, the problem of empty containers provides another challenge to carriers: They
have to manage their capital assets - i.e., containers - more efficiently to be successful. In
order to reduce the cost of managing empty containers, carriers have tried to either
collaborate with other carriers through alliances, lease more containers as opposed to
buying them, or adopt new internet-based collaboration services 2 for exchanging empty
containers. In any event, the trade imbalance and empty container movements will require
carriers to be more efficient in asset management.
2.5.2 Supply-side Drivers
Three competitive drivers affect the supply side of the container shipping industry:
chronic overcapacity, upsizing of the containerships, and continuing consolidation of
carriers. A major output of these supply-side drivers is to make the container shipping
service more commoditized over time.
1 Drewry Shipping Consultants, (1999). "Container Market Outlook: High Risk & High Stakes: Where is
the Payback?" p. 38.
2 The providers of this service include Interbox.com and Synchronet.com
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2.5.2.1 Chronic Overcapacity
The container shipping industry has suffered from chronic overcapacity problems. As
illustrated in Figure 2-7, the containership fleet capacity (CFC) has increased relentlessly
for the past 20 years. The CFC at the end of 2000 amounted to 4.8 million TEUs, which
is around nine times more containership capacity than that of 1981. The year-over-year
growth rate for the past two decades ranges from 5.0% to 18.6% and the average growth
rate is around 10.4% per annum.
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Figure 2-7 Containership Fleet Capacity over Time
In order to figure out the overcapacity situation in the container shipping industry,
historical growth rates of demand and capacity of container shipping service are analyzed.
Figure 2-8 shows that the linear trend of capacity growth rate for the past 20 years has
always outnumbered the linear trend of demand growth rate. In other words, demand and
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supply of container shipping service have not been optimally balanced at all. There has
always been some extra capacity that was not efficiently utilized. Hence, this figure
confirms that the container shipping industry might have suffered from chronic
overcapacity problem.
0.0% 1
Source: Clarksons Research Studies Year
Figure 2-8 Comparison of Growth Rates of Demand and Capacity of Container
Shipping
This chronic overcapacity has directly impacted on the freight rate of container shipping
service: the freight rate has constantly decreased over time. For example, the freight rates
in transpacific and transatlantic trades have been so tremendously eroded for the past two
decades that freight rate in 1998 is on average 63% lower than that in 1978 in real dollar
terms (Table 2-2). In addition, looking at the recent worldwide freight rates in the 1990s,
Figure 2-9 also confirms the severe erosion of the freight rates.
40
21.0%
18.0%
15.0%
12.0%
9.0%
6.0%
3.0%
Z
Chapter 2 General Dynamics in the Container Shipping Industry
Because of this lowered freight rates, carriers are confronted with low profitability despite
the increasing demand for container shipping service. In other words, the container
shipping service becomes a fairly commoditized business.
Table 2-2 Freight Rates in US East-West Trades - A 20 Year Perspective
(Change in average freight rates, 1978-1998)
Nominal Terms Real Terms
Eastbound -32.1% -72.1%
Transpacific
Westbound -20.8% -67.5%
Westbound -4.6% -60.9%
Transatlantic
Eastbound +18.2% -51.5%
(Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants)
Yearly Worldwide Average Freight Rate of Container Shipping
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Figure 2-9 Worldwide Average Freight Rates in Nominal Terms (1994 - 2000)
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2.5.2.2 Upsizing of the Containerships
The second supply-side driver of container shipping industry is the upsizing trend of the
containerships. The containership fleet is becoming oriented towards even larger vessels.
Not only are the largest ships in the fleet bigger year by year, but also there is a noticeable
upsizing occurring throughout the fleet. Particularly, the upsizing trend has accelerated
since the mid 1990s as post-Panamax containerships started to be delivered in a large
numbers. The average size of containership delivered in 2000 was 2,894 TEUs, and the
average size of containership on the orderbook for delivery in 2003 is 3,772 TEUs.3
Additionally, Table 2-3 shows that the share of orderbook of 6,000+ TEU containerships
has increased from almost nothing in 1995 (3.2% of total orderbook) to a quarter of total
orderbook in 2000 (25.4% of total orderbook).
Table 2-3 Development of Orderbook of 6000+ TEU Containerships
6000+ TEU Containerships
At end- Orderbook Percentage
# of ships 1,000 TEUs Total Order Book (1,000 TEUs)
1995 4 24.0 754.8 3.2%
1996 17 110.6 991.8 11.2%
1997 14 109.8 898.9 12.2%
1998 12 91.9 691.8 13.3%
1999 24 172.1 902.3 19.1%
June 2000 50 322.6 1,271.7 25.4%
(Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants (2000), "North European Containerization")
The main reasons for introducing the large containerships are not only to accommodate
the increasing demand for container shipping service, but also to utilize the economy of
scale so as to reduce the unit total cost of operation. In other words, given the low profit
margin due to the chronic overcapacity situation, carriers should reduce the unit cost of
operation by spreading the capital and operating cost over a large number of container
capacity. According to the research (Lim, 1998) on the cost savings of economy of scale
3 Clarksons Research Studies, (2001), "Shipping Market Outlook - Spring, 2001" p. 41.
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in the container shipping industry, a 6,000+ TEU containership could provide 21% cost
savings of operation compared to the case of a Panamax containership.4 A recent study on
the benefit of economy of scale from a very large containership - a 18,000 TEU
containerships - also confirmed the potential cost savings of economy of scale (Wijnolst,
et al., 2000). Given this cost savings of large containerships and low profitability
environment, the upsizing trend of the containership will be a crucial competitive driver of
the container shipping industry and the trend will force carriers to be more efficient cost
managers.
2.5.2.3 Continuing Consolidation of Carriers
Besides the chronic overcapacity and upsizing of the containerships, the container
shipping industry has also undergone consolidation among the carriers. The consolidation
of carriers in the container shipping industry has evolved through three different stages:
cooperation, alliances, and M&A (Merger and Acquisition).
Cooperation between carriers has long been a feature of the container shipping industry.
Carriers have cooperated one another to achieve wider port coverage, higher service
frequency, and lower costs through the use of larger containerships. For example, in its
simplest form, if two carriers have one sailing a week, they can offer their shippers two
sailings a week by simply buying slots off each other and thus avoid the need to purchase
new vessels to introduce a second weekly sailing. Although cooperation can entail costs
on an administrative level, the costs can be outweighed by the benefits which economy of
scale provides. The cooperation varies in its levels of commitment. Ranked from lowest
to highest commitment, there have been four types of cooperation: slot purchase, slot
exchange, vessel-sharing agreement, and joint service. These four forms of cooperation
tend to be trade specific.
4 A containership that can pass through the Panama Canal. The Panamax containership is no wider than
32m and has generally the container carrying capacity of lower than 4,000 TEUs.
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The second stage of consolidation of carriers is the alliances. The alliances were
established to initiate cooperation among the members on a global basis and to extend
cooperation to land-side functions as well. The first alliance, the Global Alliance, was
formed in 1994 by APL, OOCL, MOL, and Nedlloyd, and other alliances were
subsequently followed. After a couple of restructurings of the alliances, four alliances
remained stable since 1997 (Table 2-4). The advantages of an alliance over cooperation
are wider service coverage, more cost savings, and possible future service developments
(ING Barings, 2000).
Table 2-4 Membership of Alliances
New World Alliance
APL/NOL
MOL
Hyundai
P&O Nedlloyd
Grand Alliance H a yHapag Lloyd
OOCL
Hanjin
United Alliance DSR-Senator
UASC
K-Line
K-Line/Yangming/Cosco Yangming
Cosco
(Source: ING Barings, 2000)
The formation of the alliances was a prelude to a series of mergers and acquisitions during
the 1996 - 1999 period. The most significant examples of M&A involved on the main
east-west trades and are detailed in Table 2-5. Other M&A's have been relatively small-
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scale and have focused on the north-south trades, where niche carriers did not have the
strength to remain independent.
Table 2-5 Large Mergers and Acquisitions in the Container Shipping Industry
(1996 - 1999)
Companies Involved Year Company Acquired Purchaser Year
P&O Containerlines - Royal 1996 CMG CMA 1996
Nediloyd -> P&O Nediloyd
DSR-Senator Lines Hanjin 1997
APL NOL 1997
Sea-Land Maersk 1999
(Source: ING Barings, 2000)
The M&A activities are basically cost-driven, and do underline the fact that even the close
cooperation and alliances between carriers cannot completely squeeze out costs. The
M&A can provide opportunity for cost savings in administration as well as the operational
sphere. In fact, P&O Nedlloyd reported in the second quarter of 2000 that the cost saving
program was on course to reach $100 million by the end of 2000 and $180 million by
2001 (ING Barings, 2000).
The result of this continuing consolidation of carriers is the increasing concentration of
carriers in the CSI. In 1990, the top 20 carriers controlled approximately 40% of the
global container slots. In 1995, their share grew to 50%; three years later it jumped to
77%. By 2000, the top 20 operators controlled 81% of the worldwide container slots
(Figure 2-10). Moreover, the biggest carrier, Maersk-Sealand, is twice the size of its
nearest competitor and controls 12.5% of all container slots worldwide and moves around
10% of world container traffic.
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Figure 2-10 Concentration of Carriers in the Container Shipping Industry
Overall, supply-side drivers - chronic overcapacity, upsizing of the containerships, and
continuing consolidation of carriers - imply that the container shipping industry is
becoming so commoditized that efficient cost management is a primary success factor for
carriers.
2.5.3 Environmental Drivers
In addition to the demand and supply sides, environmental drivers also substantially
impact the dynamics of the container shipping industry. Among the environmental
drivers are deregulation and technological evolution.
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2.5.3.1 Deregulation
The container shipping industry has been regulated under the conference system as well as
through other governmental means. In determining the freight rate, carriers have
traditionally enjoyed the benefits of conference - a cartel that allows the carriers to set the
freight rate collectively. Through the conferences, which have been regulated under US
law since 1916, carriers could set common tariffs among members and have more
bargaining power over shippers in the freight rate settings.
Although the conferences have always operated under legal restraints which aimed at
preventing any abuse of monopoly power, there has been a general international
acceptance that the benefits of a stable container shipping environment outweighed the
drawbacks of allowing the operations of cartels. As a matter of fact, after a series of legal
judgments against conferences, they were gradually replaced by "stabilization
agreements" in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These agreements were looser
confederations of carriers, which usually included leading non-conference carriers. The
primary function of the stabilization agreement was the regulation of capacity rather than
direct control of freight rate making. Over time, the stabilization agreements tended to
absorb the conferences and have taken over the conferences' functions and responsibilities
in some cases.
Despite the weakening role of conferences, regulators and shippers were not satisfied with
the collective rate-setting practices of carriers, and tried to introduce more market-driven
environment. After years of intensive negotiations among carriers, shippers, and
regulators, the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 was enacted and has been
effective since May 1, 1999. Key provisions of the OSRA include:
* OSRA allows shippers and carriers to enter into individual confidential service
contracts
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" Carriers can maintain antitrust immunity with the limited scope of permissible
concerted activities
* Tariffs are no longer filed with the FMC (Federal Maritime Commission), but
must be made publicly available.
A recent study on the impact of OSRA concluded that the deregulatory movements under
OSRA have provided more market-driven environments for the container shipping
industry (FMC, 2001). First of all, the number of service contracts has increased
dramatically. The number of service contracts and amendments has increased by 200
percent since May 1999 and the volume of cargo moving under service contracts has also
increased. In certain of the major trade routes, some shippers now are moving nearly 100
percent of their cargo under service contracts. Carriers generally report that 80 percent or
more of their containers move under service contracts.
The second noticeable impact of OSRA is the de-emphasis of traditional conferences and
a dramatic increase in efficiency-enhancing operational types of agreements such as vessel
sharing and space charters. While there were 35 conference agreements on file with the
FMC inl998, there were only 19 as of June 1, 2001. Operational agreements made up 58
percent of all effective agreements as of June 1, 2001. In addition, most shippers (98%)
currently prefer negotiating one-on-one with individual carriers for confidential service
contracts, instead of negotiating with rate-setting conferences or group of carriers (FMC,
2001).
In summary, the deregulatory impacts of OSRA will be an important driver of the
container shipping industry. Particularly, OSRA will emphasize more of a market-driven
rate-setting environment. In other words, OSRA may help carriers move away from the
lowest price mentality because shippers would like to work with carriers who are able to
provide more shipper-friendly services - e.g., logistics-related services. Carriers could
have a real opportunity of differentiation. So successful carriers in the OSRA era should
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establish close contractual relationships with major clients across global trades and be an
integral part of shippers' supply chain processes.
2.5.3.2 Technological Evolution
The container shipping industry has been affected by several technological evolutions
historically. After the introduction of containerization in the 1950s and 1960s, the
container shipping industry saw the development of intermodal transportation in the
1970s, the double-stack train system in the 1980s, and the introduction of EDI (Electronic
Data Interchange) connections in the mid 1990s. Each technological evolution has left
unique impacts on the container shipping industry,5 and it is still an important competitive
driver of the CSI.
A major focus of the historical technological evolutions was to reduce the costs of
operation so that carriers could survive despite the ongoing commoditization processes in
the container shipping industry.
New internet-based business (e-business) models, which have entered into the container
shipping industry since 1999, now represent another technological evolution in this
industry. Two e-business models - CTP (Collaborative Tool Provider) and e-PSP (e-
Procurement Service Provider) - in the CSI will be more likely to succeed than other
models, and have an impact on the CSI in the long run.6 Unlike historical technological
evolutions, new e-business evolutions in the CSI might help carriers not only lower costs
of operations, but also improve logistics-related service offerings.
5 Detailed impacts of technological evolutions in the container shipping industry will be discussed in the
chapter 3.
6 Detailed analysis on e-business models in the container shipping industry is discussed in the chapter 5.
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2.6 Strategic Challenges of the Container Shipping Industry -
Carriers' Perspective
Discussions on the competitive drivers of the container shipping industry provide a next
question to carriers - how should carriers strategically respond to the competitive drivers?
Carriers might have to accomplish two tasks to be successful: One is the "logistics service
offerings (LSO)," and the other is the "efficient cost management (ECM)."
2.6.1 Logistics Service Offerings
The first task of carriers is to provide logistics service offerings (LSO) to shippers. The
LSO is to provide not only container shipping service, but also logistics management
services - e.g. door-to-door delivery, shipment tracking, just-in-time (JIT) inventory
management, collaborative planning, and management of international trade documents
etc. - to shippers.
The LSO is an urgent task of carriers in order to improve the current low profitability of
transporting containers between ports. Because the traditional port-to-port container
shipping service, or a "ocean-leg" container shipping service, has been substantially
commoditized due to the chronic overcapacity problem, carriers cannot expect high profit
margins from this business. Furthermore, shippers would not like to pay high premiums
for the "ocean-leg" container shipping service since it costs only 30% of total door-to-door
landed costs to shippers (Lim, 1998). Shippers consider the ocean-leg container shipping
service less valuable than the overall logistics management service.
However, shippers' increasing demand for logistics service ensures that shippers are
willing to pay high premiums for the logistics-related services and carriers can expect
better profitability from them. For example, an industry survey (Reeve, 2001) showed
that improving the global supply chain is one of CEO's top concerns. According to
another survey (KPMG, 2000), shippers stressed that, in order to continue meeting their
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needs, carriers should provide logistics services such as, better shipment tracking,
exception reporting, efficient invoicing/payment, online ordering, etc.
Besides the increasing demand for logistics service, the increasing importance of
confidential service contracts between carriers and shippers under the Ocean Shipping
Reform Act (OSRA) of 1998 could help carriers upgrade their logistics service
capabilities. In other words, in order to receive an order from a shipper, carriers should
prepare more customized, more differentiated service contracts, which must be tailored to
the shipper's need - logistics service. As a result, under the OSRA system, the LSO will
be an important strategic challenge for carriers.
Carriers have realized the importance of logistics services and started to offer them.
Ongoing development of intermodal service (e.g. intermodal container shipping service,
double-stack train system) and carriers' interest in acquiring logistics companies - e.g.,
recent purchases of logistics companies by Maersk Sealand and APL - clearly indicate
this trend.
There might be two strategies for improving the logistics service offerings of carriers:
vertical integration or virtual integration. Vertical integration means that carriers increase
their logistics service offerings by internalizing the logistics service functions into one
company organization. In other words, in the vertical integration strategy, carriers could
hire an experienced logistics salesforce or acquire logistics companies to provide better
logistics services to shippers. Meanwhile, a virtual integration approach is to invest in
internet-based business technologies and develop a virtual collaboration platform to
organize various logistics management functions between shippers and carriers.
2.6.2 Efficient Cost Management
The second strategic challenge of carriers, efficient cost management (ECM), helps
carriers survive through severely commoditized environments in the CSI. Several
competitive drivers explain that the CSI is so commoditized that efficient cost
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management is crucial for the carriers' survival. For example, the problems of empty
containers and chronic overcapacity require carriers to be more cost-efficient; upsizing
trend of the containerships proves the importance of economy of scale in the container
shipping industry; and carriers have been gradually consolidated to reduce the costs of
operation. Consequently, efficient cost management is another critical strategic challenge
of carriers. Carriers have two choices for efficient cost management: reducing asset
management costs and controlling transaction costs.
2.6.2.1 Control of Asset Management Costs
The asset management costs are related to managing the carriers' most expensive assets -
containerships - including capital cost, fuel cost, ship supply cost, crew cost, and
insurance cost. These asset management costs are fixed costs (except fuel cost), which
carriers pay regardless of the number of containers transported. Therefore, the more
carriers can reduce the asset management costs, the better profitability carriers can expect
as long as the number of containers transported reaches minimum critical mass (Figure
2-11).
Cost Curve for
Total Cost small vessel
Savings from control of
asset management costs
Cost Curve for
large vessel
Number of Containers
Transported
Figure 2-11 Benefits from Control of Asset Management Costs
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Carriers have tried to reduce these asset management costs over time by using the
economy of scale (e.g. ordering larger containerships), manning cheaper crews, or
outsourcing ship management service. Recent carriers' efforts to implement e-
procurement websites to reduce ship supply costs is also an example of reducing the asset
management costs.
2.6.2.2 Control of Transaction Costs
Meanwhile, controlling the transaction costs is another crucial target of efficient cost
management. The transaction costs are related to delivering the container shipping
service, including market research cost, sales/marketing cost (e.g. customer acquisition
cost), documentation cost, and customer support cost.
These transaction costs have generally increased over time: The recent deregulatory
movement in the container shipping industry has provoked severe competition among the
carriers to attract customers, thereby increasing the transaction costs of carriers. In
addition, increasing information overload due to the increasing container traffic volume
and increasing demand for logistics service by shippers has also increased the transaction
costs in the CSI. Therefore, controlling the transaction costs efficiently is an important
strategic challenge for carriers.
On the other hand, technological evolutions in the CSI have tried to reduce the transaction
costs. For example, EDI connections reduced communication costs so that carriers could
save overall transaction costs. Additionally, recent internet-based business activities
could also provide potential savings of the transactions costs by utilizing low cost
internet-based communication technology.
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2.6.3 Trade-offs of Strategic Challenges of Carriers
The strategic challenges of carriers - logistics service offerings, control of asset
management costs, and control of transaction costs - have internal trade-offs: carriers may
not be able to improve one strategic challenge without sacrificing another.
First of all, improving the logistics service offerings could increase transaction costs.
Because improving the logistics service offerings requires more sophisticated information
management, carriers might have to hire more experienced salespersons and spend more
money on market research; thereby increasing the transaction costs. Carriers should find a
way of compromising this trade-off between the logistics service offerings and controlling
the transaction costs.
The second trade-off occurs between the control of asset management costs and the
logistics service offerings. Focusing too much on controlling the asset management costs
could aggravate the level of commoditization of container shipping service so that carriers
might not generate enough profitability to reinvest in improving the logistics service
offerings. Therefore, controlling the asset management costs should be balanced with
improving the logistics service offerings.
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Chapter 3 Technological Evolution in the Container
Shipping Industry
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the historical evolutions of the container shipping industry. First,
the framework of technological evolutions for assessing the technological evolutions in
the industry is summarized. Second, in order to apply the framework of technological
evolutions to the CSI, historical developments of several industry variables in the CSI are
reviewed. Third, the historical impacts of technological evolutions in the CSI are
analyzed to provide insights into industry-wide impacts of technological evolutions.
Finally, the discussion concludes that, compared with the framework of technological
evolution, the current CSI is in the "mature" phase of technological evolutions, and hence
it has several competitive characteristics.
3.2 Summary of the Framework of Technological Evolution
The framework of technological evolution has been developed by technology strategy
theorists, population ecologists, and economists, such as Abernathy, Anderson, Klepper,
Tushman, Utterback, and so forth, since the mid 1970s by investigating numerous
technological innovation patterns in manufacturing industries. It has generally been
accepted that such a framework is very useful to understanding the structural dynamics of
industry within the context of technological evolution. Figure 3-1 shows that the
framework is rooted on two important concepts - dominant design and technological
discontinuity - and three phases (ferment, transitional, and mature phase).
The "technological discontinuity" - sometimes this is also called "technological
disruption" - is a point in time when current technologies of an industry are replaced by a
new revolutionary technology so that new industry dynamics are formed and competitive
landscapes of industry are totally changed. After the technology discontinuity, there
55
Chapter 3 Technological Evolution in the CSI
comes a period of time when various 'product innovations' are attempted and
accomplished. Many newly founded companies are entering the market with different
product designs and they are competing with one another and with industry incumbents
based on the new product capabilities. The number of companies increases in a short
period of time. This period is called the "ferment" phase of technology evolution. As the
companies become more and more knowledgeable about the basic requirements of
customers for the new product, the differences among the new products shrink. Finally, a
"dominant design" emerges, where a set of basic technical functionalities of the product is
intrinsically agreed upon among the industry players.
After the dominant design emerges, there usually comes a severe industry "transitional"
phase, when the number of companies in the industry suddenly decreases substantially.
The length of the transitional phase is generally shorter than that of the ferment phase.
During the transitional phase, the number of companies sometimes decreases to less than
50 percent of the number of companies in the ferment phase.
The transitional phase is followed by the "mature" phase, when the number of companies
stabilizes, accelerating the consolidation of companies. The innovation is more focused
on the "process" of manufacturing rather than the product itself. A standard is often
agreed upon among the players. The companies in this mature phase basically compete
based on price rather than the quality of product. Economy of scale is sometimes very
crucial for the competition. The product is substantially commoditized over time. In
addition, complementary assets, such as brand, reputation, distribution channel, and so
forth, which support the value of product, are more important for the competition than the
technology itself embedded in the product. These complementary assets owned by the
survived companies through the ferment and transitional phases provide high barriers to
entry to the potential new entrants.
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3.3 Historical Developments of Industry Variables in the Container
Shipping Industry
The container shipping industry has been evolving continuously since its inception in
1956, when the first "containerized" cargo was transported between Newark, New Jersey
and Houston, Texas. The framework of technological evolution discussed in the previous
section emphasizes several important industry variables that can characterize the current
technological evolution stage of the industry. Those variables include the number of
companies in the industry, industry revenue, rate of innovation, price of product, etc.
Modifying these variables to be applicable to the CSI, historical developments of several
industry variables are examined in this section. Although much of the data has already
been provided in chapter 2, they are described again in this section for the purpose of
clearer explanation.
3.3.1 Number of Container Transported
Another measure of evaluating the technological evolution of the CSI is the number of
containers transported, which is the demand side of industry dynamics. Figure 3-2 reveals
that the number of containers transported has substantially increased over time. Despite
the constant growth, the growth rate of the number of containers transported has decreased
in recent years, confirming that the industry is approaching the mature stage.
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Figure 3-2 Number of Containers Transported over Time
3.3.2 Containerization Rate
As a proxy to the number of containers transported, containerization rate (CR), which is
defined as the ratio of the containerized cargo to total general cargo that could potentially
be containerized, is another measure of industrial evolution. Figure 3-3 shows that the CR
has increased rapidly and now reaches around 50% of total general cargo in terms of
weight. It should also be noticed that the growth rate of containerization rate has leveled
off in recent years.
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Figure 3-3 Historical Containerization Rate
3.3.3 Containership Fleet Capacity
Another indication of industry growth in the CSI is the containership fleet capacity (CFC),
which is the supply side of industry dynamics. As shown in Figure 3-4, the CFC has
dramatically increased over time. Unlike other industry variables, the CFC has increased
relentlessly, i.e., showing a still high growth rate in the 1990s. This phenomenon
illustrates that the CSI might have suffered from overcapacity sparked by the excessive
capital investments, which resulted in constant decreases in freight rate as revealed in
freight rate data.
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Figure 3-4 Containership Fleet Capacity over Time
3.3.4 Freight Rate
The historical data of the freight rate (Figure 3-5), which is a meeting point between
supply and demand, clearly show that the freight rate has decreased substantially over
time, both in nominal terms and real terms. The decrease trend in freight rate is much
stronger in real dollar terms, adjusting for the inflationary effect.
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Figure 3-5 Worldwide Average Freight Rate in Nominal Terms
3.3.5 Number of Alliances
As discussed in the section of 2.5.2.3, the number of alliances and M&A deals have been
increasing in the container shipping industry. Therefore, the consolidation of carriers has
progressed over time so that the market share of large alliances and carriers has increased
(see Table 2-4, Table 2-5, and Figure 2-10).
3.4 Historical Impacts of Technological Evolutions on the Container
Shipping Industry
The container shipping industry has undergone ever-changing technological evolutions
since its inception in the 1950s. Each technological evolution established new playing
fields among industry players, and sometimes it created new rules of the game in the CSI.
Unlike a fast-changing technology industry like the personal computer industry, the CSI
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has experienced relatively slow technological evolution over the 40-year period. Despite
its relative slowness, however, the impacts of the technological evolution have been
substantial not only on the CSI itself, but also on other logistics-related industries in
general. This section reviews the historical impacts of the technological evolutions on the
CSI based on the characteristics of the technology. Because of the limitation of
information, the analysis focuses on the container shipping industry in the US. This
analysis will serve as a starting point to analyze a new technological evolution, called
internet-based business activities, which the CSI has recently been experiencing.
Historically, there have been four major technological evolutions in the CSI;
containerization itself, early intermodalism, the double-stack train system, and EDI
(Electronic Data Interchange) connections. Each evolution had a unique environment,
which expedited the birth of the technological evolution, and also provided unique
impacts on the CSI. Table 3-1 presents the summary of historical impacts of
technological evolutions on the CSI, and detailed discussions follow.
Table 3-1 Summary of the Impacts of Technological Evolutions on the Container
Shipping Industry
Technological Evolution Time Impacts on the Industry
Containerization 1956 -1972 0 Huge capital investment to build new
containerships
" The port authority's construction of
new dedicated container terminals
" Increase competition among ports
" Increased tension around port labor
* Emergence of ocean freight brokers
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Technological Evolution Time Impacts on the Industry
Intermodalism 1972 1984 e More severe competition among ports
from being a load center
0 Competition for premium service
0 Race for larger containerships
0 The increased importance of
containership itinerary
* Increased role of freight brokers
* Higher quality service for shippers
Double Stack Train System 1984 1994 9 Huge cost savings
* Higher terminal operating costs
* Increased information overload
EDI Connections 1994 1998 o Premium service to shippers
* Need for collaboration
* Increasing role of port authority for the
EDI implementation
3.4.1 Containerization from 1956 to 1972
Containerization refers to a system which adopts the "container" holding cargo inside,
transports the containers on ships, and further dispatches the container hauled on a tractor
to the final destination. Containerization was first pioneered by Malcom McLean, who
originally came from the trucking industry. He envisioned that ships could be very
efficient tractors hauling many containers at a time. He converted a tanker from World
War II into the first containership, Ideal X, and operated the first ocean container
transportation system between Newark, New Jersey and Houston, Texas, in 1956. Table
3-2 shows major events of the technological evolutions in the early containerization
period from 1956 to 1972.
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Table 3-2 Introduction of Container Shipping Service from 1956 to 1972 7
Year Events
1956 Ideal X sails from Newark to Houston - Beginning of
Container Revolution
1958 California / Hawaii - by Matson Navigation Co.
New York / Puerto Rico
1960 U.S. / Caribbean
1966 U.S. / Europe - First Transatlantic Container Shipping
Service
1968 U.S. / Far East
1969 Europe / Australia
Japan / Australia
1971 U.S. / Australia
Europe / Far East
Two major factors were involved in the pioneering of containerization in the 1950s. First,
government regulation, more specifically, the Jones Act, which precluded market-based
competition in the US domestic ocean transportation routes, provided a safer environment
to ocean shipping companies that freely experimented with new technologies without
worrying about the risks of foreign competition. In other words, because foreign
competitors were not allowed to transport ocean cargoes on the US domestic routes by
regulation, McLean's Sea-Land, a US ocean shipping company, could deploy a
containership on the route between Newark and Houston without the threat of foreign-flag
competition. The second factor was the excess fleet capacity available in the 1950s,
which was built during World War II. The US government in the 1950s sold its excess
fleets to the US ocean shipping companies at prices substantially discounted from the
7 Adapted from Franciose, M. M., (1994), Exhibit 4.
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market price. This favorable financing option relieved the US ocean carriers of financial
burden to construct new container ships in the early days.
Expedited by these factors, the newly developed container shipping system proved to be
much more efficient than the traditional general cargo handling system, which required
manual cargo lifting on and off ships. The container shipping system has provided (1)
short ship turnaround time, (2) safer and more reliable cargo transportation, thereby
lowering cargo theft enroute, and (3) significantly lowered transportation cost. Besides
these direct benefits from the container shipping system, it changed the fundamentals of
the ocean shipping industry. Those five changes are as follows:
0 Huge capital investment to build new containerships
Before the containerization era, ocean shipping companies had never experienced pressure
to upgrade their fleets in such a short period of time. However, the rapid development of
the container shipping system pressured the ocean shipping companies to renew their
fleets with expensive containerships. In order to minimize the risk of huge capital
investment, the ocean shipping companies typically utilized government subsidies as
much as possible. This heavy financial burden of expanding new containership capacity
drove the container shipping industry to be capital-intensive by nature as opposed to being
labor-intensive in the traditional break-bulk shipping era.
e The port authority's construction of new dedicated container terminals
As containerized trade volume increased, it required new cargo handling terminals that
were equipped with container handling machines. Port authorities had either to invest in
or to attract investments in new container terminals with container cranes, huge space for
container depots, and efficient intermodal connections. In summary, port authorities had
to transform themselves from labor-intensive to capital-intensive systems.
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* Increased competition among ports
Because one of the direct benefits from containerization was short ship turnaround time to
increase the productivity of an expensive containership, ocean container carriers should
selectively dispatch their ships to fewer ports than before in order to maximize the
productivity gain. Therefore, competition among ports to attract major container shipping
carriers became more severe.
* Increased tensions around port labor
Increasing numbers of container cranes forced port workers to adapt to a new container
handling system. Because the new container cargo handling system required only 20% of
the traditional port workers8 , port unions regarded containerization as the enemy of their
jobs. Therefore, this increased tension between port unions and container shipping
companies caused several strikes and walkouts around the US ports in the 1960s. In 1968,
the port union, ILA (International Longshoremen Association), representing the port
workers on the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, and container carriers agreed to the "50-Mile
Rule," under which only union workers could load or unload containers within the range
of 50 miles from the center of a port. Although it seemed to be a binding rule, the
container carriers succeeded in bypassing the rule. In addition, the rule had very limited
enforcement penalties for disobedience. After a series of legal battles in the 1970s, the
rule was finally negotiated out of the master contract between the ILA and carriers from
1989 on.
* Emergence of ocean freight brokers
As rail and trucking industries saw the emergence of freight brokers, such as freight
forwarders and consolidators, when they first introduced intermodal service like TOFC
(Trailer on Flat Cars), containerization drew a new breed of ocean freight brokers into the
container shipping industry. For example, the NVOCCs (Non-Vessel Operating Common
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Carriers), who do not own containerships but wholesale the container slots from container
carriers and resell them to shippers, started to provide marketing service for container
carriers and logistics service for shippers. Although the NVOCCs were recently
confronted with severe competition from container carriers, who have enhanced their
management and marketing capabilities through increased computer support, the
NVOCCs have played important roles in the early containerization era.
3.4.2 Intermodalism from 1972 to 1984
Starting in 1972, a landbridge intermodal service, which transports ocean containers from
the West Coast to the East Coast by train and vice versa, was established and posed
competition to the all-water shipping service through the Panama Canal. In 1972, Sea-
Land, which had pioneered containerization under the guidance of Malcom McLean, first
launched the mini-landbridge service between the West Coast and the East Coast. In
1979, American President Line (APL) began the first liner train service from Seattle to
Chicago and New York.9 The intermodal connection was provided via the COFC
(Container on Flat Car) system in general, in which international ocean containers were
transferred onto rail flat cars to be shipped to the final inland destinations on the other
coast.
After the mini-landbridge system was launched, the deregulation of the rail and ocean
transportation at the end of 1970s had driven the emergence of micro-bridge intermodal
systems to ship ocean containers to the final inland destinations. Since the micro-bridge
intermodal services did not compete with the all-water shipping service, they were
complementary to the traditional all-water container shipping. The intermodal container
traffic had increased quickly during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, although the
number of the mini-landbridge trains operated in 1981 was lower than five a week, there
were more than 240 dedicated weekly trains eastbound in 1995.10
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Three major factors had affected the emergence of intermodal activities. First, the surge
of Asian cargo bound for the US in the 1970s provided financial strength to container
carriers so that they could experiment with the mini-landbridge intermodal service.
Second, well-established rail networks, which had been already developed in the US,
made additional intermodal operations on current rail systems less costly. Third, as a
manufacturing system became more and more sophisticated in its inventory management,
shippers asked for more reliable and faster transportation service from container shipping
carriers, and hence they tried a new container shipping system via rail networks.
The intermodalism, exemplified by the mini-landbridge system, provided tremendous
impacts on the container shipping industry. The impacts are as follows:
* More severe competition among ports for being a load center among ports
As ocean container shipping system became tightly connected to the inland transportation
systems through intermodalism, competition among ports to be efficient intermodal
connection centers became more intense. Because the intermodal container shipping,
especially the mini-landbridge service was able to provide more reliable and faster service
than the all-water container shipping service, more shippers would like to be served with
the intermodal connections. For example, the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long
Beach, which had excellent rail connections, started to become leading gateways from
Asia to inland North America while the Port of New York and New Jersey lost many
container shipping businesses because the majority of container cargo bound from Asia to
the East Coast was transferred through the Port of Los Angeles and the Port of Long
Beach. In addition, the fact that the volume of the Transpacific cargo was growing at a
faster rate than the volume of the Transatlantic cargo exacerbated this phenomenon
(Speirs, 1998).
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* Competition for premium service
High oil prices in the early 1970s caused by the oil shock made ocean carriers abandon
fast containerships with more than 30 knots and build larger containerships with slower
speeds in the low-20 knots range. Despite the slow speed of containerships, shippers still
requested faster and more reliable container shipping service. This shippers' request
drove container carriers to develop intermodal service like the mini-landbridge service.
Initially, the mini-landbridge service was the premium service of faster and reliable
shipping. The intermodal container transportation between Asia and the Northeastern US
was 6 days to 14 days faster than the all-water shipping system." Only a few leading
ocean carriers could offer this service, replacing the all-water shipping service. However,
this premium mini-landbridge service was also commoditized over time so that most
container carriers finally offered the mini-landbridge service.
9 Race for larger containerships
Partly affected by high fuel costs, containerships became larger during the period of
intermodal evolution. Besides the high fuel cost effect, the mini-landbridge system
further expedited the race for larger containerships. Keeping transportation costs low
through the mini-landbridge system required large volumes of container cargoes to
minimize the unit transportation cost by spreading the cost throughout the longer
intermodal routes. This strategy also applied to the double-stack train intermodal service
as reviewed in the next section.
* The increased importance of containership itinerary
The larger containership size, driven by the intermodal evolution, emphasized the
importance of itinerary choice for carriers as well as shippers because the careful itinerary
choice could provide shorter container trip time. In other words, a US port, which a
containership calls first, could offer shorter door-to-door container trip time to the final
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destination; the containers for shorter port-to-port trips should be unloaded first, unlike the
rest of containers that would have to wait to be unloaded at a later port call. For example,
if a containership from Asia calls on the Port of Seattle first and then on to the Port of LA,
shippers served through the Port of Seattle could receive the containers faster than the
shippers served through the Port of LA. For this reason, the containership itinerary
became more important in the intermodal evolution.
* Increased role of freight brokers
As intermodal connections required many different kinds of transportation, freight
brokers, which expedite efficient transportation service contracts between shippers and
carriers, became more active than before. For example, because ocean shipping
companies lacked experience in rail and trucking transportation, they tended to hire more
freight brokers who helped find efficient ways of facilitating intermodal transportation.
* Higher quality service for shippers
Along with the deregulatory movement of the ICC (Interstate Commerce Commission)
and the FMC (Federal Maritime Commission), a carrier was allowed to publish a single
bill of lading covering door-to-door container movement from 1984 on, when the
Shipping Act of 1984 was enacted. Before the intermodal transportation era, each carrier,
who was responsible for port-to-port shipping, issued separate bills of lading.
Accordingly, shippers had to deal with several different bills of lading to ship containers
on a door-to-door basis. With the maturity of intermodal connections, however, shippers
could enjoy the simplified and faster service with a single bill of lading issued by a carrier.
In addition, intermodalism had removed stocking and restocking cargo inside the
container throughout the entire shipment. In other words, the cargo remains in the same
container for the entire door-to-door movement. This saved substantial costs associated
with re-arranging the cargo inside the container.
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3.4.3 The Double-stack Train System from 1984 to 1994
As intermodal transportation systems in the US matured, the demand for intermodal
service increased dramatically. In addition to this growing demand, liberalizing
international trade regulations further increased container traffic in and out of the US. In
responding to this growing demand, the container shipping companies gradually increased
containership size. For example, while the maximum containership capacity was 496
TEUs in 1962, it grew to 3,000 TEUs in 1972 and 4,000 TEUs in 198012. This growing
container traffic increased pressure on the intermodal transportation system. Accordingly,
container carriers experimented with new technological innovations that could possibly
reduce the cost of container transportation.
In 1984, American President Line (APL) first started double-stack train (DST) service
between LA and Chicago. The DST service transported two rows of containers - one
above the other - on specially designed rail flat cars, thereby increasing the number of
containers transported per locomotive. The service turned out to be more efficient and
cost effective than the traditional TOFC (Trailer on Flat Car) or COFC (Container on Flat
Car) intermodal services, which had evolved in the 1970s. Although the DST service
required additional investment in new flat cars, which could accommodate double-stack
containers, and in improved tunnel clearance and bridge safety, its benefits could offset
the costs involved.
In 1984, when the DST service was first launched, only APL offered the DST service
once a week between Los Angeles and Chicago. By December 1985, eight operators were
providing the DST services from both coasts, with 32 eastbound DSTs a week. As of
June 1988, 76 DSTs operated each week between 20 city-pairs. By the end of 1993, there
was a total of 241 eastbound departures each week.1 3 Figure 3-6 shows how quickly the
DST service developed over time.
73
12 Franciose, M.M., (1994), p. 12 - 13.
'. Muller, G., (1995), p.65
Technological Evolution in the CSIChapter 3
Chapter 3 Technological Evolution in the CSI
Double-Stack
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Double-stack routes in 1993 compared to 1984.
Figure 3-6 Historical Evolution of Double-stack Train Intermodal Service
(Source: Muller (1995), p. 46)
Major impacts from the DST intermodal service are as follows:
* Huge cost savings
Cost savings from the DST system were enormous. The cost savings mainly came from
two sources: First, the DST system enabled a reduction in capital investment cost because
it could reduce the number of flat cars by stacking twice as many containers as the
traditional intermodal systems. Second, since the length of the train was reduced due to
the double-stack trains, the total weight of trains to be hauled by a locomotive became
lighter so that carriers could also reduce fuel cost. One industry study showed that
carriers could save up to 41% of fuel costs.14
74
14 Ibid., p. 67
- L , . - 7 Z;K_ - .. A_
Chapter 3 Technological Evolution in the CSI
Queb-c
WMIUM
Toro
St Paw
Se lanmpofis DcUO
C Bufto
San Antroo
Lato
mcalleff
Double-SUN *ik
_.tocoyRod" 1293 Wxlcoc
* Higher terminal operating costs
Because the DST need to be served efficiently, the use of DSTs increased the container
handling operations in the intermodal terminal. The intermodal terminal operation had to
be efficient enough to load and unload numerous containers in and out of double-stack
trains. In other words, more investments in container handling equipment and labor were
critical to successful double-stack train intermodal operations.
* Increased information overload
As containerships became larger and the number of intermodal containers increased, the
amount of information associated with container handling increased substantially.
One interesting point of the DST innovation was that the CSI started to transform itself
from "product" innovation to "process" innovation. In other words, in the context of the
technological evolution, the dominant design of the container shipping service, which is to
provide door-to-door intermodal service, was generally agreed upon. In addition, the CSI
started to consider "price" of service as a main differentiator; i.e., the CSI was
substantially "commoditized."
3.4.4 EDI Connections from 1994 to 1998
There have been several pioneering attempts to couple freight transportation with
information processing. Table 3-3 shows the important historical attempts to introduce
efficient information management into the CSI.
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Table 3-3 Historical Attempts to Apply Information Technology into Container
Shipping Industry 15
Year Events
1968 Foundation of Transportation Data Coordinating Committee
(TDCC)
1983 Publication of ANSI X12 for EDI standards
1988 Adoption of EDIFACT as the official international EDI
standards
An attempt to apply information technology to the CSI dated back to the late 1960s. In
1968, the CSI had founded the TDCC (Transportation Data Coordinating Committee),
which was to develop standards to distribute transportation related documents efficiently
among trading partners. The TDCC published several transaction standards in the 1970s.
At the same time, the EDI technology began to evolve and be tested in several industries.
The CSI had also tried to launch the EDI connections but it was not successful because of
the lack of standards. In response to this problem, the first official EDI standards, ANSI
X12, was published by the US ANSI (American National Standard Institute) in 1983, and
subsequently in 1988, the International Standards Organization (ISO) adopted
international standards for EDI, called EDIFACT (EDI for Administration, Commerce,
and Transport). Thanks to these standards, EDI became popular in many industries in the
early 1990s.
Noticing that the EDI was a useful tool for transportation-related information management
and that the need for efficient information management in the CSI was increasing, the CSI
started to adopt a new technological innovation, EDI connections, in the 1990s. The EDI
directly connected trading partners through private data communication networks and
allowed them to automatically interchange pre-formatted trade, transportation, or
15 Adapted from Muller, G., (1999), p. 198.
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transaction documents. Compared to traditional transaction communication technologies
such as phone, telex, or fax, the EDI technology provided more secure, more reliable, and
much safer trading environments to the users.
Major impacts from the evolution of EDI on the CSI are as follows:
* Premium service to shippers
The EDI service reduced transaction document errors, lowering the risk of sending cargo
to a wrong destination. It also saved a lot of administrative work associated with
transporting containers for shippers as well as for carriers. In addition, it provided more
secure and faster trading environments.
e Need for collaboration
One of major obstacles to implementing the EDI was to develop standards that all users of
EDI networks should follow. Without these standards, it was impossible to interchange
information automatically. Therefore, the technological evolution of EDI gave the
container shipping industry a new lesson that collaboration was important to the success
of the CSI.
* Increasing role of port authority for the EDI implementation
Port authorities were very active in adopting the EDI system to attract container carriers.
The port by nature is a meeting point where most players in the CSI, e.g., carriers,
shippers, freight brokers, customs, etc., convene. Therefore, ports were able to be a key
place to implement EDI networks. That is why many port authorities had tried to
implement efficient local EDI networks to support container traffic through their container
terminals.
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3.5 Summary of Technological Evolutions in the Container Shipping
Industry
The analysis of technological evolutions in the container shipping industry explains how
the CSI has evolved and adjusted itself to the new technological innovations. The CSI has
adopted four major technological innovations: containerization, intermodalism, the
double-stack train (DST) system, and EDI connections. Each technological innovation
has provided unique impacts on the CSI. Summing up the above analyses, several
noticeable observations on the technological impacts on the CSI can be drawn as follows:
" Each technological innovation provided premium benefits to carriers as well as
shippers, but the innovation itself became quickly commoditized. In other words,
the innovators in the CSI have failed to protect exclusive rights for innovations so
that late followers took advantage of the innovations without paying substantial
premiums to the innovators. For example, the containerships and the container
handling system, which were cutting-edge technological breakthroughs in the
1950s and 1960s, were quickly copied by the players in the traditional ocean
shipping industry. Similarly, despite a series of technological innovations, the CSI
became further commoditized over time.
" Each technological innovation in the CSI has attracted new breeds of industry
players so that the boundary of the CSI has expanded over time. For example,
containerization introduced new players in the form of container manufacturers,
container leasing companies, ocean freight brokers, and container carriers; the
intermodalism and DST system invited rail companies as new critical players of
the CSI; and the EDI connections introduced IT companies as technology service
providers.
* The regulating framework has been important in determining the speed of
technological evolutions in the CSI, and the importance will be further emphasized
for the adoption of internet-based business activities. For instance, the Shipping
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Act of 1984, which allowed a single bill of lading for intermodal container
movements, expedited the adoption of the intermodal container transportation
system in the US. Additionally, it was not until the UN adopted the EDIFACT
standards as the international format of EDI that the EDI connections became
popular in the CSI.
Combining the above observations and the framework of technological evolution, it is
concluded that the CSI has generally followed the patterns of technological evolution as
explained in section 3.2. Supporting evidence for this conclusion is as follows:
" The "technological discontinuity" occurred in the ocean shipping industry when the
first container shipping service started in 1956; i.e., "containerization" can be
equivalent to the "technological discontinuity" of the framework of technological
evolution.
* After the containerization was first launched, a series of "product innovations" were
attempted through intermodalism and DST innovations. In other words,
intermodalism and the DST system have focused on the "contents" of the container
shipping industry to achieve efficient door-to-door container shipping service.
* In the wake of the DST innovation, the "dominant design" of the container shipping
industry emerged, where a set of basic functionalities of the container shipping service
was generally agreed upon among the CSI players. The dominant design of container
shipping service include: the usage of standardized containers; shore-based container
cranes to load and unload containers; door-to-door container shipping service using
the intermodal connections via ports; the hub-and-spoke container transportation
system, and so forth.
* After the DST innovation, the EDI connections began to provide a "process
innovation," in which the framework of technological evolution expects to emerge
after the acceptance of the dominant design. In other words, the EDI connections
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focused on improving the information processing of container shipping without
changing the basic configurations of container shipping service. Moreover, current
internet-based business activities in the CSI try to improve the process, not the
product, of the container shipping service' 6 .
In conclusion, the analysis above argues that the CSI is now in the "mature" phase in the
context of technological evolution. For this reason, we can draw several competitive
characteristics of the CSI as follows.
" Barriers to entry into the CSI are relatively high because the CSI is capital-intensive,
requiring huge capital investments to participate For the same reason, barriers to exit
from the CSI are also relatively high.
* The management of complementary assets, such as brand, reputation, and distribution
channel, is critical.
" The container shipping service has become so substantially commoditized that
profitability of container shipping service is slim and efficient cost management is
crucial for competition; hence, the competitive tactics to utilize economy of scale, for
instance the usage of larger containerships, bigger containers, and more powerful
container cranes, are widely used.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter delineates the technological evolutions in the container shipping industry.
Applying the framework of technological evolution reveals that the container shipping
industry is in the mature phase of technological evolution, where the technological
innovations are more focused on the process rather than the product. Furthermore, being
16 The nature of internet-based business activities in the CSI will be further examined in the Chapter 5.
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in the mature phase, the container shipping industry is substantially commoditized,
thereby controlling the cost efficiently is important for the success.
In the next chapter, the evolution of EDI, which is the most recent technological evolution
and is similar to the internet technology, is closely analyzed to improve the understanding
of the impacts of new technology on the container shipping industry.
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Chapter 4 The Evolution of EDI in the Container
Shipping Industry
4.1 Introduction
Among the series of technological evolutions in the container shipping industry is the
adoption of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange). The EDI, a computer-to-computer data
exchange without human involvement, has provided various impacts on the container
shipping industry in the 1990s. It is worth reviewing the detailed evolution of EDI
adoption in the CSI because it has not only provided various impacts on day-to-day
business practices in the CSI, but also it turned out to be the first step of a new
technological evolution of the internet-based business in the CSI.
This chapter presents the detailed evolutionary dynamics of EDI adoption in the CSI,
particularly focused on the activities from the late 1980s to the 1990s. Although the EDI
adoption in the transportation industry in general dated backed to the late 1960s, it was not
until the mid 1990s that the EDI adoption became important in day-to-day business
practices in the container shipping industry.
This chapter is organized as follows: First, general information of the EDI technology,
including the definition of EDI, technical structure of the EDI system, standards of EDI,
and benefits of the EDI technology, is briefly reviewed. Next, evolutions of EDI adoption
in the CSI are analyzed. Based on the case studies on several EDI projects implemented
in the CSI, evolutionary dynamics, driving factors, and impacts of EDI adoption in the
CSI are discussed. Then, interactions and comparisons of EDI and the internet-based
business (e-business) are evaluated. Finally, based on the analysis of EDI adoption in the
CSI, insights into the potential e-business dynamics in the CSI are presented.
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4.2 Understanding of EDI
The first step into the research on EDI is to understand the EDI itself. In order to do that,
this section reviews the definition of EDI, technical structure of the EDI system, standards
of EDI, and benefits of the EDI technology.
4.2.1 Definition of EDI
EDI, or Electronic Data Interchange, has been defined in various terms depending on the
researchers of EDI.17 Despite the slight variations of the definition of EDI, EDI can be
defined as follows based on Pfeiffer's(1992) and Sokol's(1995) works on EDI:
EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) is the intercompany computer-to-
computer communication of standard business transactions in a standard
format via telecommunication links.
A brief explanation of five important components of EDI is presented in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Five Components of EDI Definition
Intercompany
Computer-to-Computer
Intercompany refers to the electronic transmission of
data between companies; i.e., the electronic
transmission of data within the companies is not
regarded as EDI.
EDI is to provide link between senders' and receivers'
computers for business transactions without human
intervention.
1 Pfeiffer(1992) p. 17 - 18 provides several definitions of EDI.
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Standard business
transactions
EDI does not refer to the transmission of e-mail or
other free-form messages. Rather, the data in EDI
should be standardized business transactions, such as
invoice, purchase order, bill of lading, etc., in a
computer-readable form.
In order for the incoming EDI data to be recognized by
Standardformat the receiving computers, the transmitted business
transactions must be in a predefmed format.
The EDI data should be exchanged between the inter-
Telecommunication links company computer systems throughtelecommunication mediums, such as proprietary direct
networks, value-added network (VAN), or the internet.
4.2.2 Technical Structure of the EDI System
Figure 4-1 illustrates the technical structure of the EDI system and explains how the EDI
system works in reality. Let's suppose that a buyer and a seller exchange a group of
purchase orders through EDI.
The buying company generates the purchase order transactions in its purchasing
application just as it did in the paper environment. However, instead of printing the
traditional paper document, it passes virtually the same information through two separate
programs - application link and EDI translator - in the EDI system, which generates the
computer-readable EDI standard file. This standard data stream is then transmitted to the
seller's computer via telecommunication links. In the seller's computer system, the data
stream is passed through the seller's EDI system, which maps the EDI standard fields into
the simple file needed by the receiving computer application, edits and verifies the
incoming information, and then passes it to the receiving order entry application for
processing. The order entry application processes it just as it would do any incoming
purchase order. These all processes are done automatically without human intervention.
85
EDI in the Container Shipping IndustryChapter 4
Chapter 4 EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
Internal Buefiles Byr
Purchasing
application
Application
file
SellerInternalSellerfiles
Order processing
application
Application
file
1 EDI standardfile
Figure 4-1 Technical Structure of EDI System
(Adapted from Sokol(1995) p.18 and p.20)
4.2.3 Evolution of the EDI Standards
EDI, by definition, exchanges standardized business transactions in a standard format; it is
therefore a pre-requisite to have a standard that allows trading partners to communicate
standardized business transactions between the computers without any human
intervention. Indeed, the historical development of EDI has been dependent upon the
evolution of the EDI standards. The evolution of the EDI standards has expanded from
the national industry-specific standards to the international cross-industry standards.
Table 4-2 presents the categories of the EDI standards that have been developed.
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Table 4-2 Categories of the EDI Standards18
National International
TDCC
UCS SWIFTIndustry-specific WINS ODETTE
VDA
ANSI X12Cross-industry TRADACOMS EDIFACT
4.2.3.1 National Industry-specific EDI Standards
EDI started as a means to automate and systemize the documentation associated with the
transportation industry. Besieged by mountains of paperwork associated with freight
movements, major carriers, shippers, and financial institutions founded the Transportation
Data Coordinating Committee (TDCC) in 1968 to standardize the way that transportation-
related business transactions were handled. The first standards were published by the
TDCC in 1975 for rail, motor, ocean, and air freight industry documents. Not until 1977
did the first EDI transmission take place when Conrail and Missouri Pacific Railroads
began to exchange data for waybills. 19 The TDCC standards started to be adopted
gradually by the transportation industry from the late 1970s; railroad companies were
particularly active in implementing EDI with the TDCC standards.
Impressed by the early success of the EDI system in the transportation industry, several
industries developed their own industry-specific EDI standards in the early 1980s based
on the TDCC standards. Examples include the Uniform Communication Standards (UCS)
in 1982 for the grocery industry and Warehouse Information Network Standards (WINS)
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for the warehouse industry. Both the grocery and warehouse industries started to
implement the EDI systems based on their own EDI standards.
Besides the U.S., the German automotive industry developed its own EDI standards, or
VDA, and implemented EDI system among the German automotive trading partners.
4.2.3.2 National Cross-industry EDI Standards
As the benefits of industry-specific EDI became apparent, the users of the EDI system
looked for cross-industry EDI standards. In an effort to develop the cross-industry EDI
standards, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) chartered and accredited the
EDI standard committee, X12, in 1979. The members of X12 committee encompassed a
multitude of buyer and seller companies from many different industries, VAN service
providers, and consultants in EDI, as well as the government. The first official cross-
industry EDI standards, ANSI X12, was released in 1983.
The ANSI X12 has experienced an extensive follow-up until 1988 so that it became de-
facto EDI standards in the US and Canada in the early 1990s. The TDCC for the
transportation industry, the UCS for the grocery industry, and the WINS for the
warehouse industry have all moved under the X12 organization's auspices. In addition,
many industries, which started to adopt the EDI system from the mid 1980s, such as
automotive, retail, chemical, electronics, petroleum, paper, and so forth, have adopted the
ANSI X12 standards for their EDI systems.
Besides the U.S., the U.K. developed its own version of national cross-industry EDI
standards, or TRADACOMS20 , which was used across a wide spectrum of industries in
the U.K.
20 Trade Data Communication Standards
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4.2.3.3 International Industry-specific EDI Standards
Some industries that should deal with international business transactions have frequently
developed their own international industry-specific EDI standards. Banks and other
financial institutions were among the first industries to make use of EDI to accelerate data
processing and the electronic funds transfer (EFT) for business transactions. The banking
industry developed its own EDI standards, SWIFT2 1 , and has used it extensively for
international electronic funds transfer. The other example is the ODETTE standards
employed internationally since 1984 within the European automotive industry.
4.2.3.4 International Cross-industry EDI Standards
Finally, the progression of the EDI standards comes to the international standard,
supported by cross-industries in many countries. For this purpose, EDI for
Administration, Commerce, and Transport (EDIFACT) was developed in 1987 based on
the ANSI X12 and ODETTE standards. The EDIFACT was formally adopted by the
United Nations to become the international EDI standards.
As of the year of 1995, over 80 business transactions were approved and being used under
the EDIFACT standards. Although the EDIFACT standards have been developed for
various areas of trade, the primary focus of EDIFACT has been on transportation.
The EDIFACT standards are now widely used in Europe and Asia for the international
business transactions as well as for the national ones. Particularly, Asian countries
including Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc. only use the EDIFACT standards
because they started to implement the EDI systems in the early 1990s. However, in the
U.S., EDIFACT is not as popular as in Europe and Asia because many industries have
already established the EDI systems based on the ANSI X12 standards. Many industries
21 Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
22 Organization for Data Exchange by Teletransmission in Europe
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in the U.S. use the EDIFACT standards for only international business transactions such
as filing customs documents.
4.2.4 Potential Benefits of EDI
Many practitioners and researchers have attempted to identify the potential benefits that
EDI could offer. The benefits can be grouped into two categories (Pfeiffer, 1992): direct
benefits and indirect benefits. The direct benefits are mostly operational savings related to
the internal efficiency of the organization. Examples of the direct benefits include
reduced transaction costs, improved cash flow, reduced inventory levels, and higher
information quality. Meanwhile, the indirect benefits are mostly tactical and competitive
advantages - for example, increased operational efficiency, better customer service,
improved trading partner relationships, and increased ability to compete. Table 4-3
presents the list of the two types of potential benefits.
Table 4-3 List of Benefits from ED123
Direct Benefits
* Reduced transaction costs * Elimination of paperwork; labor savings
* Improved cash flow * Faster processing and exchange of
information
* Reduced inventory levels * Shorter order cycles; reduced ordering
costs
* Higher information quality * Increased timeliness, accuracy, and
accessibility of information
Indirect Benefits
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* Increased operational efficiency
" Better customer service
" Improved trading partner
relationships
* Increased ability to compete
" Improved internal operations due to time
and cost reduction and better information
management
* Shorter lead times; more timely
information about transaction status
* Enhanced trust through increased sharing
of information; elimination of nuisance
factors (e.g., errors in orders); increased
ability to participate in JIT programs
* Increased ability to reach new markets;
increased ability to provide better service
at a lower cost
4.3 Evolution of EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
The container shipping industry has been a pioneer in adopting the EDI technology,
particularly for the international transactions. Ever increasing container volume and
increasing demand for an efficient management of transportation-related documents
forced the CSI to actively implement the EDI systems.
This section explores the historical evolution of EDI in the container shipping industry.
Starting with basic structures of the EDI system in the container shipping industry, several
case studies of EDI projects in the container shipping industry, dynamics of EDI adoption
in the CSI, driving factors of EDI adoption, and impacts of EDI on the CSI are closely
reviewed.
4.3.1 Basic Structures of the EDI System in the Container Shipping
Industry
Current EDI systems in the container shipping industry have basic structures that enable
seamless exchange of business transactions through the EDI networks among the trading
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partners. There are two basic structures of the EDI system in the container shipping
industry from the carriers' perspective: The first is the EDI system for the 'service
delivery' value chain and the second is the EDI system for the 'asset management' value
chain in the container shipping industry.
4.3.1.1 The EDI System for the 'Service Delivery' Value Chain
The 'service delivery' value chain in the container shipping industry is related to how
ocean container carriers interact with shippers and improve the customer service. Figure
4-2 presents the general structures of the EDI system for the 'service delivery' value chain
in the container shipping industry.
In order to serve the shippers' information request on container delivery, carriers should
first develop the EDI networks with shippers. This is the 'front-end' connection of the
EDI system for the 'service delivery' value chain. After receiving the information request
from shippers, ocean carriers must communicate with other trading partners that enable
the movement of containers. As such, carriers develop the EDI networks with inland
carriers (i.e., railroad companies, trucking companies), terminal operators, other ocean
carriers, banks, marine insurance companies, and the Customs service. This is the 'back-
end' connection of the EDI system for the 'service delivery' value chain. This back-end
connection allows the carriers to respond to the shippers' request without human
intervention.
The EDI networks can be connected through the direct communication lines among the
trading partners, or EDI-VANs, which provide a central clearing house of the EDI
messages.
To illustrate the operation of the EDI system for the 'service delivery' value chain, an
example of the EDI transactions for export is provided in the following24
24 The example is summarized from Sokol (1995), p. 241.
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Other
Ocean Banks
Carriers
Terminal Marine
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Ocean
Carriers
Inland Customs Back-end
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Front-end
Exchange of EDI based
documents
- - -r. EDI connection through EDI-VANs
Figure 4-2 The EDI System for the 'Service Delivery' Value Chain of the
Container Shipping Industry
First, the booking request, also known as the reservation request, is sent by the shipper to
the ocean carrier, requesting either reservation of space, a shipping container, or
equipment. It contains the information needed by the ocean carrier to understand the
nature and routing of the shipment and to provide any special handling requirements.
Next, the booking confirmation responds to the booking request to confirm availability of
space, containers, or equipment. This is a critical transaction set because just the sending
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of the request alone does not guarantee the booking. In the booking confirmation, the
ocean carrier includes the booking number that it has issued. This number is used by the
shipper as a shipment reference number until the bill of lading is issued with its
identifying number.
After receiving the booking confirmation, the shipper returns the shipment information. It
contains all the information needed to generate a bill of lading and to handle freighting
and scheduling. The shipment information transaction set replaces the shipper's letter of
instruction in the paper world.
The shipment information transaction set is followed by the freight details and invoice.
This transaction set is sent by the ocean carrier to convey information regarding shipping
charges. This transaction set may be thought of as the master document of both the
import and export chain as it contains all information related to a shipment. While this
transaction set contains the same information as the paper bill of lading, it cannot replace
the bill of lading completely because of the legal issues on the electronic bill of lading.
However, some carriers, for example APL, are developing the electronic bill of lading to
replace the paper bill of lading.
Next is the gate activity or terminal operations activity gate arrival transaction set. This
is sent by the shipper to inform the ocean carrier that containers have arrived at the port
and are ready to be loaded into the vessel. At the same time, the ocean carrier issues the
terminal operator a stow plan in which it identifies the exact location into which the
containers are to be loaded in a vessel and tells any special handling requirements.
In addition, the shipment inquiry can be sent to the ocean carrier by the shipper to request
information regarding the status of location of a shipment. The ocean carrier may then
respond with the status details reply after exchanging the shipment status information
with the terminal operators or the inland carrier. Sometimes the ocean carrier transmits
the reply even though no inquiry has been made. In this case, the status details reply
transaction set acts as a simple notification of status.
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The EDI transactions for import follow a similar process, but they should interact with the
Customs service. Following is the Example of the EDI transactions for import.
First, the arrival notice is transmitted by the ocean carrier to the importer or customs
broker to inform them that a shipment is scheduled for arrival. It contains much of the
same information as contained in the paper bill of lading.
Next, the ocean carrier issues a U.S. Customs Manifest. This shows the exact contents of
the vessel. It is sent to the U.S. Customs office by the ocean carrier. Here both EDIFACT
and proprietary U.S. Customs-developed formats are acceptable.
Just as in the export process, the shipment inquiry and the status details reply are included
in the import process as well. The shipment inquiry is sent by the importer or customs
broker to the ocean carrier, and the status details reply is returned.
Finally, the gate activity can be sent by the terminal operator to the ocean carrier to inform
that the cargo has been removed from the ocean vessel and either passed to a local
trucking company or to a railroad company for inland delivery.
4.3.1.2 The EDI System for the 'Asset Management' Value Chain
The 'asset management' value chain in the container shipping industry is related to how
ocean container carriers manage their vessels efficiently. Figure 4-2 presents the general
structures of the EDI system for the 'asset management' value chain in the container
shipping industry.
25 The example is summarized from Sokol (1995), p. 241 - 242.
95
EDI in the Container Shipping IndustryChapter 4
Chapter 4 EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
Ocean
Carriers EDI-VAN
Ship
Management
Figure 4-3 The EDI System for the 'Asset Management' Value Chain of the
Container Shipping Industry
In this EDI system for the 'asset management' value chain, ocean carriers develop the EDI
networks with ship management companies through either direct communication links or
EDI-VANs, and exchange the EDI business transaction sets. An example of the business
transaction sets in this EDI system is the purchase order sent by the ocean carrier to the
ship management company to request the ship maintenance service. Responding to the
purchase order transaction set, the ship management company sends the invoice after
finishing the ship maintenance required by the ocean carrier.
Compared to the EDI system for the 'service delivery' value chain, the EDI system for the
'asset management' value chain is relatively less adopted in the container shipping
industry.
4.3.2 Case Studies of EDI Projects in the Container Shipping Industry
There have been many EDI projects worldwide in the container shipping industry.
Regardless of their success or failure, those projects provided the CSI with valuable
experience in implementing the EDI systems. In order to understand the evolution of EDI
in the CSI, this section reviews several EDI projects that were implemented in the CSI
from the late 1980 to the mid 1990s. The examples were selected on a worldwide basis to
provide a better picture of the level of EDI adoption in the CSI.
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4.3.2.1 A Singapore Case: TradeNet2
TradeNet in Singapore is one of the most recently successful EDI cases in the container
shipping industry. TradeNet was developed in the early 1990s under the active guidance
of the Singapore government, particularly the Customs organization. It was the first
nation-wide EDI system in the world: 95 - 98% of information related to trade and
transport in Singapore is processed through TradeNet. Major characteristics of this
project are outlined below:
TradeNet is a system that integrates documentation in the maritime community. In a
community system, data are input once, are routed to partners, and are shared among them
through a centralized clearing center; i.e., the users of TradeNet need to provide the details
of cargo only 'once.' Figure 4-4 shows how TradeNet is organized as a community
system.
" TradeNet, as a totally community-based system, has been initiated and designed by the
maritime community to meet its own needs. It was developed based on the processes
used by the nine major members representing the majority of users in the port
community.
* TradeNet, together with PortNet at the Port of Singapore, reduces the documentation
process for exporting a consignment from 35 to 16 steps and the processing period
from 2 - 4 days to 15 - 30 minutes. Total cost savings from TradeNet are estimated at
more than US $4 million per year.
* The Singapore government and the Customs organization have played a crucial role in
developing TradeNet. In particular, cooperation and coordination have existed
between the Trade Development Board, port authorities, and customs offices.
26 Adapted from Lee, et al. (2000), p. 134 - 137.
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Figure 4-4 Network of TradeNet system
4.3.2.2 A Korean Case: KT-Net and KL-Net
The Korean trade and transportation industry has suffered from high documentation costs
generated from export and import of containers. As many as 350 different paper
documents are required, including the purchase order, waybill, bill of lading, letter of
credit, customs declaration, and insurance certificate, etc. The total number of documents
for international trade per day was estimated at 2 million documents, resulting in the cost
of trade-related paperwork in Korea alone is said to be US $8 billion per year27
In order to reduce the trade-related documentation cost, two independent EDI systems
were developed. The first EDI system is the Korea Trading Network (KT-Net). KT-Net
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was established in 1990 by the Korea Foreign Trade Association under the guidance of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry. The service of KT-Net covers licensing, insurance,
customs clearance, duty drawback, shipment request, issuance of bill of lading, and so on.
After a trial period in 1994, the main system started to provide full service from 1995.
This system is more focused on providing EDI service to the shippers community.
However, KT-Net did not cover the transportation-related documentation through ports, a
parallel system was needed to close the gap in the EDI system for international trade.
The second EDI system is the Korea Logistics Network (KL-Net). KL-Net was co-
founded in 1994 by container shipping companies, including three major ocean carriers
(i.e., Hanjin, Cho Yang, and Hyundai Merchant Marine), the Busan Container Terminal
Company (BCTOC), the Korea Container Terminal Authority, shippers, freight
forwarders, and other professional maritime organizations. It aims to develop an EDI
network for container cargo logistics, which would allow exporters and importers to
exchange data with the maritime community. The main system became fully operational
in 1995.
Despite the major effort to develop an EDI system in the Korean container shipping
industry, the adoption of EDI in Korea has been lamentably slow so far. Three reasons
might cause the slow adoption of EDI in Korea: First, the cost of using the EDI system
has been too expensive for small and medium trading and transportation companies.
Second, the sharing of information of cargo between KT-Net and KL-Net was not
complete although both systems adopted the EDIFACT standards. Third, the Customs
organization was not active in adopting the EDI system in its work procedure.
4.3.2.3 A Hong Kong Case: TradeLink
TradeLink is an EDI system for exchanging trading documents among the trading and
transportation companies in Hong Kong. It was founded by the Hong Kong government
and a consortium of banks, telecommunications, trading, and transportation companies in
1992. After a series of technical testings of its EDI system, TradeLink started to offer
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EDI service for textile export licensing from the beginning of 1997. TradeLink has a
seven-year franchise from the Hong Kong government to process all official trade
documentation through its EDI network.
The adoption of EDI through TradeLink has been generally successful despite its starting
later than other nations. For example, the average of EDI adoption of production
notification document among the trading communities in Hong Kong as of January 2000
was estimated to reach 85% (Bangsberg, 2000).
The main reason for the success of TradeLink is an active involvement of the Hong Kong
government with adoption of EDI. The Hong Kong government proposed the statutory
trading documents to be processed through TradeLink and monitored the EDI adoption of
each statutory trading documents.
4.3.2.4 The U.S. Case
The container shipping industry in the U.S. has been most advanced in implementing the
EDI technology. Following the pioneering work of TDCC to develop the EDI standards
for the transportation industry, most of large shippers, carriers, and port authorities have
implemented the EDI networks since the mid 1980s to automate the exchange of
transportation-related documents among the trading partners. Particularly, the U.S. has
well established the intermodal EDI networks, which are hardly found in other regions.
Unlike the EDI systems in Asia and Europe, most EDI systems in the U.S. are based on
the ANSI X12 standards, rather than the EDIFACT standards. This is because many U.S.
industries including the transportation industry have already constructed the EDI systems
with ANSI X12 well before EDIFACT became accepted as an international EDI standard.
Although it is not difficult to transform the ANSI X12 based EDI documents into the
EDIFACT based ones, and vice versa, this might hinder the U.S.-based EDI systems from
being connected to the international EDI networks.
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Below are examples of the EDI systems established in the container shipping industry in
the U.S. These examples can provide the general pictures of the EDI adoption in the U.S.
EDI Systems in the U.S. Ports
Port authorities in the U.S. have been focal points in distributing container-specific
information among the players in the container shipping industry. Many port authorities
have already implemented the EDI systems to be used by the port users. A well known
example is the Automated Cargo Expediting System (ACES) in the Port of New York and
New Jersey. ACES, developed by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and
GE Information Services, is a portwide computerized service, providing information on
location and status of international maritime shipments. The information includes arrival
notices from ocean carriers, manifests from ocean carriers to both U.S. Customs and the
maritime terminal operator, delivery orders from customhouse brokers, cargo status
replies from marine terminals, and electronic bookings from freight forwarders to ocean
carriers.
Linked by GE's global network and electronic data interchange (EDI*EXPRESS)
services, ACES allows users to streamline the information management process, speeding
cargo transfers, reducing information delays and errors, improving customer service, and
increasing office productivity. Figure 4-5 shows a brief structure of ACES.
Another example of the EDI system in the U.S. port is LINX used by the ports of Seattle
and Tacoma. LINX provides the region's transportation community with an EDI
information exchange system to optimize cargo movement, providing users with a
competitive edge in international and domestic markets. The development of LINX
activities are occurred with the guidance and input of a communications sub-committee of
representatives from the region's port authorities, railroads, freight forwarders, ocean
carriers, terminal operators, and other interested parties.
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Figure 4-5 Automated Cargo Expediting System (ACES) in Port of New York and
New Jersey28
EDI Systems for Intermodal Movement in the U.S.
The container shipping industry in the U.S. has successfully developed the EDI systems
for intermodal container transportation. Particularly, railroad companies led the way in
EDI use because so much of its traffic is handled by more than one railroad. Following
the issuance of the TDCC standards for carrier-related activities, the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) created Railinc in 1981 as a wholly-owned, for-profit
subsidiary. Railinc aimed to provide the rail industry with seamless EDI service to make
the industry more competitive and efficient.
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Railroads are using EDI in many applications, including bill of lading, shipment status,
equipment and cargo weights, yard management, waybill retrieval, freight claim
submissions, interline tracing, rate requests, logistics costs evaluation, fleet management,
and other modules to meet specific customer needs 29. EDI allows railroad companies to
sharply improve performance, enabling them to offer the seamless service to their
intermodal customers, which are ocean container carriers or freight forwarders. EDI
permits timely and accurate billing, enabling customers to access information with only a
phone call.
Like the rail industry, EDI also provides trucking companies with the ability to improve
the services offered to customers. In particular, the trucking industry's use of EDI has
been encouraged by large retailers and manufacturers who introduced just-in-time (JIT)
inventory management strategies. Trucking companies are increasingly using EDI to
submit invoices and bills of lading, saving money by eliminating manual keyboarding of
information and improving equipment utilization. In case of intermodalism, truckers have
become closely linked partners with railroad companies as well as ocean carriers by
synthesizing their respective communication systems to improve service for their
customers.
EDI Systems of Ocean Container Carriers in the U.S.
Major ocean container carriers serving in the U.S. have developed the EDI networks since
the mid 1980s3 . Direct EDI connections to the selected large shippers, freight
forwarders, and terminal operators became active in the early 1990s. Among the many
business transactions used for EDI, the shipment status for tracking the container location
is the most widely used business transaction for EDI.
In addition, the business transactions for imports to the U.S. began to be widely used for
EDI transactions in the early 1990s after the U.S. Customs announced the EDIFACT-
2 9 Ibid., p. 287.
30 The information on the EDI systems of ocean container carriers in the U.S. is based on an interview with
Connie Mead, Director of EDI at Log-net, on April 10, 2002.
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based EDI system in 1988. Many carriers have implemented the EDI networks with
shippers, freight forwarders, customs brokers, and terminal operators to distribute the
customs-related documents for import in accordance with the customs proprietary format.
For example, the ocean container carriers issue an electronic U.S. Customs manifest,
showing the exact vessel contents for each importer with a shipment on board. Then, the
ocean container carrier, the steamship agent, customs brokers, or NVOCC send the
manifest to the U.S. Customs Service. Meanwhile, the EDI networks for export have
recently been implemented since the late 1990s and are not as popular as the EDI
networks for imports.
Besides the EDI connections with shippers and terminal operators, carriers have also
developed the inter-carrier EDI networks in the mid 1990s. Through the inter-carrier EDI
networks, carriers share the information on gate activity, booking transactions, shipment
status, and so forth. The inter-carrier EDI networks became more important recently as
many carriers have established alliances or vessel sharing agreements since the mid 1990s.
Unlike the EDI systems in Asian countries, where the governments have been pushing the
adoption of EDI, the EDI systems of ocean container carriers in the U.S. have been driven
by the customers' demand for EDI. Hence, the evolution of the EDI system of ocean
container carriers in the U.S. has been slow and gradual for more than 20 years. In
addition, despite the widespread awareness of EDI, only large shippers and freight
forwarders are connected to the large ocean container carriers through the EDI systems.
The shippers of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) generally do not implement the
EDI systems with carriers.
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4.3.2.5 The European Case
The container shipping industry in Europe has also developed EDI networks since the late
1970s and the early 1980s. Unlike the U.S. and Asian countries, port authorities played a
leadership role in implementing most EDI projects in Europe. Ports of Bremen and
Bremerhaven are the first example of implementing the EDI networks in Europe 1 . Their
port information system, COMPASS, was established in 1976 through the efforts of over
100 separate interested users of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven. COMPASS joined
all institutions involved with exporting/importing goods via Bremen/Bremerhaven into an
integrated information network around a central database.
COMPASS provided EDI connections for optimizing container handling, automobile
exports, import distribution, and industrial project shipments. Access to these highly
specialized services is through the telecommunication interface known as LOTSE
(Logistic Tele-Service), an open system without hardware or software compatibility
problems. LOTSE ensured compatibility at all levels of communication between trading
partners between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s.
Following the adoption of EDIFACT by the United Nations in 1987, ports of Bremen and
Bremerhaven upgraded COMPASS into the Teleport Bremen based on EDIFACT
standards. The Teleport Bremen offers a worldwide network of managed EDI for the port
user community. Intelligent nodes for international communications have been
established in strategically placed economic centers such as Singapore, providing smooth
data/information interchange between business partners.
Besides the case of Bremen/Bremerhaven, other major ports in Europe have implemented
EDI networks in the early 1980s. Table 4-4 summarized the selected examples of EDI
systems in the European ports.
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Table 4-4 Selected EDI Systems in the European Ports3 2
Name
(Start year) Bodies Involved Major Services Purpose
DAKOSY
(1982)
ADEMAR+
(1983)
FCPS
(1984)
INTIS
(1985)
SEAGHA
(1986)
Port community,
Hamburg
Port community,
Le Havre
Maritime Cargo
Processing, plc.
Port community,
Rotterdam
Port community,
Antwerp
Mail box, Port-EDI,
GDCS*, DGIS**,
EDIFACT, Customs
clearance
Mail box, Port-EDI,
EDIFACT, Customs
clearance
Mail box, DGIS,
Inventory control,
Customs clearance
Mail box, EDIFACT,
GDCS, DGIS, Port-
EDI, Customs
clearance
Mail box, EDIFACT,
GDCS, DGIS, Port-
EDI, Customs
clearance
Data communication systems
for the transport sector
Exchange of information and
documents for container
cargoes among the operators
of the Le Havre
To reduce clearance time for
cargo in the seaport areas.
Applied in Felixstowe plus 13
locations, including ports,
ICDs, and airport.
Communications network and
information structure in
Rotterdam
Belgian transport EDI system
based on EDI network in the
port of Antwerp
* GDCS: Global Data Communication System
** DGIS: Dangerous Goods Information System
4.3.3 The Level of EDI Diffusion in the Container Shipping Industry
As shown in the case studies above, the EDI systems have been implemented worldwide
in the container shipping industry. Indeed, the container shipping industry was one of the
forerunners among the EDI adopters. A next research question is how much EDI has been
32 Adapted from Lee, et al. (2000), p. 135.
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actually diffused in the container shipping industry. The answer to this question can be
used for anticipating the potential diffusion dynamics of the internet-based business in the
container shipping industry.
Answering the research question, however, is not an easy task. Although there are many
articles explaining the individual EDI projects implemented in the container shipping
industry, it is rare to find historical research investigating the actual level of EDI diffusion
in the container shipping industry. In fact, there are only a couple of research projects on
the level of EDI diffusion in the transportation industry in general (Bowman, 1994; Grant,
1995; Pfeiffer, 1992). It is difficult to derive the precise data on the level of EDI diffusion
in the container shipping industry. Rather, only a qualitative estimation of the EDI
diffusion in the container shipping industry might be feasible.
To overcome this difficulty, this research uses a two-fold process. First, the research
projects on the level of EDI diffusion in the transportation industry are used for estimating
the overall trends of the EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry. Then, the
estimated results are reconfirmed by reviewing the case studies and interviewing industry
experts.
As the first step, Table 4-5 is the summary of the level of the EDI diffusion in the
transportation industry in general.
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Table 4-5 Summary of Research on the Level of the EDI Diffusion in the
Transportation Industry
Author Sununary
Rockwell 0 Half of all companies shipping products internationally by ocean or
(1999) air transportation use EDI.
Grant (1995) 0 Transportation industry has used EDI on average for slightly more
than five years as of 1995; i.e., EDI has been adopted in the
transportation industry since around 1990.
* Despite the widespread use of EDI, only a few large transportation
companies have actively used EDI.
* Average EDI trading partners per company in the transportation
industry is 114, a figure considerably higher than the U.S. average of
65 trading partners per company.
* Percentage of EDI-enabled trading partners in 1995 is 19% of total
trading partners per company in the transportation company. This
percentage is well below the U.S. average of 23% in 1995.
* Percentage of documents sent via EDI in 1995 is 33% of total
documents in the transportation industry, and the percentage will
increase to 50% by 1998.
Bowman (1994) e Only about 10% of ocean shippers are linked to their carriers
electronically, although the biggest companies have adopted the
technology enthusiastically.
Pfeiffer (1992) e Logistics companies started the EDI linkages from 1986 on average.
Meanwhile, the case studies on the EDI systems in the container shipping industry explain
the diffusion of EDI as follows:
* The diffusion of EDI in Asian countries has started from the mid 1990s and increased
faster due to the well-defined EDIFACT standards and active guidance of the
governments.
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" EDI in the U.S. became widely accepted from the early 1990s. Particularly, the
intermodal EDI is more advanced than other regions. However, the EDI adoption is
limited to large companies.
* In Europe, port authorities have led the adoption of EDI since the mid 1980s. It is
expected that EDI is widely used in the container shipping industry.
In addition, two industry experts also mentioned the level of diffusion of EDI in the
container shipping industry during interviews:
" Hank Lavery (CEO of Lavery Logistics)
"In the transportation industry, including the container shipping, the
overall adoption of EDI might be less than 50%. Although EDI in the
transportation industry has been adopted from the early 1990s, the
penetration of EDI has been limited to the large carriers and shippers.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been reluctant to adopt EDI
unless they were forced to join the EDI networks by the powerful trading
partners."
* Connie Mead (Director of EDI at Log-net)
"Since the early 1990s, only larger carriers and shippers began to adopt
the EDI technology on a daily basis. SMEs were laggard in adopting the
EDI, partly due to the high cost."
In summary, the different research projects and comments on the EDI diffusion discussed
above can lead to a qualitative estimate of the level of EDI diffusion in the container
shipping industry. Although EDI started to be used as early as the mid 1970s in the U.S.,
it was not until the early 1990s that the container shipping industry widely adopted the
33 This is based on the interview with Hank Lavery on April 5, 2002.
34 This is based on the interview with Connie Mead on April 10, 2002.
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EDI technology. However, EDI is still limited to the large carriers and shippers only,
leaving behind SMEs due to the high implementation costs. Overall, the level of EDI
diffusion in the container shipping industry is estimated as less than 50% in terms of
active EDI-enabled trading partners. Figure 4-6 describes the estimated level of EDI
diffusion in the container shipping industry.
Level of EDI
Diffusion
50%
25%
I I I I I I
1980 1990 2000 Year
Figure 4-6 Level of EDI Diffusion in the Container Shipping Industry
4.3.4 Drivers and Inhibitors of the EDI Diffusion
The diffusion of EDI in the container shipping industry has been impacted by positive
drivers and negative inhibitors. The drivers expedited the adoption of EDI by carriers and
shippers while the inhibitors kept the players in the container shipping industry from
implementing the EDI networks. Identifying the drivers and inhibitors facilitates the
understanding of the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry and is
useful for anticipating the potential diffusion of the internet-based business in the
container shipping industry.
110
Chapter 4 EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
Chapter 4 EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
4.3.4.1 Drivers of the EDI Diffusion
In general, three drivers have helped the diffusion of EDI in the container shipping
industry: standardization, customer demand with market power, and positive network
externality from experience.
Standardization
As shown in Figure 4-6, it was not until the early 1990s that EDI began to be used widely
in the container shipping industry. The main reason for such a wide acceptance is the
establishment of the EDIFACT standards in 1987. The EDIFACT standards allow
international trading partners to exchange trade and transportation documents through the
EDI network. Before the EDIFACT standards, EDI has been implemented only within a
industry or a country that shares the proprietary EDI standards. In the container shipping
industry, which is by nature an international and cross-industry business, it is
indispensable to use the common international standards for the EDI transactions. Thanks
to the EDIFACT standards, the container shipping industry started to exchange the
business transactions among the international trading partners through the EDI networks.
Customer Demand with Market Power
The second driver of the EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry is the customer
demand with market power. In other words, a major driver of implementing the EDI
networks by carriers is the demand for the EDI transactions by shippers who have strong
market power. From the mid 1980s, the large manufacturing and retail companies, who
are big customers of carriers, started to implement the Just-In-Time (JIT) inventory
strategy. The JIT inventory strategy required more timely information on the shipments;
EDI could provide more timely information on the status and location of cargo with little
human intervention. Unless carriers could provide the EDI service, particularly to large
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shippers who preferred the JIT inventory strategy, carriers would fall behind in the severe
competitive environments.
Empirical studies on the diffusion of EDI in the transportation industry supported this
general trend. Pfeiffer (1992), Grant (1995), and Ferguson (1998) found that customer
demand or request was the first reason why carriers adopted the EDI technology. In
addition, a theoretical model for explaining the early adoption of EDI (Hart, et al. 1997)
also emphasizes the importance of power in expediting the adoption of EDI.
Positive Network Externality from Experience
Together with the established EDI standards, positive network externality helps attract the
new users of the EDI networks as the number of EDI users increases: As the number of
EDI users increases, they are more experienced in the utilization and benefits of EDI so
that they can persuade the non-EDI trading partners more effectively into joining the EDI
networks.
In fact, the costs of adding trading partners and transaction sets into a EDI network have
decreased as the industry becomes more experienced in EDI. According to the survey on
EDI in the transportation industry (Grant, 1995), the cost of adding a new trading partner
experienced in EDI is only $810 whereas the cost of adding a new trading partner doing
EDI for the first time is as much as $1,263. Furthermore, the cost of adding a new
transaction set with an existing trading partner is just $541. This positive network
externality from experience improves the diffusion of EDI in the container shipping
industry.
4.3.4.2 Inhibitors of the EDI Diffusion
Despite the potential benefits, EDI has not been well adopted by the SMEs in the
container shipping industry. Three inhibitors might delay the diffusion of EDI in the
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container shipping industry: high cost of implementing EDI, lack of smooth integration
with legacy computer systems, and cultural reliance on paper-based business transactions.
High Cost of Implementing EDI
The cost of implementing EDI has been prohibitively expensive to the small and medium
companies. This high cost of implementing EDI was the main reason why the diffusion of
EDI has been limited to the large companies. According to the survey on the EDI costs
(Ferguson, 1998), the average yearly direct investment per company in EDI was $400,000
or more as of December 1997 to potentially be a leader in EDI and the company should
maintain at least 2 full-time personnel to support the EDI implementation. In addition, in
evaluating eight different costs of doing EDI between 1995 and 1997, the most significant
cost was the initial setup. Overall, these costs of EDI implementation are too expensive
for the SMEs.
Furthermore, introducing EDI requires business process reengineering (BPR) within the
company to utilize EDI more effectively. So, the BPR entails another indirect costs of
implementing EDI. This makes the EDI implementation more expensive than otherwise
expected.
Lack of Smooth Integration with Legacy Computer Systems
Although EDI allows smooth exchange of business transactions among the trading
partners, the success of EDI relies on the integration of EDI messages with internal legacy
computer systems in a company. Because the legacy computer systems in a company
were developed before EDI is actively used, they are sometimes not suitable for
communicating with EDI messages, hence requiring expensive investment to establish the
linkage between them. This hinders the further growth of the diffusion of EDI in the
container shipping industry.
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Cultural Reliance on Paper-based Business Transactions
While in theory EDI could eliminate any paper-based business transaction, companies in
reality still prefer using the paper documents. A major reason for this persistent reliance
on the paper is that the current legal system does not allow complete replacement of the
paper documents with electronic documents. In one way or another, companies should
keep the paper-based business transactions for legal purpose. This practice prohibits the
substantial take-off of EDI in the container shipping industry.
4.3.5 Benefits of EDI in the Container Shipping Industry
As the level of the diffusion of EDI in the container shipping industry became mature,
EDI provided benefits to this industry. The benefits of EDI in the container shipping
industry can be divided into three categories: operational benefits, cultural benefits, and
competitive benefits.
4.3.5.1 Operational Benefits of EDI
EDI provided several operational improvements to the container shipping industry.
According to the survey (Grant, 1995), the transportation industry identified the five most
substantial benefits of EDI: improved accuracy of data, reduced clerical errors, improved
customer service, decreased administrative costs, and faster access to information.
Among these benefits, the most important ones are improved data accuracy and reduced
clerical errors. Before EDI, the transportation industry's error rate was that one in five
documents contained an error. After EDI, error rates have fallen by 50%. Nonetheless, at
a 10.3% error rate, the transportation industry continued to have the highest error rate of
any industry group in the survey. Meanwhile, the transportation industry saw a 23%
savings in the cost of processing an average document once EDI was implemented.
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4.3.5.2 Cultural Benefits of EDI
EDI taught a new cultural lesson to the container shipping industry: collaboration. To
develop the EDI networks, intimate collaborative work among the trading partners is
essential. The container shipping industry should agree on the standards of the EDI
communications, perfect the configuration of internal computer systems to smoothly flow
the EDI messages, and more importantly, share the important operational information
among the trading partners. Carriers, for example, must exchange the information on the
location of containers with other inland transportation carriers, and also be tightly
connected to the computers of manufacturing and retail companies to share the logistics-
related information. The EDI implementation, therefore, emphasized the importance of
collaboration to materialize the benefits from the new technologies.
4.3.5.3 Competitive Benefits of EDI
EDI has provided competitive advantages to the adopters of EDI. Once carriers establish
the EDI connections, they can improve the customer lock-in, thereby improving revenues
while reducing costs. This is why many companies decided to develop EDI in order to
pursuer the related competitive advantages (Grant, 1995). Another EDI expert also
confirmed that EDI has provided competitive benefits by increasing customer lock-in.
In addition, theoretical research on the impact of EDI shows that EDI will reduce the
supplier base after implementing EDI by providing competitive advantages to the adopters
of EDI (Wang, et al. 1995).
4.4 Interactions of EDI and the Internet-based Business
The internet technology has become available for business applications since 1998 and
new internet-based business (e-business) models began offering various services to the
container shipping industry. Having a similar technical origin, EDI and the internet will
3 This is based on the interview with Hank Lavery, CEO of Lavery Logistics, on April 5, 2002.
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be expected to interact with each other to develop new impacts on the industry. This
section first compares the characteristics of EDI and the internet technology, and then
discusses the potential interactions between EDI and the internet-based business in the
container shipping industry.
4.4.1 Comparison of EDI and the Internet
There is no doubt that EDI has offered substantial benefits to the container shipping
industry. EDI has improved the operational efficiency of the container shipping industry
by providing more reliable and automatic communication networks than other traditional
telecommunication technologies, e.g. telephone, fax, or telex. Carriers and shippers, who
implemented EDI networks, have benefited from improved accuracy of data, reduced
error rate, lower transaction costs, better customer service, and so forth.
EDI in the container shipping industry is now in the mature stage of technological
evolution: The level of diffusion of EDI in the container shipping industry has stagnated at
50%. There have been no significant technological breakthroughs of the EDI technology
in recent years. Reasons for the maturity of EDI are high implementation cost as well as
closed and inflexible nature of the EDI system. In addition, the eroding competitive
advantages from EDI due to the wide availability of EDI hinders faster diffusion of EDI in
the container shipping industry. These characteristics limit the diffusion of EDI only to
large carriers and shippers.
On the other hand, the internet has recently started and is a new telecommunication
technology. The internet is more advanced than EDI in almost every aspect; it provides
cheaper, more reliable, and more flexible telecommunication networks. Any company
that has internet access with an internet browser can easily exchange business documents
through the internet. The internet is an affordable telecommunication option for even
SMEs due to the low implementation cost. Although the internet, unlike EDI, does not
offer the machine-readable standard yet, it is developing a new machine-readable
standard, or XML (Extensible Markup Language), for seamless exchange of business
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documents among different computer systems. Table 4-6 compares the characteristics of
EDI and the internet technology in the container shipping industry.
Table 4-6 Comparison of EDI and the Internet Technology
9 High implementation cost
" Transaction focused
" Closed system
* Inflexible and rigid
* Highly standardized and machine-
readable format
* Limited to large companies
9 Low implementation cost
* Transaction and other value-added
service are possible
* Open system
* Flexible, resilient, and responsive
* Developing standards, e.g. XML
* Applicable to SMEs as well as large
companies
EDI and the internet, however, share common characteristics. The most important
common characteristic is that both EDI and the internet are network-based
telecommunication technology, which is impacted by the network externality. The
network externality tends to make the technologies follow a typical S-shaped technology
curve as the number of the network users increases. In the early stage of the evolution of
the network-based technology, the potential benefits from the network are so uncertain
that the network size increases very slowly. It takes time to reach the critical mass of the
network users, which allows the rapid diffusion of technology. This is called a "start-up
problem" of the network-based technology. Once the network users exceed the critical
mass point, they start to be impacted by the positive and negative network externality. On
the positive side, the more the users of the network, the more benefits can be enjoyed by
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the network users from the size of the network. On the negative side, however, as the
number of the network users increases, the perceived competitive advantages from the
network become decreased, or commoditized, over time; thereby, the size of the network
tends to stagnate. This negative dynamics is called a "stalling problem" of the network.
In summary, EDI in the container shipping industry has improved its performance since
its first application in the early 1980s and shown an S-shaped technology curve. After
arriving at the mature stage in the late 1990s, the EDI performance has leveled-off and is
expected to remain stagnated in the future. However, in the late 1990s, the internet
technology began to provide the container shipping industry with new performance, which
is comparable to the current EDI capability. Like the EDI technology, the internet is
expected to follow a similar S-shaped technology curve in the future.
Figure 4-7 shows this historical development of EDI and expected development of the
internet technology in the container shipping industry.
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4.4.2 Potential Interactions between EDI and the Internet Technology
As discussed above, EDI and the internet technology are interacting with each other.
They are in a transitional stage of technological evolution. Considering various
comparative characteristics of EDI and the internet technology, the interactions between
the two technologies will be expected to provide interesting impacts on the container
shipping industry. Four potential interactions between EDI and the internet technology
are anticipated.
" First, EDI will not disappear temporarily despite the wide popularity of the internet-
based business; Rather, EDI will be transformed into a type of the internet-based
business activities by utilizing the internet's cheaper telecommunication networks. In
other words, as the internet becomes more popular and easily accessible, the majority
of EDI transactions can be transmitted more cheaply, reliably, and faster. Therefore,
EDI could be more diffused in the internet era. In fact, recent research shows that EDI
traffic going through the web will increase by 20% over the next four year, with 80%
of all EDI transactions supported by the internet in 10 years (Mitchell, 2002). Driving
the movement is the lower cost of doing business via the internet. In addition, 72% of
companies using EDI indicated that they plan to convert some EDI to XML at some
point in the future (McGarr, M.S., 2001). Furthermore, given that EDI adopters have
invested a substantial amount of money in EDI, they cannot scrap it completely, but
will improve the efficiency of EDI using the internet technology.
* Second, reviewing the evolution of the EDI standards, standardization will be an
important factor in determining the take-off of the diffusion of the internet-based
business activities. In EDI, the establishment of the EDIFACT standards was the
critical point that expedited the adoption of EDI in the container shipping industry.
The well-defined standards allowed trading partners to develop the seamless EDI
networks with less investment and time. Accordingly, developing a generally
accepted internet standard for exchanging the business transactions, such as XML, is a
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prerequisite for the rapid diffusion of the internet-based business in the container
shipping industry.
* Finally, it is necessary to overcome the "start-up problem" of the network in the
internet-based business activities as in the EDI networks. To do this, collaboration
among large carriers and shippers is important for the success of internet-based
business activities in the container shipping industry. Reviewing the early success of
EDI projects, the governments or large market players actively pushed the adoption of
EDI among the trading partners by utilizing their market power. The active
involvement of such market leaders expedited the arrival of the critical mass of users,
which made the EDI network be more successful as soon as possible. Given that both
EDI and the internet-based business are by nature network-based activities, the active
role of powerful market players is an important factor for successful internet-based
business activities.
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the historical evolution of EDI in the container shipping industry
and provides insights into the potential dynamics of the internet-based business activities
in the container shipping industry. After reviewing the general information on EDI,
detailed characteristics of the EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry have been
investigated by comparing several EDI projects. The analysis reveals that EDI began to
be actively used in the container shipping industry since the early 1990s thanks to the
establishment of the well-defined international EDI standards, EDIFACT, in 1987.
Three drivers - standardization, customer demand with market power, and positive
network externality from experience - explain the rapid diffusion of EDI in the mid
1990s. Despite the rapid diffusion of EDI, the diffusion process has been retarded
recently due to the three inhibitors: high cost of implementing EDI, lack of smooth
integration with legacy computer systems, and cultural reliance on paper-based business
transactions. EDI has been limited to large carriers and shippers in general, and the
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current level of EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry is estimated as less than
50% in terms of active EDI-enabled trading partners. The EDI adopters in the container
shipping industry have enjoyed operational benefits, realized the importance of
collaboration, and benefited from the competitive advantages by increasing customer
lock-in.
Meanwhile, close comparison of EDI and the internet concludes that (1) EDI is expected
to be gradually absorbed by the internet-based telecommunication networks; (2) the
internet standards for exchanging business transactions should be a critical factor for the
take-off of the internet-based business activities; and (3) active collaboration among large
carriers and shippers could overcome the "start-up" problem of the network in the
internet-based business activities, thereby expediting the diffusion of EDI in the container
shipping industry. These insights into the potential interactions of EDI and the internet
are useful for anticipating the potential diffusion dynamics of the internet-based business
activities in the container shipping industry, which are analyzed in detail in the next
chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
When internet-based business (e-business) activities began booming from the middle of
1998, the container shipping industry (CSI) was no exception in seeing numerous new
internet-based business models. The e-business models in the container shipping industry
have been growing significantly since mid-1999. More than 100 firms charged with new
e-business models have been founded during the years of 1999 and 2000 in the CSI to
utilize the potential benefits from the internet-based technologies. Each new venture has
tried to penetrate the market with its own competitive strategy with unique technology
settings. Surviving through the dot-com crash36 in mid-2000, the e-business models in the
CSI became an important driving force of the daily business activities in the CSI.
This chapter reviews and evaluates the e-business models in the container shipping
industry. There are two sections in this chapter: The first section analyzes the current
state of the art of e-business models in the CSI. Five different e-business models in the
CSI are identified based on their service types. The general trends and characteristics of
each e-business model in the CSI are carefully examined. Brief case studies of each e-
business model are also presented. Based on the information in the first section, the
second part of this chapter comparatively evaluates the e-business models in the CSI using
three frameworks developed from a technology strategy perspective. This comparative
analysis helps identify the most promising e-business models in the CSI.
36 The timing of the dot-corn crash is the 3rd quarter of 2000, i.e., from July to September 2000, when the
technology stock market began nose-diving and drove many e-business companies to go bankrupt or change
their business focus.
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5.2 Characteristics of Internet-based Business Models in the
Container Shipping Industry
The e-business models in the CSI can be divided into five different categories based on
the service type they provide: portal, e-marketplace, collaborative tool provider (CTP), e-
procurement service provider (e-PSP), and e-chartering service provider (e-CSP). Three
of them - portal, e-marketplace, and the CTP - can be related to the value chain of service
delivery of carriers, whereas the rest - e-PSP and e-CSP - can pertain to the value chain
of asset management of carriers. In other words, the former is externally focused from
carriers perspective while the latter is internally focused. Figure 5-1 shows this
relationship.
Processing Negotiation Transaction
Shipper Market for Service & Movement Consignee
Information
E-Marketplaces Collaborative Tool Provider
Asset
Management
Chain 
of /Carriers/
e-Procurement
Marketing,
Sales, &
Negotiating
Contracting &
Documenting
e-Chartering
Figure 5-1 Value Chain and Internet-based Business Models of the Container
Shipping Industry
Although these five e-business models are still alive despite the dot-com crash, the focus
for each model has changed slightly. The following sections review the characteristics of
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each e-business model in the CSI, analyze how these models have changed before and
after the dot-com crash, and present a brief case study for each e-business model.
5.2.1 Portal
Portals provide their customers with the market information that is crucial for the shippers
and carriers to sign a contract for container movement. The major strategy of the portal
service is to execute the following process: providing crucial market information for the
industry, attracting members of the portal, building business community among the
members, expediting business transactions among the members through the portal, and
finally creating revenue and profits. In other words, they want to be a 'Yahoo!' for the
container shipping industry. Examples include MaritimeDirect.com, Freightgate.com, GT
Nexus, INTTRA, Cargo Smart, and so forth.
The revenue models of the portal are the subscription fees that the portal charges to the
members, transaction fees for the business contracts among the members, and advertising
revenue. The types of market information the portal provides are the freight rate along the
trade routes, fuel price for operating the vessels, port-specific information, etc.
The weakness of this approach is that it does not guarantee profits. There are numerous
"free" market information sources on the internet. If the free market information sources
are easy to acquire and useful to understand the market, it is difficult to attract the
members who are loyal to the portals. As long as the portals cannot attract the loyal users
of their websites, it is impossible to build the business community, expedite business
transactions, and create revenue and profits. Therefore, the key success factor of the
portal is the ability to provide high quality market information that makes the users of the
portal pay subscription fees to be members of the business community.
Before the dot-com crash, the portal was one of popular e-business models in the CSI.
Every investor of the portal believed that the portal would capture the majority of the
benefits from the internet-based business revolution. However, it turned out that it was
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very expensive to build a profitable portal site in the CSI. Moreover, the users of the
portal were not loyal to the portal's service and just visited the portal's website to collect
market information. Accordingly, many early portals in the CSI, for example,
MaritimeDirect.com, went bankrupt in the middle of the dot-corn crash.
Two reasons might have caused the failure of the early portals: First, the portal could not
provide precious market information or contents that could gather the critical mass of
users of the portals. In other words, the portals could not develop sufficient "liquidity"
that should have enabled business contracts through their websites. Second, most of the
portals lacked industry contacts to attract the users of their service because many founders
of the portals were pure entrepreneurs with little container shipping experience. Many
founders had backgrounds in consulting or investment banking as opposed to the
container shipping industry. Thus, the portals failed to grab major ocean shipping
companies as the loyal users of their website.
After the dot-com crash, noticing that pure portals without any industry support rarely
succeed, new portals, or "carrier-oriented portals," were launched. Examples included GT
Nexus, INTTRA, and Cargo Smart. A difference from the early portals is that the carrier-
oriented portals have attracted several major container shipping companies as equity
investors. By attracting the carriers as investors as well as customers, the carrier-oriented
portals could increase the customer loyalty, credibility of their services, and financial
strength, thereby increasing the possibility of being profitable in the long run. Another
difference between the early portals and the carrier-oriented portals is that the carrier-
oriented portals have tried to integrate the functions of the collaborative tool providers
(CTPs). In other words, they have emphasized the functions of the collaboration between
carriers and shippers by providing common platforms. Sometimes they have developed
partnerships with the CTPs. These characteristics are examined in the case studies below.
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Case Study: MaritimeDirect.com - An Early Portal
One example of the portal business model is MaritimeDirect.com, founded by a couple of
wealthy ocean shipping businessmen in April 2000, right before the fall of NASDAQ.
Although it was not clear how much investment was raised initially, it was then believed
to be a promising portal in the CSI in terms of money and industry contacts.
MaritimeDirect.com first offered basic ocean shipping related market information, such as
industry-specific news, weather, port information, and general economic news. More
importantly, the detailed port related information, such as ports' specifications, points of
contacts, and so forth, was so unique at the time of its foundation that the information was
hardly found in other portal sites. In general, the content of MaritimeDirect.com was
excellent enough to attract the potential users of the portal.
MaritimeDirect.com, however, failed to transform the potential customers into real
business contracts. By the end of 2000, MaritimeDirect.com could not provide any
revenue-generating service on its website. It just burnt away its initially raised money.
Furthermore, it even did not force the users to register, which is one of the basic tactics to
track the users' information preference on the web contents. A pressured stock market
from the 3rd quarter of 2000 to the 1 st quarter of 2001 gave little help to such an e-business
model without generating any profit. Despite the good financing and the resourceful
industry contacts of the founders, MaritimeDirect.com finally went bankrupt in March
2001.
Case Study: GT Nexus - A Carrier-oriented Portal
GT Nexus, formerly known as Tradiant, was founded on March 27, 2000 by a couple of
former IT (Information Technology) staff members from APL (American President Line),
which is one of the largest container shipping companies. GT Nexus' primary vision was
to provide efficiency and integration to the global supply chain. The management team is
composed of entrepreneurs, IT experts, and container shipping industry veterans. Major
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founding investors include venture capital companies, nine large container shipping
carriers, and a large trading company.
GT Nexus has two service types as of November 2001; "global planning series" and
"global execution series," which are mainly targeted for the carriers' customer support.
The global planning series provides not only basic market information to the registered
users, such as news and freight rates, but also transportation planning tools, such as
contract support module, business forecasting module, and optimal freight allocation
module service. Meanwhile, the global execution series focuses on supporting actual
container shipping management so that the series provides booking systems for shippers,
documentation systems for managing transportation and trade documents across
international carriers, a container tracking system, and reporting systems that identify
trends and analyze data captured in the GT Nexus system. In summary, GT Nexus'
product is a combination of the pure portal approach and collaborative tool provider's
approach. It adopts an "evolutionary" approach in developing internet-based business
with the container shipping industry by closely working with large incumbent ocean
container carriers.
5.2.2 E-marketplace
E-marketplace provides a virtual meeting place for the buyers and sellers of container
shipping services. At the virtual meeting place, the buyers and sellers can find the
business partners, and make a business contract for the container shipping service. For
example, the buyers post their service request on the e-marketplace, and then the sellers of
the container shipping service bid for the contract. In same way, the sellers post their
service offerings on the e-marketplace and then the buyers choose the service that is the
most suitable for their business needs. In other words, the e-marketplace tries to build an
efficient marketplace for the spot market3 7 of the container shipping service.
37 There are two types of markets in the container shipping industry based on the duration of service
contract: spot market and long-term contract market. In the spot market, carriers and shippers make a
contract on an as-needed basis (such as for a single voyage), whereas, in the long-term contract market,
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The e-marketplace providers generate revenue by collecting transaction fees if a contract
between the buyers and sellers is made. The fees could be a small portion of the total
price of transaction. The e-marketplace is basically a new type of intermediary assisting
the buyers and sellers to make a contract more efficiently through the internet-based
technology. They want to be an "e-Bay" for the container shipping industry. Examples
include the e-marketplaces for general container shipping service contract (e.g.,
GoCargo.com), container leasing and sharing (e.g., Interbox.com, Synchronet.com), and
refrigerated container shipping service (e.g., GoReefers.com).
The critical success factor of e-marketplace is the "liquidity" : buyers and sellers can find
sufficiently large numbers of business partners to meet their business requirements. For
example, if the buyers cannot find many qualified sellers, the buyers will not join the e-
marketplace, and vice versa.
Throughout the dot-com crash, several e-marketplaces, especially the ones for general
container shipping service contract, went bankrupt. For example, GoCargo.com, which
was one of the first e-marketplaces in the CSI, failed to generate enough revenue to
sustain the operation and went bankrupt in March 2001. A main reason for its failure was
that the auction service of the GoCargo.com was so focused on driving down the freight
rate that major carriers refused to join the auction service, thereby reducing the liquidity of
the e-marketplace. Only the e-marketplaces for container leasing/sharing and refrigerated
container shipping service are still operating, though with very little profit. It remains to
be seen if these e-marketplaces will be successful in the long term.
Case Study: GoCargo.com
GoCargo.com was founded on October 12, 1999 by an entrepreneur with consulting
background with a vision of being the first business-to-business company in the container
carriers and shippers make a contract that is valid for a longer period of time (i.e., one year). The average
market share of spot market is around 20% of the total market size.
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shipping industry. It provides a dynamic auctioning platform where buyers and sellers of
container shipping service do business online. In other words, it wanted to be an 'eBay'
in the container shipping industry. More specifically, GoCargo.com adopts a reverse
auction strategy that shippers (or buyers) post their service requirements and then carriers
(or sellers) bid for the service requirements. At the end of bidding process, the lowest
bidder wins the competition and the bidder (or carrier) and shipper make a business
contract. GoCargo.com adopts a "revolutionary" approach in that it tries to apply a "stock-
trading-type" of service into the container shipping industry. It is, unlike GT Nexus,
really a shipper-oriented internet-based business model.
Major customers of GoCargo.com's service are small shippers and NVOCCs (Non-Vessel
Operating Common Carriers), both of which are targeting the spot market of container
shipping service. As of September 27, 2000, GoCargo.com claimed that its total
membership exceeded 12,000 and cumulative transaction volume since its inception
amounted to more than 5,000.
Major investors are leading investment banks and venture capital companies, such as
Goldman Sachs, Atlas Ventures, and Seed Capital Partners. No incumbent industry
players, however, have invested in this company. In addition, few industry veterans are
seated in the management team.
Although it was successful during the first half of the year of 2000, it confronted tough
market pressure from the carriers who dislike GoCargo.com's shipper-oriented auction
model because the auction can erode the freight rates by shifting the market power from
carriers to shippers. With a few exceptions, a majority of large carriers did not join the
GoCargo.com's service. Only NVOCCs have provided their shipping capacity to
GoCargo.com's auction market. In addition, the overall size of the spot market that
GoCargo.com was tapping is relatively small compared with a long-term contract market,
where carriers and shippers directly negotiate shipping contract on a yearly basis. The
ratio of spot market size to the long-term contract market is estimated to be 2 to 8.
Bewildered by this pressure, GoCargo.com launched a new internet-based platform in
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February 2001, called NaviPact, which helps carriers and shippers negotiate long-term
contracts online efficiently. Despite this effort to transform its business model from the
spot market to the long-term contract market, GoCargo.com finally went bankrupt in
March 2001.
5.2.3 Collaborative Tool Provider
Collaborative Tool Provider (CTP) offers the shippers and carriers the means to manage
the container movement efficiently by integrating logistics information seamlessly among
the inter-company computer systems. Among their service offerings are tracking
container movement from the shipper to the consignee, generating and distributing
internet-based trade documents for container movement across the business partners, and
providing smooth customs clearance with less human involvement, calculating total
landed cost for the transportation service. By using the CTP's service, the shippers and
carriers can efficiently manage their logistics functions. Most CTPs develop special
internet-based software for each specific function. They generate revenue by either
selling the software, collecting licensing fees for the software, or charging subscription
fees for using the internet-based service.
The CTPs can be divided into three types based on their business focus: First, a carrier-
oriented CTP (c-CTP) offers internet-based transportation management software mainly
for carriers. Examples of the c-CTP include Celarix, ShipLogix, CarrierPoint, Descarte,
and so forth. The c-CTPs usually provide a fleet management tool, tracking and tracing of
containers, tariff publishing tool, auctioning tool, and so on. The second type of the CTP
is a shipper-oriented CTP (s-CTP). The s-CTPs offer internet-based logistics management
software that can enhance the shippers' or transportation intermediaries' supply chain
management capabilities. Their software provides the functions of managing different
carriers efficiently, calculating total landed cost, checking trading regulations
automatically, and so on. Examples of the s-CTPs' service are international trade
management (e.g., Vastera, ClearCross), trade regulation and landed cost calculation (e.g.,
NextLinx), logistics management software (e.g., FreightDesk.com, Oceanwide, Rely
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Software, G-Log), etc. The third type of the CTP is a niche player (n-CTP), which
provides internet-based software for specific functions of the container shipping industry.
The functions that the n-CTP's service offers include an internet-based international trade
payment system (e.g., CCEWEB, TradeCard), an internet-based trading environment (e.g.,
Boleron.net), etc.
A critical success factor for the CTP is standardization. A basic function of the CTP's
software is to connect the specific business information with current company-wide
computer system. So, if the CTP's product does not follow the industry standard, it will
not be successful.
Case Study: FreightDesk.com
FreightDesk.com was founded on March 10, 2000 by Rob Quartel, who was a former
commissioner of Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) in the U.S. It attempts to help
transportation intermediaries, e.g., freight forwarder and customs brokers, improve their
transportation management work by using its internet-based collaborative transportation
management tools. Its first product, called FreightDeskPro, is a comprehensive internet-
based system that automates and simplifies the entire process of managing international
shipments from purchase order to delivery confirmation. FreightDesk.com also offers
tracking capability for the users of its collaborative tools. Its revenue model is a
transaction-based approach, not subscription-based one, so that users only pay as much as
they use FreightDesk.com's service.
FreightDesk.com has a clear market entry strategy that focuses on freight forwarders,
which in general lack IT capability despite the urgent need. It likes to be called an "IT
department for transportation intermediaries38." Accordingly, its technical approach is not
revolutionary, but "evolutionary."
38 Private interview with FreightDesk CEO Rob Quartel on March 16, 2001
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Unlike GT Nexus and GoCargo.com, most investors in FreightDesk.com are individuals,
not institutional investors, so that its investors' list is not publicly available. The
management team is generally composed of entrepreneurs with IT industry background,
but it has a few industry veterans.
5.2.4 E-procurement Service Provider (e-PSP)
E-procurement service provider (e-PSP) offers internet-based trading platforms for
carriers to buy ship management-related parts and service - called "ship supplies --
from the ship suppliers. In other words, the e-PSP tries to automate the purchasing of ship
supplies for carriers by either hosting internet-based auction systems or providing
business negotiation tools.
In general, the ship supplies market is relatively well positioned to attract the e-PSPs.
First, the ship supplies market size is huge. Total ship supplies market size in 1998 was
$4.2 billion and the containerships provided $792 million40 , which is almost 20% of total
ship supplies market size. In addition to the huge market size, the ship suppliers are so
fragmented and geographically dispersed that the value of an internet-based information
service, which provides efficient information flow among the market participants, could
be substantial. Moreover, since the ship supplies have very different specifications, it is
critical for carriers to maintain the information of their ship parts for efficient ship
maintenance.
Given this market attractiveness, several e-PSPs were founded targeting the ship supplies
market before the dot-com crash, and they have been relatively sustainable even after the
dot-com crash. One e-PSP has shown positive cash flow from its operation, which is
quite impressive for an e-business company4 1. The examples of the e-PSPs include
39 For example, the ship supplies include bunker, lubricants, cabin stores and waters, general stores, spares,
victualling, etc
40 Booz Allen & Hamilton, (1998), "Strategy Summary on Setfair.com Project,"
41 According to the DigitalShip.com's article on August 2 7tb, 2001, SmartSpares.com reported that it was
cash flow positive.
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OneSea.com, PrimeSupplier.com Arena.com, E4Marine.com, MarineProvider.com, Smart
Spares, OceanConnect.com, etc.
Case Study: OneSea.com (or SeaSupplier.com)
OneSea.com was founded in early 1999, when many other e-business companies in the
CSI were launched. One of the original founding members was Maersk (now Maersk
Sealand), the largest container shipping company, and other founding members included
well-known Norwegian ship owners and managers, such as V-Ships, Acomarit, Bergesen,
Teekay, Jebsen, Hoegh, etc. OneSea.com, collaborating with Computer Associates,
developed an online auction system, online catalogues, and customer profiling systems, to
expedite the internet-based procurement of ship supplies.
A major strength of OneSea.com, compared to other e-PSPs, was that it had lured many
major industry players as founding investors. This collaborating effort could provide the
liquidity to OneSea.com's e-procurement platform. In addition, the support from the
industry players made OneSea.com be more active in M&A (merger and acquisition)
deals with other e-PSPs by utilizing broad industry contacts from the founding member
companies. After a series of M&A deals with smaller e-PSPs, OneSea.com finally
became merged with PrimeSupplier.com, a formidable e-PSP competitor backed by
another industry giant, Stolt-Nielsen, in May 2001, renaming itself SeaSupplier.com.
5.2.5 E-chartering Service Provider (e-CSP)
An e-chartering service provider (e-CSP) specializes in connecting the ship owners and
charterers, who rent the ships for operation. Historically, the ship chartering business has
been a relationship-based activity so that a trusted 3 rd party, or the ship broker, has
controlled the ship chartering market. The ship brokers develop a database on up-to-date
ship-related information, maintain good relationships with ship owners and charterers, and
play the brokerage role in ship chartering. Given the globe-wide nature of the container
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shipping industry and complex ship specifications, the ship brokers have played an
important role in ship chartering.
In the wake of the internet boom in 2000, however, several new e-CSPs were launched to
capture this ship chartering market and they are generally in the early stages of business
development. The e-CSPs provide useful ship chartering related information and online
negotiation tools for ship owners and charters. The benefit to carriers of using the e-CSP
service is that it can reduce the information search cost, which has been awarded to the
ship brokers, to find out the right ship owners and charterers to make a ship chartering
contract. Despite its potential benefits to ship owners and charterers, it remains to be seen
whether or not the e-CSPs can overcome the traditional relationship-based nature of the
ship chartering market.
The examples of the e-CSPs include LevelSeas.com, Shipbrokering.com, Slotcharter.com,
ShipIQ.com, and Shipping-direct.com.
Case Study: LevelSeas.com
LevelSeas.com was founded in April 2000 to provide internet-based ship chartering
service to the ocean shipping community. The founding shareholders were venture
capitalists and charterers of tanker or bulk ships such as Shell, BP, and Cargill; however, a
ship broker, Clarksons, and bulk shipping companies, such as Maersk, Bergensen, OMI,
Teekay, and V Ships, later joined the company as shareholders. LevelSeas.com now has
34 ocean shipping related companies, including major charters, owners, and brokers, as
shareholders.
LevelSeas.com's product is designed to make ship chartering activities more efficient
through the internet-based communication technology. Its first internet-based chartering
product, called LSX 1.0, was launched in July 2001 and enable owners, charterers, and
brokers to trade, communicate, and manage market information online. Its second
version, LSX 2.0, which was launched in September 2001, provides contract negotiation,
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questionnaire and charter party editing functionality, and a button to actually complete a
ship chartering transaction.42
The revenue model of LevelSeas.com is to charge a mixture of subscription fees and
transaction commission, which is expected be 0.5% of the value of a transaction
conducted through its website (up to $20,000 per transaction).
A major competitive advantage of LevelSeas.com over other e-CSPs is to attract diverse
industry players in ship chartering market as shareholders. The strong support from the
industry players could potentially increase the liquidity of its e-chartering marketplace so
that its operation can be profitable as soon as possible. However, LevelSeas.com might
have to overcome two strategic challenges to be successful: First, none of the players -
charterers, owners, or brokers - in the ship chartering market are yet ready to pay the
transaction commission although they are willing to become subscribers to the
LevelSeas.com's service. LevelSeas.com should deal with this uncertainty of its revenue
source. Second, the strong presence of traditional ship brokers in the ship chartering
market might limit the success of LevelSeas.com. Still, many ship brokers did not join the
LevelSeas.com's service for fear of losing ship brokerage business: they worry about
potential disintermediation of the ship chartering market. Given that the ocean shipping
industry has been very old and fairly fragmented, the role of ship brokers cannot be
ignored. Therefore, to develop the right strategic partnership with traditional ship brokers
is crucial to the success of LevelSeas.com in the future.
5.2.6 Summary
This section has analyzed the characteristics of internet-based business models in the CSI.
Table 5-1 shows a general overview of e-business models in the CSI.
4 Digital Ship, (2001), "Latest in online chartering," July/August 2001, p. 23.
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Table 5-1 General Overview of internet-based business activities in the CSI
e- Business Models
MaritimeDirect
Freightgate.com
GT Nexus
INTTRA.com
CargoSmart.com
GoCargo.com
GoReefers.com
Interbox.com
Synchronet.com
Celarix
ShipLogix
CarrierPoint
Descarte
Vastera
ClearCross
NextLinx
FreightDesk
Oceanwide
Rely
Software
CCEWEB
TradeCard
Bolero.net
SeaSupplier.com
OceanConnect
Bunkerworld.com
MarineProvider
Smart Spares
ShipServe.com
iShipExange.com
LevelSeas.com
Shipbrokering
Slotcharter.com
ShipIQ.com
Shipping-Direct
It is clear from this analysis that those e-business models have tried to change the basic
dynamics of the CSI although some models have not been successful so far. Several
notable conclusions can be drawn from this analysis.
0 The boundary of each e-business model becomes blurry over time. For example, the
early portals only focused on providing useful market information to attract the
potential users, without supplementing the service with other sophisticated
transportation management tools that the CTPs have usually tried to offer. However,
realizing that the early portal model was not successful in amassing the critical volume
of loyal users of its portal service, many recent portals, such as GT Nexus,
INTTRA.com, and CargoSmart.com, also provide various collaborative tools. In
addition, the portals and the CTPs even developed close partnerships to supplement
their weaknesses. For example, GT Nexus, which is a carrier-oriented portal, and
NextLinx, which provides regulatory contents and trade compliance software,
formalized their strategic partnership in August 2001.
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" Consolidation among the e-business companies in the CSI will be more active in the
near future. Throughout the dot-com crash, many e-business companies went bust due
to either unproven business models or weak financial support from investors. The e-
business companies with more market-friendly strategies and financial strength will
develop more merger-and-acquisition (M&A) deals to fortify their competitive
positions.
* After the dot-com crash, it seems that the e-business models that are more "friendly"
to major industry players, such as large carriers and shippers, will be sustained in the
long run. For example, the early portals, which had little industry support, have failed,
whereas the carrier-oriented portals receiving direct support from major carriers, such
as GT Nexus and INTTRA.com, showed relatively sustaining operations despite the
dot-com crash. Furthermore, the majority of the CTPs, which provide operational
efficiency to major carriers and shippers, have managed to survive so far.
* Traditional business relationships in the CSI are so strong that it is difficult to
revolutionize the current business practices with internet-based technology. For
example, GoCargo.com, which tried to totally change the way of doing business in the
CSI by tapping an internet-based auction system, failed to survive because the
majority of carriers and shippers prefer the long-term contract market, which is mainly
based on business relationships and quality of service, as opposed to price itself.
Thus, the e-business models that can honor current business practices, such as the
CTPs, are more likely to succeed in the long run.
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5.3 Comparative Evaluation of Internet-based Business Models in the
Container Shipping Industry
Each e-business model in the container shipping industry has its unique strengths and
weaknesses. Given the market information discussed in the previous section, it is
necessary to do a comparative analysis of these e-business models in the CSI. The
comparative analysis can explain the reasons why many e-business models have failed,
provide an insight into which e-business models are more likely to survive in the long run,
and thus aid in understanding the potential impacts from e-business activities on the
container shipping industry.
Three frameworks are proposed from a technology strategy perspective and used to
comparatively evaluate the potential success of different e-business models in the
container shipping industry : the "Appropriability - Complementary Assets" (A-CA)
framework, the "Network Externality - Customer Lock-in" (NE-CL) framework, and the
"Market Type - Customer Focus" (MT-CF)" framework. Each framework is specifically
designed to identify the e-business models that are more likely to succeed in a given
market environment. The A-CA framework provides a short-term success possibility for
technology-oriented new ventures and helps them develop alliance strategies. Meanwhile,
the NE-CL framework presents long-term success potential for technology-oriented new
ventures. Finally, the MT-CF framework is useful for evaluating the internet-based
marketplaces.
5.3.1 Evaluation Using the "Appropriability - Complementary Assets"
(A-CA) Framework
5.3.1.1 "Appropriability - Complementary Assets" (A-CA) Framework
As Teece (1987) has argued, there are four different strategic playing fields for
technology-oriented new ventures, based on two variables: level of appropriability and
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availability of complementary assets (Figure 5-2). Appropriability is the extent to which
the technology expertise of ventures is protected either by intellectual property rights such
as patents and trade secrecy, or by technical complexity that is difficult to copy. In the
real world, the appropriability can be strong or weak. For example, Coca-Cola maintains
strong appropriability for its cola formula by keeping it as a trade secret; whereas internet-
based auction technology has weak appropriability due to its low technical complexity.
Meanwhile, complementary assets are the resources that support the successful
deployment of new technology, such as distribution channels, sales force, brand,
reputation, manufacturing expertise, supplier exclusivity, and so on. In general, the
complementary assets are freely available - i.e., tightly held by the technology-oriented
ventures themselves - or tightly held by other players. For instance, in the early stage of
the internet portal market, the complementary assets such as brand, distribution channels,
or sales force were freely available because no one had ever owned them whereas in a
sophisticated medical equipment (e.g., CT scanner) market, the complementary assets
were tightly held by incumbent major players like GE.
A major benefit from the A-CA framework is that it is useful for understanding the short-
term success possibilities of technology-oriented new ventures and for developing alliance
strategies for them. For example, among the four strategic playing fields in the A-CA
framework, a strategic alliance is more likely to be useful in the field of strong
appropriability with complementary assets being tightly held by others (location (1) in
Figure 5-2). In this field, a new venture has a strong technological capability that looks
very attractive to potential alliance partners, while it lacks important complementary
assets that are tightly controlled by other companies. Consequently, the company in the
field (1) had better develop strategic alliances with other companies to improve its
competitiveness, and the alliances will also be successful for the alliance partners.
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Availability of
Complementary Assets
Freely available or
tightly held by
themselves Tightly held by others
(4) - Outsourcing (1) - Cooperation
(2) - Vulnerable to
(3) - Run to Market Competition
"Appropriability
Strategies
- Complementary Assets" Framework and Alliance
However, a company in the field (2) is most vulnerable to competition and least able to
develop alliances with other companies since the company has neither a technological
advantage nor important complementary assets. A new venture in the field (2), therefore,
should either fortify appropriability through aggressive internal R&D efforts or develop
strong alliances with complementary asset owners.
On the other hand, a company in the field (3) in Figure 5-2 had better pursue a stand-alone
strategy to enter the market as soon as possible, because the market is freely open to new
entrants and no company has yet dominated the market. In this case, the first company to
enter the market and build tight control of complementary assets will be more likely to
succeed. In contrast, a new venture in the field (4) will tend to outsource some
complementary assets to other companies because the venture controls technological
advantages with strong appropriability and can easily leverage the strong appropriability
to develop outsourcing partnerships.
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5.3.1.2 Evaluation of e-Businesses in the Container Shipping Industry with
the A-CA Framework
Figure 5-3 shows the overall evaluation of six e-business models in the container shipping
industry using the A-CA framework.
Availability of
Complementary Assets
Freely available or
tightly held by
themselves
Strong
0 '
Weak
Tightly held by others
Figure 5-3 Application of "Appropriability - Complementary Assets" Framework
to e-Business Models in the Container Shipping Industry
First of all, most e-business models in the CSI except the carrier-oriented portals have to
deal with complementary assets tightly held by others. The CTPs, early portals, e-
marketplaces, e-PSPs, and e-CSPs do not own sufficient complementary assets - e.g.,
established brand image, reputation, efficient sales force, and distribution channel - since
they are small technology-oriented new ventures. For example, those companies have
little brand recognition from the buyers and sellers of container shipping service, who are
the core customers of e-marketplaces. Without knowing reliable brands, few customers
are willing to join the e-marketplace. Having fewer customers lowers the liquidity of the
43 The early portal and carrier-oriented portal are separately analyzed because they have different
characteristics from the perspective of A-CA framework.
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e-marketplace, making profitability elusive. In addition, because their business models
are trying to change current business practices among incumbent players who have strong
relationships, they cannot avoid collaborating with incumbent players to some extent.
Therefore, all e-business models except the carrier-oriented portals have to compete in a
field where complementary assets are tightly held by other companies.
Meanwhile, the carrier-oriented portals hold complementary assets that help them execute
their business model successfully. In other words, because the carrier-oriented portals,
such as GT Nexus, INTTRA, and CargoSmart.com, have several large container carriers
as founding shareholders, the carrier-oriented portals can easily build their brand
recognition and distribution channels, thereby establishing close relationships with major
incumbent industry players.
On the other hand, on the dimension of the level of appropriability, only the CTPs have
strong appropriability, whereas for the others it is weak. The CTPs are providing
proprietary internet-based software that helps carriers support customers better or helps
transportation intermediaries better manage the international cargo shipments. Their
products are process-specific, so that it is difficult for other competitors to copy them in a
short period of time. In other words, technological complexity itself provides relatively
strong appropriability. In contrast, the software, which portals, e-marketplaces, e-PSPs,
and e-CSPs are offering, can be easily customized from off-the-shelf internet-based
platforms. For example, the function of matching buyers and sellers online without
considering qualitative factors can be easily developed using the auctioning software for
commodity products such as oil, natural gas, or stocks.
This analysis provides two important insights into the e-business models in the CSI: First,
the analysis shows which e-business models are more likely to survive in the early stage
of market entry. Comparing Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3, the e-business models located in
the field of weak appropriability and complementary assets being held by others, such as
early portals, e-marketplaces, e-PSPs, and e-CSPs, are vulnerable to competition and thus
less likely to survive. The demise of MaritimeDirect.com, an early portal, and
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GoCargo.com, an e-marketplace, confirms the vulnerability of these e-business models.
However, the CTPs and carrier-oriented portals are more likely to survive in the early
stage of market entry than others, because the CTPs have strong appropriability and the
carrier-oriented portals tightly control the complementary assets. As long as the CTPs and
carrier-oriented portals supplement their strategic weaknesses, they can be successful new
service providers for the container shipping industry.
This application of the A-CA framework provides another insight into developing alliance
strategies for the e-business models in the CSI. Comparing Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3, the
CTPs should cooperate with the owners of complementary assets to realize their
technological advantages. Unless the CTPs receive support from the owners of
complementary assets, who are mostly major incumbent carriers, shippers, and
intermediaries in the CSI, they cannot sell their proprietary software to the incumbents
successfully. In addition, the comparison between Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3 indicates
that the carrier-oriented portals should enter the potential market as soon as possible
before other competitors develop the ownership of complementary assets or launch
technically superior software.
Table 5-2 and Figure 5-4 below further explain the potential alliance strategies for e-
business models in the CSI from the A-CA framework. Another two-by-two matrix for
developing alliance strategies can be proposed from the A-CA framework based on two
dimensions: level of alliance needs and level of alliance implementability. The level of
alliance needs is determined by the locations within the A-CA framework. For example,
since the early portals, e-marketplaces, e-PSPs, and e-CSPs are located in the field (2) of
the A-CA framework, it is most "urgent" to develop strategic alliances with strong owners
of complementary assets in order to survive. Otherwise those e-business models in the
field (2) of the A-CA framework will fail because of weak appropriability and no control
of complementary assets. Meanwhile, because the CTPs are in the field (1) of the A-CA
framework, where cooperation with owners of complementary assets is valuable for
potential success, having strategic alliances is a necessary condition for their strategic
developments. In addition, the carrier-oriented portals may need strategic alliances to
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enter the market as soon as possible, but the alliance developments are not urgent as long
as the carrier-oriented portals have enough relationships with current industry players.
Accordingly, the strategic alliances for the carrier-oriented portals can be a necessary
condition for their strategic developments.
The level of alliance implementability, on the other hand, can be determined based on the
strategic capabilities of e-business models. In other words, the higher level of
appropriability a company has, the greater the possibility of alliance formation (Eisenhardt
and Schoonhoven, 1996). Additionally, if a company can control the complementary
assets tightly, it can easily develop strategic alliances with others who do not own
complementary assets. Therefore, the CTPs and carrier-oriented portals can easily
develop strategic alliances, thanks to their higher level of appropriability or tight
ownership of complementary assets; whereas the remaining e-business models may have
trouble in implementing strategic alliances because of their low level of appropriability.
Table 5-2 Application of "Appropriability - Complementary Assets" Framework
and its Implication for Alliance Formation in e-Business Models in the
Container Shipping Industry
Strong
Tightly held by
others
Weak
Freely available or
tightly held by
themselves
Weak
Tightly held by
others
Necessary Necessary Urgent
Easy Easy Difficult
Highly likely Highly likely Likely but difficult
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Easy
4-4
Z
Strong
Necessary
Level of Alliance
Implementability
Difficult
Potential Relationship between Alliance Needs and Alliance
Implementability of e-Business Models in the Container Shipping
Industry
Additionally, Figure 5-4 hints at another potential dynamic in e-business models in the
CSI; The CTPs and carrier-oriented portals seem more likely to develop strategic alliances
together, because the CTPs need to partner with someone who owns complementary
assets and the carrier-oriented portals possess complementary assets. Alternately, the
carrier-oriented portals should increase the appropriability of their technical service
whereas the CTPs offer proprietary software that can supplement the service of the
carrier-oriented portals. In reality, the CTPs and carrier-oriented portals have developed
several strategic alliances. For example, GT Nexus developed a strategic alliance with
NextLinx, which provides internet-based software to calculate total landed cost
automatically, and INTTRA partnered with Vastera to provide international trade
management service for shippers.
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5.3.2 Evaluation Using the "Network Externality - Customer Lock-in"
(NE-CL) Framework
5.3.2.1 "Network Externality - Customer Lock-in" (NE-CL) Framework
Internet-based businesses are by nature network-oriented activities. Any e-business model
should attract potential users of its internet-based service, develop a community of users,
drive business interactions among the users, and finally generate profits from the business
interactions among the users. Consequently, network-related factors, such as network
externality and customer lock-in, are critical in evaluating the e-business models.
Network externality (NE) is the extent that the size of network, or the number of users of
network-oriented service, can impact the benefits of users themselves. If the benefits of
users of network-oriented service increase as the number of users increases, the service
has positive network externality. Conversely, if the benefits of users of network-oriented
service decrease as the number of users increases, the service has negative network
externality. For example, e-marketplace in the CSI can have positive network externality
if sellers of container shipping service can find potential buyers more easily as the number
of users of e-marketplace increases, and vice versa. In contrast, e-marketplace will suffer
from negative network externality if sellers must spend more time to find the appropriate
buyers as the number of users of e-marketplace increases.
On the other hand, customer lock-in (CL) is the extent that customers will stick to current
service. The more attractive the current service is, the more strongly the customer will be
locked in to the current service. The customer lock-in, particularly of technology-based
service, is affected by switching costs and standards. In other words, if switching costs,
which customers pay for changing the service from one to another, are high, the customer
lock-in to current service will increase, and vice versa. In addition, if the standards are
well established among the customers, the customers are more likely to stick to their
current service.
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The combination of network externality and customer lock-in provides a useful
framework of a two-by-two matrix (Figure 5-6) - strong/weak impact of network
externality versus strong/weak degree of customer lock-in. Particularly, the "network
externality - customer lock-in (NE-CL)" framework presents long-term success potential
of e-business models because it generally takes longer for e-business new ventures to
develop the impact of network externality and customer lock-in. Furthermore, the NE-CL
framework can also help develop competitive strategies of each e-business model in the
CSI.
5.3.2.2 Evaluation of e-Businesses in the Container Shipping Industry with
the NE-CL Framework
Figure 5-5 shows that each e-business model in the container shipping industry has
different impacts of network externality. In the short term, marketplace-like e-business
models, such as e-marketplaces, e-PSPs, and e-CSPs, have stronger network externality
than others because the more buyers in the e-marketplaces, the more sellers will join the e-
marketplaces expecting additional business potentials, and vice versa. In other words,
adding new users will provide more 'direct' value to the current users of the e-
marketplace. It will simply follow Metcalf s Law that the value of network is
proportional to the second order of the number of users. However, in the long run, the
network externality of the marketplace-like e-business models will be saturated over time
because marginal benefits from the additional users will be offset by the increasing costs
of finding the right trading partners.
Meanwhile, benefits from the network externality of the CTPs are weak when the number
of users is few in the early stage of business development since adding a new user does
not necessarily mean that the current users could directly reduce their logistics
management costs. In order to receive benefits from new users, both new users and
current users must actually do the collaborative business, which is not easy to develop in
such a short period of time. Put another way, immediate and direct impacts from the new
users on the benefits of current users will be limited in the short run. However, in the long
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term, the CTPs have much stronger network externality, which can exceed the network
externality of e-marketplace. Since, for example, exchanging transportation-related
documents through CTP's web-based service is very sticky due to high switching costs,
the customers of the CTP service can substantially reduce communication and
administrative costs once it reaches a critical mass of users.
On the other hand, the portals will provide very little network externality to the users.
They just show market information with few connections among the users. So the number
of users of the portals does not change the overall value of the network.
Besides the differences of the impact of network externality, one e-business model's
degree of lock-in to the service also differs from other e-business models' degree of lock-
in (Figure 5-6). In principle, users of the CTP's service tend to be loyal to the service
because the software of the CTPs has its own standards that allow the users to distribute
transportation-related documents easily. Therefore, the CTP users are more likely to be
locked in to the service. In contrast, the users of marketplace-like e-business models can
change their service choices more freely from one place to another because those e-
business models require fewer standards than the CTP service. Furthermore, the portal
users are much less locked in than the CTP users since the portal service has low network
externality and the fewest standards among the e-business models in the CSI.
In summary, this analysis with the "NE-CL" framework maintains that the portal model is
relatively less valuable to the users than other e-business models in the CSI. On the
contrary, the CTPs can provide long-term value to their users through positive network
externality and higher degree of customer lock-in. Therefore, the portals have the lowest
long-term success potential and the CTPs have the highest long-term success potential
among the e-business models in the CSI.
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5.3.2.3 Development of Competitive Strategies from the Analysis with the
NE-CL Framework
The analysis with the NE-CL framework shows that e-business models in the CSI have
different impacts of network externality and degrees of customer lock-in. For example,
the CTPs have strong network externality with higher level of customer lock-in, taking a
longer time to reach critical mass for network externality benefits. The marketplace-like
e-business models, such as e-marketplace, e-PSP, and e-CSP, have strong network
externality with medium level of customer lock-in, taking a relatively short time to
achieve network externality benefits. Meanwhile, the portals have weak network
externality with a low level of customer lock-in. These different characteristics in the NE-
CL framework can help each business model develop different competitive strategies.
First of all, the CTPs will compete with three strategic foci: the product-oriented
approach, being niche players, and developing good relationships with incumbent players.
First, because the CTPs are developing sophisticated software that provides efficiency to
current transportation management functions of carriers and shippers, their competitive
advantage should originally come from their own products so that they tend to adopt a
product-oriented approach for competition. Once the product is good enough to win over
competitors, it will attract more users, eventually providing positive network externality.
Second, the CTPs will focus on a particular set of customers or a particular set of
transportation management functions for their products/services in order to develop a
critical mass of users who might be loyal to the CTPs' service. In other words, although
benefits from the network externality for the CTPs' services are tremendous in the end,
the CTPs should survive through the slow adoption rate in the early stage. Therefore, the
CTPs had better be niche players and start to develop a critical mass of users of the
specific functions of transportation management at first. For example, FreightDesk.com,
which provides transportation management software, is targeting freight forwarders that
are most desperate for automated transportation management service, thereby attracting
loyal users as soon as possible to survive through early difficulties. Third, since the CTPs
try to upgrade current manual-based transportation or trade management processes by
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providing internet-based software, collaboration with incumbent industry players is very
important. Therefore, they try to maintain good relationships with the incumbents,
especially large and powerful ones. For example, Vastera, which offers trade management
service, maintains a close relationship with Ford to provide auto-related logistics
management service.
Unlike the CTPs, marketplace-like e-business models, such as e-marketplaces, e-PSPs,
and e-CSPs, should develop different competitive strategies. Since the impact of network
externality on marketplace-like e-business models is quicker than that of the CTPs, the
marketplace-like e-business models focus more on promotion and marketing to push early
adoption by customers. In other words, they try to enjoy first-mover advantage by
attracting buyers and sellers as quickly as possible. Once an e-marketplace reaches a
critical mass of users, it can enjoy the benefit of network externality and dominate the
business against competitors. Therefore, the marketplace-like e-business models have
spent more money on advertising, promotion, press relationships, and so forth than other
e-business models. However, a weakness of this strategy is that an e-marketplace will be
more likely to fail if it does not spend enough money on marketing to persuade potential
customers to join the e-marketplace. It may be a risky 'all-or-nothing' competitive
strategy.
Meanwhile, because the portals have few benefits from network externality or from
customer lock-in, they might have difficulty in finding suitable competitive strategies. In
fact, they are more vulnerable to competition because they have few revenue sources and
a low level of customer lock-in. The only implementable strategy for the portals might be
to collaborate with other e-business models because resourceful market information
provided by the former can help the latter attract more users. The portals themselves seem
unlikely to be profitable business in the long run.
In summary, different degrees of network externality and customer lock-in drive different
strategic choices to the e-business models in the container shipping industry. Each player
should adopt the strategies that provide maximum benefits from the perspective of
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different degrees and time frames of network externality. Therefore, the CTPs should
follow the strategies of the product-oriented approach, of being a niche approach, or of
developing good relationships with incumbent players, whereas e-marketplaces would
take aggressive promotion and marketing strategies. However, because the portals have
weak network externality and a low degree of customer lock-in, they should collaborate
with other e-business models in order to survive.
5.3.3 Evaluation Using the "Market Type - Customer Focus" (MT-CF)
Framework
5.3.3.1 "Market Type - Customer Focus" (MT-CF) Framework
The third criterion for evaluating e-business models, MT-CL framework, is to analyze the
customer focus of e-business models with market types in which e-business models are
competing. In other words, e-business models are more likely to succeed if their customer
focus matches with a market player who has relatively stronger buying power than other
market players. This framework is based on the assumption that, given the difficulty of
diffusing new technology into the traditional relationship-based industries such as the
container shipping industry, technology-oriented new ventures utilizing stronger buying
power of potential customers are more likely to succeed.
There are two market types in MT-CF framework: the buyers' market and the sellers'
market. The buyers' market is the marketplace where buyers have stronger buying power
than sellers. For example, the ship supplier market in the container shipping industry,
where carriers buy ship management-related products from ship suppliers, is a buyers'
market because carriers, or buyers, have much stronger bargaining power than the
suppliers. In contrast, the sellers' market is the marketplace where sellers have stronger
bargaining power than buyers. For example, a spot market of container shipping service,
where carriers sell container shipping capacity to shippers on a short-term basis, is a
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sellers' market since carriers, or sellers, have stronger bargaining power than shippers,
who are generally small companies in the spot market.
Two variables are important in determining the market type: relative market concentration
and relative service dependency. First, the market concentration means the extent that a
market is controlled by a certain number of players. In other words, the fewer players
controlling the market, the higher the market concentration. To determine the market
type, relative market concentration can be used: the ratio of buyers concentration and
sellers concentration ( i.e., relative market concentration = buyers concentration / sellers
concentration ). If the relative market concentration is higher than one, the market tends
to be a buyers' market because buyers might utilize their concentrated buying powers.
Similarly, if the relative market concentration is lower than one, the market is more likely
to be a sellers' market. The second variable, service dependency, is defined as how
urgently a market player is dependent upon the service. In order to estimate the market
type, relative service dependency ( i.e., the ratio of buyers' service dependency and
sellers' service dependency), can be used. Thus, if the relative service dependency is
larger than one, the market tends to be a sellers' market since sellers can be in a better
bargaining position by exploiting the buyers' service dependency. Likewise, if the
relative service dependency is smaller than one, the market is more likely to be a buyers'
market.
The MT-CF framework in Figure 5-7 provides two places of success and failure
respectively. An e-business model tends to succeed if the market type, buyers' or sellers'
market, coincides with the customer focus of the e-business model. On the contrary, if the
market type and customer focus of e-business model are different, the e-business model is
more likely to fail.
This framework is particularly useful when e-business models have clear sets of buyers
and sellers so that the market type and customer focus are easily identified. For example,
marketplace-like e-business models, such as e-marketplace, e-PSP, and e-CSP, can be
effectively analyzed with the MT-CF framework.
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Figure 5-7 - The "Market Type - Customer Focus" (MT-CF) Framework
5.3.3.2 Evaluation of e-Business Models in the Container Shipping Industry
with the MT-CF Framework
Table 5-3 and Figure 5-8 show the evaluation of e-business models in the container
shipping industry with the MT-CF framework. The CTPs and e-PSPs are well positioned
to be potentially successful. They are competing in a buyers' market, focusing on buyers
as targeted customers. They have the right match of market type and customer focus.
Thus, they are more likely to succeed than other e-business models in the CSI.
On the contrary, e-marketplaces clearly choose the wrong customer focus to be
sustainable. The e-marketplaces, which provide internet-based marketplace for the spot
market of container shipping service, are offering their service in a sellers' market while
they target buyers. So, the e-marketplaces might be difficult to succeed given this wrong
combination of market type and customer focus. They should change their customer
focus from buyers to sellers in order to be successful.
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Meanwhile, the portals and e-CSPs are in a gray area where they are competing in a
neutral market type. Their potential success might depend on how they creatively partner
with buyers or sellers to be more powerful in the marketplaces.
Table 5-3 Application of "Market Type - Customer Focus" Framework to e-
Business Models in the Container Shipping Industry
Shippers, 3PLs C, S, I Carriers Carriers,Brokers
Tech. company Carriers Tech. company Ship suppliers Charterers
Buyers Sellers Buyers Buyers Neutral
Buyers Neutral Buyers Neutral Neutral
Buyers Sellers Buyers Buyers Neutral
Neutral Buyers Buyers Neutral
,ss Potential Low-Medium Low
(1) C: Carriers, (2) S: Shippers, (3) I: Intermediaries
Neutral
Low-Medium
Customer Focus
Sellers
Figure 5-8 Evaluation of e-Business Models in the Container Shipping Industry
with the MT-CF Framework
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5.3.4 Summary
In this section, current e-business models in the CSI have been analyzed with three
different frameworks - A-CA framework, NE-CL framework, and MT-CF framework.
The analysis explained the reasons why many e-business models in the CSI have failed,
found out the potentially successful e-business models, and recommended the desirable
competitive strategies of e-business models in the CSI. Among the major findings are:
" The CTPs will be most likely to succeed in the long term as well as in the short term.
" The CTPs and carrier-oriented portals are likely to develop strategic alliances together
and their alliances might be successful.
" Besides the CTPs, e-PSPs are also likely to succeed due to their right match of market
type and customer focus.
Therefore, this comparative evaluation of e-business models in the CSI draws the
conclusion that the most promising e-business models in the CSI are 1) the CTPs in
alliance with carrier-oriented portal and 2) e-PSPs for ship supplies procurement. These
promising e-business models will be more likely to impact the container shipping industry
in the long term.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to analyze internet-based business (e-business) models in the
container shipping industry. Five different e-business models - portal, e-marketplace,
collaborative tool provider (CTP), e-procurement service provider (e-PSP), and e-
chartering service provider (e-CSP) - have been launched in the container shipping
industry with unique competitive strategies and technology settings. Case studies of each
e-business model show that the boundary of e-business models becomes blurry over time,
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resulting in active consolidation among the e-business companies in the CSI, and an e-
business model, which is more friendly to major industry players and traditional business
relationships in the CSI, such as CTP, is more likely to succeed in the long run.
Furthermore, a comparative analysis of e-business models in the CSI using the three
frameworks - A-CA framework, NE-CL framework, and MT-CF framework - developed
from a technology strategy perspective confirms that two e-business models - CTPs in
alliance with carrier-oriented portals and e-PSPs - are more likely to succeed in the long
run.
The outcome of this research can be used for assessing the potential impacts of e-business
on the container shipping industry: Since it is now understood that two promising e-
business models might be more successful than others, it is possible to measure the
impacts, qualitatively or quantitatively as appropriate, of e-business activities on the
container shipping industry. For example, an analysis of the potential interactions
between strategic challenges of carriers and two promising e-business models can provide
a general picture as to how the container shipping industry will be impacted by e-business
activities and how carriers should respond to those impacts.
In the following chapters, a system dynamics modeling methodology is applied in order to
measure the impacts of e-business activities on the container shipping industry.
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Chapter 6 A Generic Model for the Dynamics of
Supply-and-Demand in the Container
Shipping Industry
6.1 Introduction
To analyze the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry, the traditional
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry should be investigated
and used as a reference system. This chapter explains a system dynamics model for the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. Although there have
been several system dynamics models dealing with general dynamics of supply-and-
demand in different industries (Hernandez, 1990; Sterman, 2000; Taylor, 1999; Thornton,
1992; Weil, 1998), the model developed in this research is the first attempt to simulate the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry.
A brief description of the historical development of supply-and-demand dynamics is first
presented. Section 6.3 provides the overview of the causal relationships that drive the
dynamics of supply-and-demand. Section 6.4 explains a system dynamics model for the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry, including the scope
and boundary of the model and quantitative formulations that compose the causal
linkages. Section 6.5 validates the model by calibrating it with real industry data. The
chapter concludes with the findings from the modeling of dynamics of supply-and-
demand in the container shipping industry.
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6.2 Historical Developments of Supply-and-Demand in the Container
Shipping Industry
The dynamics of supply-and-demand are in general composed of three groups of
variables: supply, demand, and profitability. A closer look at these variables helps one
understand the internal dynamics of supply-and-demand; i.e., how the balance between
supply and demand of service could determine the price of service and the profitability of
the service provider. Hence, this section explores the historical developments of the
variables of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. Although it is
desirable to analyze the variables for a longer period of time, the analysis focuses on the
data in the 1990s due to the lack of data availability.
6.2.1 Demand for Container Shipping Service
The demand for container shipping service has increased dramatically since the first
container shipping service in 1956. Figure 6-1 reveals that the number of containers
transported, measured by million TEUs of port handling, has substantially increased over
time. On average, the demand for container shipping service has grown at 10.3% per year
from 1975 to 2000. Although the demand has increased constantly, the growth rates have
been changing with a decreasing trend over time. Another demand metric is annualized
container shipping demand in the 1990s, showing that demand increased from 10.4
million TEUs per year in 1990 to 17.9 million TEUs per year in 1999, which is a growth
rate of 8% per annum (Figure 6-2). This figure also confirms that the growth rates of the
demand have changed over time. In summary, the demand for container shipping service
has been increasing with different growth rates over time.
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Figure 6-1 Number of Containers Handled at Ports per Year
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Figure 6-2 Annualized Container Shipping Demand in the 1990s
(Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999)
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6.2.2 Supply of Container Shipping Service
There are five variables for the supply for container shipping service: containership
capacity, containership capacity on order, order rate of containership capacity, delivery
rate of containership capacity, and discard rate (or scrapping rate) of containership
capacity.
As illustrated in Figure 6-3, the containership capacity has increased relentlessly for the
past 20 years. The containership capacity at the end of 2000 amounted to 4.8 million
TEUs, which is around nine times more containership capacity than that of 1981. The
year-over-year growth rate for the past two decades ranges from 5.0% to 18.6% and the
average growth rate is around 10.4% per annum. Like the demand for container shipping
service, the growth rates of containership capacity have been changing over time although
the containership capacity has been ever increasing.
Historical Development of Contalnership Fleet
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Figure 6-3 Containership Capacity over Time
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A closer look at the containership capacity data in the 1990s also confirms that the
containership capacity has been increasing over time (Figure 6-4). Particularly,
containership capacity has increased faster from 1995 to 1999.
Containership Capacity
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Containership Capacity: Real CSI Data 1 1 1 1 1 TEU/year
Figure 6-4 Containership Capacity in the 1990s
(Source: Clarksons Research Studies)
Meanwhile, the containership capacity on order, which is the containership capacity being
constructed in shipyards, has increased over time with some cyclical behaviors (Figure
6-5). In addition, both the order rate, which is the containership capacity ordered by
carriers per year, and the delivery rate, which is the containership capacity delivered by
shipyards to carriers per year, show similar developments over time (Figure 6-6, Figure
6-7).
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Figure 6-6 Order Rate of Containership Capacity in the 1990s
(Source: Clarksons Research Studies)
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Figure 6-7 Delivery Rate of Containership Capacity in the 1990s
(Source: Clarksons Research Studies)
On the contrary, the discard rate, which is the containership capacity scrapped per year,
has been relatively minimal compared with the total containership capacity (Figure 6-8).
For example, the amount of capacity scrapped in 1998 when it was the highest is only 2%
of containership capacity in 1998. The reason for this is that because containerships can
be used around 25 - 30 years, the early containerships built in the early 1960s started to be
scrapped in the early 1990s. Therefore, the discard rate will increase as more
containerships reach their maximum usage of life.
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Figure 6-8 Discard Rate of Containership Capacity in the 1990s
(Source: Clarksons Research Studies)
6.2.3 Profitability of Container Shipping Service
The profitability" of container shipping service is determined by the revenue from
container shipping service and the cost associated with it. The revenue comes from the
freight rate of container shipping service, which is mainly determined by the utilization,
and the utilization is calculated by demand divided by the annualized containership
capacity available. Meanwhile, the cost of container shipping service is generally
determined by external factors, such as the impact of economy of scale, fuel price, etc.
Unlike the demand and containership capacity of container shipping service, the
utilization and freight rate of container shipping service in the 1990s have been decreasing
over time even though there are some local ups and downs (Figure 6-9, Figure 6-10). The
major reason for this is that the growth rates of containership capacity have always
4 The profitability can be defined in several ways; in this research, however, gross profitability, which is
operating margin (i.e., revenue minus cost) divided by revenue, is used for the profitability data.
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exceeded the growth rates of the demand of container shipping
late 1990s.
service, particularly in the
Utilization
.. . ... .. .. . . .. . ..
0.61
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Time (year)
Utilization: Real CSI Data Fraction
Utilization of Container Shipping Capacity in the 1990s
(Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants, 1999)
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Figure 6-10 Freight Rate of Container Shipping Service in the 1990s
(Source: Containerization International)
While the utilization and freight rate data are readily available in the 1990s, the cost data
are not easily obtainable. Although it might be possible to estimate the cost structure of
individual carriers, estimating the industry-wide cost structures is very difficult.
However, it is expected that the cost of container shipping service must have been
decreasing substantially in order to be profitable under the environment of ever-eroding
freight rates. Particularly, the impact of economies of scale, which attempts to reduce the
unit cost by deploying larger containerships, has enabled carriers to manage to be
profitable despite the decreasing freight rates.
Even though the cost data are not directly available, the profitability data could help
estimate the cost data indirectly. There have been very little well-tracked industry-wide
profitability data for the container shipping industry. Part of this reason is that many
carriers are privately held - only several large carriers are publicly held companies - so
that they tend not to publish their detailed financial performances. The only available data
on industry profitability are given by the American Shipper, which has reported container
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carriers' annual average profitability from 1996. Given this difficulty, the author
collected profitability data of six major publicly held container carriers 45 in the 1990s,
calculated the average profitability of those carriers, and finally estimated the industry
profitability data in those periods by regression analysis using the American Shippers
data. Figure 6-11 presents the estimated average profitability of all carriers in the
container shipping industry and that of six major container carriers in the 1990s. The
profitability of container carriers in the 1990s changes cyclically ranging from 4.5% to
7.1%. The average profitability in the 1990s is around 6.42%.
Average Operating Margin of Container Carriers
--- Average Profitability of 6 Major Carriers -n- Average Profitability of Total Carriers
7.0%
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.0%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Figure 6-11 Profitability of Carriers in the 1990s
(Source: American Shippers; Financial reports from carriers)
45 The six carriers are Evergreen, Hanjin, K-Line, Mistui OSK, NOL/APL, and NYK.
169
6.3 Causal Relationships of Supply-and-Demand in the Container
Shipping Industry
In system dynamics modeling, it is assumed that the historical developments of
interrelated variables can be explained by the internal causal relationships among them.
In other words, the causal linkages among the variables comprising the system should
control the dynamic changes of the variables over time. Developing a system dynamics
model requires, therefore, one to identify and quantify the internal causal linkages among
the variables and regenerate the dynamic behaviors of the variables.
Since the causal linkages among the variables are complex, interrelated, and hard to
explain in words, the causal loop diagrams (CLD) are commonly used for identifying and
illustrating the causal relationships. For example, Figure 6-12 shows the causal loop
diagrams for the dynamics of supply-and-demand of the container shipping service. The
causal loop diagrams in the system dynamics modeling is a graphical methodology of
showing the causal linkages with arrows connecting the variables. The polarity of a
connecting arrow is determined by the direction of causal linkage between the connected
variables. For example, if the two connected variables change in the same directions -
i.e., the increase of one variable causes the increase of the other variable, or the decrease
of one variable causes the decrease of the other variable - the connecting arrow should
have a positive sign. If the two connected variables change in the opposite directions -
i.e., the increase of one variable causes the decrease of the other variable, and vice versa -
the connecting arrow should have a negative sign.
Meanwhile, a loop composed of the chain of circulating variables can be classified into
either a balancing loop or a reinforcing loop. For instance, a loop is called a balancing
loop if one variable in the loop starts in an increasing trend and ends in a decreasing trend
after passing through all causal linkages along the loop, and vice versa. The balancing
loop prevents the variables from increasing or decreasing continuously and makes them
change cyclically. However, a loop is called a reinforcing loop if one variable in the loop
starts in an increasing trend and ends in an increasing trend again after passing through all
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causal linkages along the loop, and vice versa. The reinforcing loop always makes the
variables change in one direction, either increasing or decreasing.
In general, the causal relationships of an industry that has a high fixed cost structure and
supplies commodity-like products or services are well known (Auh, et al. 2001; Sterman,
2000; Weil 1998). Since the container shipping industry has similar characteristics, the
causal linkages among the industry variables could be extended from the previous
research with some modifications reflecting the industry-specific characteristics.
From a broader perspective, three causal relationships are expected to govern the balance
of supply-and-demand of the container shipping service - reinforcing "demand -
capacity" feedback loop, balancing "freight rate - demand" feedback loop, and balancing
"freight rate - capacity" feedback loop. Detailed illustrations of each feedback loop are
provided in the following.
+owww bm Expected
Balanc ing peated
L f r 
f 
E peCtin ai 
e
Freight Rate S - IStrength
+ Balancing + Demand
Loop -1 .
Demand C+s
Reinforcing Indicated
Utilization + +Loop - I Capaciy
Capacity
Figure 6-12 Causal Loops for Dynamics of Supply-and-Demand in the Container
Shipping Industry
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6.3.1 Reinforcing "Demand - Capacity" Feedback Loop
Historical data on demand and capacity of the container shipping service show that they
have increased constantly over time while freight rate has decreased. A reinforcing loop
might be involved in this dynamics (see Figure 6-13). As freight rate decreases, demand
of the container shipping service will pick up given that the external impact of the GDP
growth rate holds constant. The increased demand will force carriers to invest in more
container ships to meet the demand of container shipping service. Then, the increased
capacity will lower the utilization, which is the demand divided by capacity, and the
lowered utilization further reduces the freight rate. Therefore, these dynamics construct a
reinforcing loop and explain the ever increasing demand and supply, and decreasing
freight rate.
Freight Rate
Expected
++ Demand
Demand+
Reinforcing Indicated
Utilization '" + Loop - 1 Capacity
Capacity
Figure 6-13 Reinforcing "Demand-Capacity" Feedback Loop
6.3.2 Balancing "Freight Rate - Demand" Feedback Loop
Although demand of the container shipping service has been constantly increasing over
time, the growth rate of the demand is not constant; indeed, the growth rate of the demand
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has varied over time. A balancing loop might have controlled the changing growth rate of
the demand (see Figure 6-14). As freight rate decreases, demand will increase because the
cheaper freight rate could draw more demand for the container shipping service. The
increased demand will then increase the utilization, and the increased utilization will
increase the freight rate, thereby constituting a balancing feedback loop.
+ Demand
+ NRifocn N/
f ~i d
1U\ j
\\ /
Freight Rate
+Balancing
Loop- .
Demand
Utilization +
Figure 6-14 Balancing "Freight Rate - Demand" Feedback Loop
6.3.3 Balancing "Freight Rate - Capacity" Feedback Loop
The capacity of container shipping service measured in TEUs available per year has been
increasing with changing growth rates. Another balancing feedback loop could explain
this changing growth rate of capacity (see Figure 6-15). As freight rates decrease, the
expectation of carriers of the future freight rate will decrease and so does the financial
strength to invest in more containership capacity. Then the decreased financial strength of
carriers will make carriers reduce their containership capacity; however, the reduced
capacity will increase the utilization so that the freight rate will increase. Therefore, these
dynamics provide another balancing feedback loop.
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Figure 6-15 Balancing "Freight Rate - Capacity" Feedback Loop
6.4 Model Structure
This section contains a formal description of a system dynamics model for the dynamics
of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. The model is developed based
on a system dynamics model for the airline industry (Weil, 1998); however, several
updates of the model structures are undertaken to reflect the characteristics of the
container shipping industry, and efforts are made to quantify the causal relationships and
estimate the parameters.
6.4.1 Purpose and Boundary of the Model
The purpose of the model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container
shipping industry is to understand the internal dynamics of determining the supply and
demand of container shipping service and the profitability of carriers, and to simulate the
historical trends of industry behaviors in the 1990s. The model will then be used as a
reference system to test the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry.
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The model purpose defines the scope and focus of the model that are reflected in the
model boundary. Table 6-1 delineates the primary features included in the model
(endogenous variables), the exogenous parameters, and what is excluded from the model.
Among the features ignored in the model is the capacity of shipyards. It is possible that, if
the orderbook of shipyards becomes closer to the maximum of shipyards' shipbuilding
capacity and delivery of ships is expected to be delayed, carriers would tend to order ships
in advance in order to receive the newly built ships on schedule. These activities could
increase the order rate, containership capacity on order, and containership capacity, etc.,
more than in the normal environments. However, because the impact of shipyard capacity
on the change of containership capacity is in general limited for a short period of time,
ignoring this impact does not change the general trends of supply-and-demand dynamics
in the container shipping industry. Therefore, the shipyard capacity is assumed to be
unlimited in the model.
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Table 6-1 Model Boundary Chart for the Model of Dynamics of Supply-and-
Demand in the Container Shipping Industry
Endogenous Variables Exogenous Parameters Excluded in the
________________________________________________ _ __ __ __ __ ___ __ __ __ __ m odel______m  e
* Indicated demand *
* Indicated demand growth rate
* Indicated demand growth rate
by GDP growth rate
* Indicated demand growth rate
by freight change
* Perceived GDP growth rate
* Perceived freight rate change
* Effect of demand change trend
on unit administration cost
* Freight rate
* Effect of relative utilization on
freight rate
* Effect of utilization change
trend on freight rate
* Utilization
* Demand
* Net slot capacity
* Containership capacity
* Containership capacity on
order
* Order rate
* Delivery rate
* Discard rate
* Desired containership capacity
* Desired order rate from
containership capacity
" Desired order rate from fleet
aging
* Desired containership capacity
on order
* Profitability
* Expected profitability
* Effect of relative profitability
on order
* GDP growth rate
* GDP growth rate perception
delay
* GDP sensitivity on indicated
demand
* Freight rate perception delay
" Freight rate sensitivity on
indicated demand
* Initial indicated demand
" Demand adjustment delay
" Average time interval for trend
estimation
* Initial freight rate
" Time to adjust freight rate
* Average time interval for trend
estimation of utilization change
* Utilization perception delay
* Utilization trend sensitivity on
indicated freight rate
" Voyage TAB
" Time to perceive utilization
" Reference utilization
* Planning horizon
* Average time to project demand
" Average voyages per year
" Capacity adjustment time
" Time to adjust capacity on order
" Target profitability
" Time to perceive profitability
* Containership delivery time
* Containership retirement age
" Initial capacity
" Initial capacity on order
" Initial unit administration cost
" Initial unit fixed cost
* Initial unit variable cost
* Effect of economy of scale on
cost
(*) The underlined variables are state variables in the model
* Shipyard capacity
* Technology-driven
demand increase
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For the purpose of presentation, the model has been decomposed into four major sectors.
Section 6.4.2 describes the demand sector. The demand sector represents how the demand
of container shipping service is determined. The next section contains the formulation
describing the dynamics of freight rate. It is assumed that the freight rate of container
shipping service is determined by the level of utilization. And then, the capacity sector is
explained in section 6.4.4. The capacity sector simulates how carriers decide the
acquisition of containerships. Finally, the cost structure of container shipping service is
modeled in section 6.4.5.
6.4.2 Demand Sector
The demand sector models the development of container shipping demand. It is assumed
that the demand for container shipping service is determined by two factors (Sterman,
2000; Weil, 1998): GDP growth rate and the change of freight rate. The GDP growth rate
drives the overall increase of the container shipping demand whereas the change of freight
rate explains the changing growth rate of the demand (see the causal loop diagram in
Figure 6-14). Figure 6-16 shows the stock and flow structure for this sector.
The main input to this sector from other sectors is the freight rate, and the exogenous
parameters to this sector include GDP growth rate, GDP growth rate perception delay,
GDP sensitivity on indicated demand, average time interval for trend estimation, initial
perceived price change, freight rate perception delay, freight rate sensitivity on indicated
demand, demand adjustment delay, and initial perceived demand change. The output
from this sector is the effect of demand change trend on administrative cost, which models
the increasing administrative cost in order to serve the increasing amount of container
shipping demand. The detailed equations are explained in the following. 46
46 For the purpose of presentation, the equations are expressed in functions used in Vensim DSSO, a system
dynamics modeling software. The examples of the functions are SMOOTH, TREND, INTEG, etc. Detailed
definition and characteristics of these functions can be found in
http://www.vensim.com/documentation/vensim.htm and in Sterman (2000).
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Figure 6-16 Structure of Demand Sector
(1) Demand Change Trend = TREND(Demand, Average Time Interval for Trend
Estimation, Initial Perceived Demand Change )
(2) Demand = SMOOTH(Indicated Demand, Demand Adjustment Delay)
(3) Indicated Demand = INTEG (Indicated Demand Growth, Initial Demand)
(4) Indicated Demand Growth = Indicated Demand* Indicated Demand Growth Rate
(5) Indicated Demand Growth Rate = Indicated Demand Growth Rate by GDP Growth
Rate + Indicated Demand Growth Rate by Freight Rate Change
(6) Indicated Demand Growth Rate by GDP Growth Rate = Perceived GDP Growth
Rate*GDP Sensitivity on Indicated Demand
(7) Perceived GDP Growth Rate = SMOOTH ( GDP Growth Rate, GDP Growth Rate
Perception Delay)
(8) Indicated Demand Growth Rate by Freight Rate Change = Perceived Freight Rate
Change*Freight Rate Sensitivity on Indicated Demand
(9) Perceived Freight Rate Change = SMOOTH ( Freight Rate Change Trend ,Freight
Rate Perception Delay )
(10) Freight Rate Change Trend = TREND( Freight Rate, Average Time Interval for
Trend Estimation,. Initial Perceived Price Change)
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6.4.3 Freight Rate Sector
The freight rate sector captures how the freight rate of container shipping service is
determined and calculates the profitability of carriers. It is formulated that the freight rate
is the function of either utilization or utilization change trend. Figure 6-17 shows the
structure of freight rate sector.
The inputs to this sector from other sectors are unit total cost, unit variable cost, demand,
and containership capacity. In addition, the exogenous parameters include initial freight
rate, time to adjust freight rate, reference utilization, time to perceive utilization, voyage
TAB (i.e., the number of voyages per year), average time interval for trend estimation of
utilization change, initial perceived utilization change trend, and utilization perception
delay. A nonlinear relationship between relative utilization and indicated freight rate is
controlled by the table function, "TAB - Relative Utilization on Freight Rate." The
detailed equations in the freight rate sector are shown in the following.
(11) Freight Rate Change Trend = INTEG ( Change in Freight Rate, Initial Freight Rate)
(12) Change in Freight Rate = (Indicated Freight Rate-Freight Rate)/Time to Adjust
Freight Rate
(13) Indicated Freight Rate = MAX(Minimum Freight Rate, Freight Rate*"Adj. Effect
of Relative Utilization on Freight Rate")
(14) Minimum Freight rate = Unit Variable Cost
(15) Adj. Effect of Relative Utilization on Freight Rate = IF THEN ELSE ( Effect of
Utilization Change Trend on Freight Rate = 0, Effect of Relative Utilization on
Freight Rate, Effect of Utilization Change Trend on Freight Rate)
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Figure 6-17 Structure of Freight Rate Sector
(16) Effect of Utilization on Freight Rate = "TAB - Relative Utilization on Freight
Rate"(Relative Utilization)
(17) Relative Utilization = Perceived Utilization/Reference Utilization
(18) Reference Utilization "TAB - Reference Utilization"(Time)
(19) Perceived Utilization = SMOOTHi(Utilization, Time to Perceive Utilization)
(20) Utilization = Demand / Net Slot Capacity
(21) Net Slot Capacity = VoyageTAB(Time)*Containership Capacity
6.4.4 Capacity Sector
The capacity sector simulates the development of containership capacity over time
through a stock-management system (Sterman, 2000), which is widely accepted for
modeling capital acquisition in the industry. Figure 6-18 shows the structure of capacity
sector.
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Figure 6-18 Structure of Capacity Sector
The inputs to this sector are demand and profitability, which are calculated from the
demand sector and freight sector respectively. The exogenous parameters to this sector
include initial capacity, initial capacity on order, containership delivery time,
containership retirement age, time to adjust capacity on order, planning horizon, average
time to project demand, average voyages per year, capacity adjustment time, reference
utilization, target profitability, and time to perceive profitability. A nonlinear relationship
between profitability and desired order rate is described by the table function of "TAB -
Relative Profitability on Order,"
In this model, carriers are assumed to calculate the order rate based on two factors: desired
order rate and adjustment from capacity on order. The desired order rate is determined by
desired order rate from fleet aging, which is the amount of containerships ordered to
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replace the scrapped containership capacity; desired order rate from desired capacity,
which is estimated from the projected demand and reference utilization; and effect of
relative profitability on order, which increases the desired order rate if carriers'
profitability is better than target profitability, and vice versa. Meanwhile, after estimating
the desired order rate, carriers would consider the containership capacity on order (i.e.
orderbook of containerships) to calculate the adjustment from capacity on order, and
adjust the order rate. Detailed equations of this sector are provided below.
(22) Containership Capacity = INTEG ( Delivery Rate - Discard Rate, Initial Capacity)
(23) Containership Capacity on Order = INTEG ( Order Rate - Delivery Rate, Initial
Capacity on Order)
(24) Order Rate = MAX ( 0, Indicated Order Rate)
(25) Indicated Order Rate = Desired Order Rate + Adjustment from Capacity on Order
(26) Desired Order Rate = (Desired Order Rate from Desired Capacity + Desired Order
Rate from Fleet Aging) * Effect of Relative Profitability on Order
(27) Adjustment from Capacity on Order = (Desired Containership Capacity on Order-
Containership Capacity on Order)/Time to Adjust Capacity on Order
(28) Desired Order Rate from Desired Capacity = (Desired Containership Capacity-
Containership Capacity)/Capacity Adjustment Time
(29) Desired Containership Capacity ( Projected Demand / Reference Utilization) /
Average voyages per year
(30) Projected Demand = FORECAST ( Demand, Average Time to Project Demand,
Planning Horizon)
(31) Desired Order Rate from Fleet Aging = Discard Rate
(32) Effect of Relative Profitability on Order = "TAB - Relative Profitability on
Order"(Relative Profitability)
(33) Relative Profitability = Expected Profitability / Target Profitability
(34) Expected Profitability = SMOOTH( Profitability, Time to Perceive Profitability)
(35) Desired Containership Capacity on Order = Desired Order Rate*Containership
Delivery Time
(36) Delivery Rate = Containership Capacity on Order / Containership Delivery Time
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(37) Discard Rate = Containership Capacity / Containership Retirement Age
6.4.5 Cost Sector
This sector depicts the cost structure of container shipping service. Figure 6-19 shows the
cost sector and detailed equations are provided in the following.
Initial Unit
Administration Cost
TAB - Economy of Effect of I
Scale on Cost on Un
<Time>
Initial Unit
<Effect of Diemand Change Trend Variable Co
on Unit Administration Cost>
Unit Administation Cost Unit Variable Cos
L Total "ost
conomy of Scale
it Total Cost
Initial Unit
Fixed Cost ~ Uit F. ed Cost
st
Figure 6-19 Structure of Cost Sector
(38) Unit Total Cost = ( Unit Administrative Cost + Unit Fixed Cost + Unit Variable
Cost) * Effect of Economy of Scale on Unit Total Cost
(39) Unit Administrative Cost = Initial Unit Administration Cost * Effect of Demand
Change Trend on Unit Administration Cost
(40) Unit Fixed Cost = Initial Fixed Cost
(41) Unit Variable Cost = Initial Variable Cost
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The unit cost of container shipping service, measured in dollar per TEU, comprises three
components: unit fixed cost, unit variable cost, and unit administrative cost (Lim, 1994).
The fixed cost includes the expenses for maintaining the containership fleet - for example,
capital cost, depreciation, vessel expense, and crew expense - and is not a function of
container shipping service provided. The variable cost is the direct costs of moving
containers such as cargo expense, terminal handling charges, haulages, port charges,
bunker expenses, etc., and is a function of a number of containers transported. The
administrative cost is the indirect supporting cost of providing container shipping service
- for instance, market research cost, sales cost, documentation cost, customer support cost,
and other administrative cost.
The input to this sector is the effect of demand change trend on administrative cost, which
is estimated from the demand sector. The exogenous parameters to this sector include
initial administrative cost, initial fixed cost, initial variable cost, and effect of economy of
scale on unit total cost. The output of this sector, unit total cost, is used for estimating the
profitability of carriers in the freight rate sector.
6.5 Model Validation
This section describes a study to validate empirically the proposed model of dynamics of
supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. A brief summary of model
validation methodology in system dynamics modeling is first presented. Next, data and
parameters used for validating the model are explained. Finally, the empirical calibration
processes of the model to the industry data in the 1990s are illustrated, followed by the
validation of estimated parameters from interviews with industry veterans.
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6.5.1 Model Validation Methodology
Once a model is developed, the model should be validated before it is used for policy
analysis and design. Unless a model is considered valid, any further analysis with the
model may be meaningless. Therefore, any model must be validated with the appropriate
measures.
Model validation in system dynamics has been a complicated topic (Barlas, 1989, 1996) .
Because system dynamics models are by nature "causal-descriptive" (theory-like, "white-
box"), which illustrates how real systems actually operate in some aspects, generating an
"accurate" output behavior is not sufficient for model validity; what is crucial is the
validity of the internal structure of the model. A white-box model, being a "theory" about
the real system, must not only reproduce/predict its behavior, but also explain how the
behavior is generated, and possibly suggest ways of changing the existing behavior.
However, validating the internal structure of the model cannot be entirely objective,
formal, and quantitative; Rather, it can be subjective, informal, and qualitative. Therefore,
it is hard to validate a system dynamics model in a formal way.
Given the difficulty of model validation in system dynamics, it is widely accepted in
system dynamics that model validation be a gradual process of "confidence building"
with respect to the "purpose of model," rather than a binary "accept/reject' divisions
(Barlas, 1996; Forrester, 1961, 1968); i.e., validity of a system dynamics model cannot be
discussed without reference to a specific purpose (Oliva, 1996).
To summarize the model validation process in system dynamics, Barlas (1996) proposed
two steps of model validation process for a system dynamics model: The logical order of
validation is first to test the validity of the structure (structure validity) with respect to the
model purpose, and then start testing the behavior accuracy (behavior validity). In the
structure validity, models should explain the real system with causal links embedded in
the model. The validity of the model structure is assessed by direct comparison with
knowledge about the real system structure. Causal loop diagrams are often useful ways of
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testing the structure validity. Sometimes a simple test simulation is used to uncover
potential structural flaws.
After passing the structure validity test, a model should be tested for behavior validity.
The behavior validity is to measure how accurately the model can reproduce the major
behavior patterns exhibited in the real system. It is crucial to note that the emphasis is on
pattern prediction (periods, frequency, trends, phase, lags, amplitudes, etc.), rather than
point (event) prediction (Barlas, 1996). As long as a system dynamics model can
reproduce the patterns of the real system, it is considered as passing the behavior validity
test.
A system dynamics model developed for dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container
shipping industry is regarded as passing the structure validity test. The reasons for this are
as follows: First, the causal relationships, on which the model is based, are adapted from
the generic causal links of supply-and-demand in the market economic system, which are
well recognized and widely accepted in system dynamics (Sterman, 2000). Second,
Weil's model on the airline industry, which the model on the container shipping industry
is rooted on and generic causal links of supply-and-demand are embedded in, shows
strong structure validity compared with the real system. Third, after calibrating the model
with the real system, the model structures and key parameters were consulted with
industry veterans to ensure the structure validity of the model. As shown in the later
sections, the industry veterans generally agree with the model structures and accept the
values of estimated parameters. Accordingly, the model for dynamics of supply-and-
demand in the container shipping industry developed in the research can be considered as
passing the structure validity.
Since the model has passed the structure validity test, it should now be tested with
behavior validity in order to be used for further policy analysis. Testing the behavior
validity is explained in the following, starting with a discussion on the data collection
followed by the calibration process.
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6.5.2 Data Collection and Parameter Estimation
In order to calibrate the model, input data should be collected first. There are four types
of data to be collected: exogenous input variables, reference points for decision-making,
information delay time, and nonlinear relationships. The data are collected from various
industry resources (journal papers, analyst reports, industry magazines, etc.) and
interviews with industry veterans. When the data for variables are not available, the best
judgment for each variable is used in the trial simulation and modified later, if necessary,
in order to provide better calibration result.
6.5.2.1 Exogenous Input Variables
The exogenous input variables set the initial condition of the model and draw the
boundary of the model. Examples of exogenous input variables to this model include
initial capacity, initial capacity on order, initial unit costs (fixed, variable, and
administrative), initial demand, initial freight rate, initial perceived changes (demand,
price, and utilization), GDP growth rate, Voyage TAB (i.e., number of voyages per year),
average voyages per year, containership delivery time, and containership retirement age.
The values of each exogenous input variable, its unit, and its source are presented in Table
6-2, Figure 6-20, and Figure 6-21.
Table 6-2 - Exogenous Input Variables
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Initial Capacity 1.78 million TEU / Year Clarksons Research Studies (2001)
Initial Capacity on 154,000 TEU / Year Clarksons Research Studies (2001)
Order
Initial Demand 10.4 million TEU / Year Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999)
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Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Conference freight rate in 1990 from
Lloyd's Shipping Economist, adjusted by theInitial Freight Rate 1,539 $ / TEU freight rate extrapolated from 1994, 1995,
and 1996
Estimated by assuming 5% of profitability
Initial Unit Total Cost 1,492 $ / TEU and the break-down of total cost came from
Lim (1994)
Initial Unit Variable 965 $ / TEU
Cost
Initial Unit Fixed 219 $ / TEU
Cost
Initial 278 $ / TEU
Administrative Cost
Initial Perceived Initial perceived demand change to be used
Demand Change 0 1 / Year for estimating the trend of demand change.It is assumed to be zero.
Initial perceived price change to be used for
Initial Perceived Price 0 1 / Year estimating the trend of price change. It is
Change assumed to be zero.
Initial Perceived Initial perceived utilization change to be
Utilization Change 0 1 / Year used for estimating the trend of utilizationchange. It is assumed to be zero.
Average Voyages per 6.8 Dimensionless Estimated from demand and capacity data in
Year the Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999)
Average time to build a containership. It is
Containership Delivery 1.55 Years estimated around 18 months from
Time calibration process and confirmed with
industry veteran.
Although containerships are usually used for
25 years, the calibration process make theContainership 100 Years model be set with 100 years of service time
Retirement Age of containerships. Detailed will be
explained in the calibration section.
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6.5.2.2 Reference Points for Decision-making
Data for reference points for decision-making are the variables that carriers perceive in
their mental models to make managerial decisions. Examples include reference
utilization, planning horizon, capacity adjustment time, and target profitability.
Descriptions, values, units, and sources of the data for reference points are provided in
Table 6-3.
Table 6-3 Data for Reference Points for Decision-making
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Target utilization on which carriers decide to
increase/decrease freight rate and invest in
Reference Utilization 0.75 - 0.86 Dimensionless new containership capacity. Confirmed with
industry veterans. For further information,
look at Figure 6-22 below.
The number of years that carriers consider
when they estimate desired containership
Planning Horizon 14.44 Years capacity in the future. Derived from
calibration and confirmed with industry
veterans.
The time period that carriers would like to
catch up with desired container capacity. It
Capacity Adjustment 4-4.25 Years has been shorter over time by constructing
Time bigger containerships in the mid 1990s.
Estimated from interview and calibration.
A reference profitability on which carriers
Target Profitability 0.0642 Dimensionless decide to increase/decrease the order rate ofcontainership capacity. Assumed to be
average industry profitability in the 1990s.
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Figure 6-22 Reference Utilization
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6.5.2.3 Information Delay Time
When carriers determine managerial decisions, they should wait or spend some time to
process and digest the information that is used for the decisions. This information delay
constitutes another important parameter to be considered in the system dynamics
modeling. Examples of the information delay time in the container shipping industry
include GDP growth rate perception delay, freight rate perception delay, demand
adjustment delay, average time interval for trend estimation, average time interval for
trend estimation of utilization change, time to adjust freight rate, utilization perception
delay, time to perceive utilization, average time to project demand, time to adjust capacity
on order, and time to perceive profitability. Because data for the information delay time
are information processing time, it is often hard to estimate the delay time precisely.
Many of the data for information delay time are therefore estimated by the best judgment
or by the calibration process if they are important for the calibration purpose. Detailed
descriptions of these parameters are presented in Table 6-4.
Table 6-4 Data for Information Delay Time
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
GDP Growth Rate Time to perceive the GDP growth rate. It 
is
GPrceptioh Rlate 0.25 Years assumed to take a quarter year for marketPerception Delay participants to know the GDP growth rate.
Time for shippers to perceive the change of
Freight Rate Perception 0.1 Years freight rate. It is assumed to be around a
Delay month to perceive the freight rate change.
Time for shippers to actually change the
Demand Adjustment demand of container shipping based on the
Delay 0.5 Years indicated demand. It is assumed to be 6
months to adjust.
Average Time Interval Time periods that shippers look at for
for Trend Estimation 1 Years estimating the change of freight rate. It isassumed to be 1 year.
Average Time Interval Time periods that carriers look at for
for Trend Estimation of 0.264 Years estimation the change of utilization. It is
Utilization Change estimated from calibration process.
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Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Time for carriers to change the freight rate in
accordance with indicated freight rate. It isTime to Adjust Freight 1 Years estimated to be one year from calibration
process and confirmed with current industry
practice.
Time for carriers to perceive the utilization
change. It must be relatively shorter than
Utilization Perception 0033 Years other delays because carriers always track
Delay . the utilization change closely. It is estimated
to be around 12 days from calibration
process.
Time for carriers to get to know the current
timti Perceive 0.083 Years utilization. It is assumed to be around aUtiliationmonth.
Averaging time for past demand used in theAverage Time to 1 Years projected demand. It is assumed to be 1 year
Project Demand following the Weil's model.
Time over which carriers would like to
adjust the amount of orderbook. The
Time to Adjust 0.2817 Years shorter, the more carriers consider the
Capacity on Order amount of orderbook for ordering new
containership capacity. It is estimated to be
around 3.3 months from calibration process.
Time to Perceive Time for carriers to calculate the expected
Profitability 0.5 Years profitability. It is assumed to be a half year.
6.5.2.4 Nonlinear Relationships
There are four table functions in the model to simulate the nonlinear relationships among
the variables: effect of economy of scale on cost, effect of demand change trend on unit
administration cost, effect of relative utilization on freight rate, and effect of relative
profitability on order. Two of them - effect of economy of scale on cost and effect of
demand change trend on unit administration cost - are exogenously input, while the rest
are endogenously generated - i.e., interconnecting endogenous variables.
In reality, data for exact impact of economy of scale on cost in the container shipping
industry are not readily available. In this model, therefore, the effect of economy of scale
on cost is exogenously input by calibrating the simulated profitability with the real world
profitability. It is estimated that economy of scale in the container shipping industry have
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reduced the total unit cost of container shipping to a level of 80% over the past 10 years
(see Figure 6-23).
In addition, data for exact effect of demand change trend on unit administration cost are
not available either. Reasonable assumptions are made for this relationship: If the demand
change trend is less than 10%, the impact is assumed to be minimal, i.e., 1.5% impact on
unit administration cost. However, for the demand change trend is larger than 10%, the
impact is assumed to be substantial (Figure 6-24).
The rest of nonlinear relationships - effect of relative utilization on freight rate and effect
of relative profitability on order - are estimated from the calibration process and presented
in Figure 6-25 and Figure 6-26.
Effect of Economy of Scale on Cost
Dimensionless
1.2
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Figure 6-23 Effect of Economy of Scale on Cost
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Figure 6-24 Effect of Demand Change Trend on Unit Administration Cost
Effect of Relative Utilization on Freight Rate
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Figure 6-25 Effect of Relative Utilization on Freight Rate
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Figure 6-26 Effect of Relative Profitability on Order
6.5.3 Empirical Calibration of the Model
After collecting the data for exogenous parameters, the model can now be calibrated to the
real industry data in order to ensure the behavior validity. In other words, for the behavior
validity, simulation results from the model should successfully regenerate the behavior of
historical industry data.
For the calibration purpose, nonlinear least squares estimation using Powell's (1969,
1972) optimization algorithm as implemented in Vensim* is used in this research. Two
sets of variables should be chosen for calibration: variables for objective functions and
variables for constraints. The variables for objective functions are important industry data
that characterize the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry.
Meanwhile, the variables for constraints are selected based on two factors: (1) the
variables should be critical in determining state variables in the model; (2) data for the
variables, however, are not readily available from industry sources so that they should be
estimated indirectly. Eight variables are selected for objective functions whereas twelve
variables are chosen for constraints (Table 6-5). All exogenous parameters are set to the
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values estimated in 6.5.2, and the model is initialized to reflect the status of container
shipping industry in 1990.
The summary statistics for the historical fit of the model4 7 to the real industry data are
shown in Table 6-6, and Figure 6-27 shows the behavior of the simulated data against the
historical series.
Table 6-5 Objective Functions and Constraints for Calibration
Variables for Objective Functions Variables for Constraints
" Demand 0 GDP Sensitivity on Indicated Demand
* Freight Rate 0 Freight Rate Sensitivity on Indicated Demand
* Containership Capacity on Order 0 Effect of Relative Profitability on Order
* Containership Capacity 0 Effect of Relative Utilization on Freight Rate
* Order Rate 0 Effect of Economy of scale on Cost
" Delivery Rate 0 Time to Adjust Capacity on Order
" Utilization 0 Time to Adjust Freight Rate
" Profitability 0 Containership Delivery Time
* Planning Horizon
* Utilization Perception Delay
" Utilization Trend Sensitivity on Indicated Freight Rate
" Average Time Interval for Trend Estimation of
Utilization Change
47 A Vensim module to calculate the summary statistics for the fit between the simulated and historical time
series is used (Oliva, 1995).
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Table 6-6 Historical Fit of the Model
Theil's Inequality Statistics
Variable Name tM E Bias Unequal Unequal
Variation ovariance
Demand 10 0.985 2.0% 0.302 0.042 0.656
Containership Capacity 10 0.995 2.1% 0.106 0.001 0.893
Containership Capacity 8 0.611 15% 0.091 0.012 0.897
on Order
Order Rate 9 0.748 42.6% 0.062 0.475 0.463
Delivery Rate 9 0.582 28.6% 0.363 0.018 0.619
Utilization 10 0.823 1.8% 0.082 0.001 0.917
Freight Rate 7 0.775 3.4% 0.026 0.204 0.770
Profitability 10 0.891 5.6% 0.016 0.452 0.532
The simulation results show that the model tracks the historical industry data quite well.
Most of the Mean Absolute Percent Error's (MAPE) between the simulated and actual
data are less than 6% except those of containership capacity on order, order rate, and
delivery rate, indicating a close fit of the model to the actual behavior of the container
shipping industry. In addition, the low bias and variation components of the Theil's
inequality statistics indicate that errors are unsystematic (Sterman, 1984, 2000).
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6.5.4 Validation of Estimated Parameters
The empirical calibration of the model in section 6.5.3 shows that the model for dynamics
of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry successfully simulates the
historical behavior of the industry variables. In addition to the behavior validity of the
model, the estimated parameters of the model were discussed with industry veterans in
order to increase the confidence of the model.
Although general structures of the model are reconfirmed through interviews with
industry veterans, four parameters are rechecked in particular (Table 6-7). The interviews
confirm that the model structure for dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container
shipping industry is acceptable and understandable, and the estimated parameters are
reasonable.
Table 6-7 Validation of Estimated Parameters
Parameters Value in Interviewee Comments on Parameters
____________ the model Inrvee
Planning Horizon 14.44 years Peter Keller, "We consider at least 10 years ahead
COO of NYK America before ordering containerships because
the life cycle of containership is at least
20 years."
Target Profitability 6.42% Peter Keller, "We tend to consider that 5% - 6% of
COO of NYK America operating margin is a threshold by
which we determine our performance."
Containership 1.55 years Jae-shin Kim, "It usually takes 18 months from
Delivery Time (or 18.6 Technical Manager signing contract with ship owners to
months) Hyundai Heavy delivering a containership to them."
Industries
Reference 75 - 86% Peter Keller, "We start to consider increasing
Utilization COO of NYK America capacity if the utilization in
transatlantic is around 85%, or 80% in
transpacific trade routes."
200
A Generic Model for the Dynamics of S&DChapter 6
6.6 Insights from the Modeling of the Container Shipping Industry
The model developed here is the first system dynamics analysis of the dynamics of
supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. The model successfully simulates
the dynamic behavior of container shipping services - for example, increasing trend of
supply and demand of container shipping service, different growth rates of supply and
demand of container shipping service, decreasing trend of freight rate and utilization, and
changing profitability of carriers.
In addition to simulating the behavior of the industry, the modeling process also reveals
several insights into the container shipping industry, which helps one to understand the
future dynamics of supply-and-demand in this industry. Notable insights from the
modeling are provided in the following.
" Demand of container shipping service is more highly sensitive to GDP growth rate
than to the changing trend of freight rate. The demand is approximately 4 times
more sensitive to GDP growth rate than to changing trend of freight rate.
* Carriers might have used longer planning horizon (approximately 14 years) in the
capacity planning, which in turn over-speculates the future demand and capacity
thereby generating the chronic overcapacity problems.
* Orderbook of containership has been an important factor for capacity ordering
decision, which is contrary to the general belief in the industry that carriers tend
not to consider the current orderbook of containership in capacity planning.
* The ordering of containerships for replacing the capacity scrapped has been
minimal. The reason for this is that the capacity of early containerships, which
were built in the early 1960s and started to be scrapped from the 1990s, is minimal
compared with current capacity level. However, as more containerships reach the
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maximum age of service life over time, the impact of containership capacity
scrapped on capacity ordering will become more important.
* Reference utilization, by which carries would increase or decrease freight rate and
determine the desired containership capacity, must have been decreasing over time
to reflect the decreasing cost structure of container shipping service due to the
economy of scale
6.7 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a system dynamics model for dynamics of supply-and-demand
in the container shipping industry. Overall, the model was able to explain the causal
linkages driving the dynamic behaviors of industry variables and simulate the dynamic
behaviors of industry variables in the 1990s, thus increasing our confidence of the
structure and behavior validity of the model. Given the confidence of the model, it now
can be used as a reference system to test the impacts of e-business on the container
shipping industry, which is explored in the following chapters.
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Chapter 7 Modeling the Diffusion Dynamics of EDI in
the Container Shipping Industry
7.1 Introduction
In Chapter 1, the evolution of EDI in the container shipping industry was closely analyzed
in order to better understand the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry.
Since EDI and internet technology have similar technical characteristics such as network
externality, a profound analysis on the diffusion dynamics of EDI could provide useful
insights into the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry. Hence, a
system dynamics model simulating the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container
shipping is developed in this research.
This chapter is organized as follows: a brief summary of previous research on modeling of
technology diffusion is first presented. Section 7.3 illustrates the causal relationships that
drive the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry. Next, section 7.4
explains a system dynamics model for diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container
shipping industry, followed by the model validation through empirical calibration of the
model in section 7.5.
7.2 Previous Research on the Modeling of Technology Diffusion
The diffusion or adoption of new technologies or products is a critical factor in the success
of any technology-based company. Successful adoption of a new technology can give a
company a significant advantage over competitors, both in terms of the opportunity to
lead the technological innovation and in terms of the ability to drive down costs ahead of
the competition. Understanding the diffusion dynamics of new technologies is therefore
very important.
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A number of theories and models have been developed to improve the understanding of
dynamics of technology diffusion. In particular, because the diffusion or adoption of new
technology often follows the S-shaped patterns, many models have been proposed to
simulate the S-shaped diffusion patterns of new technology.
The first attempt to simulate the S-shaped growth was to develop analytic models. The
analytic models provide simple analytic equations, which can generate S-shaped growth
patterns, so that they are easy to understand and calculate. Examples of this analytic
model include the logistics growth model, the Richards model, the Gompertz model, the
Weibull model, and the Fisher-Pry model (Fisher and Pry, 1971; Richardson, 1991;
Sterman, 2000; Walk, 2002). Because the analytic models are simple and successfully
simulate any S-shaped growth behaviors, they are also widely used for quantitative
technology forecasting (Vanston, 2002). However, since the models have strict
assumptions to derive the analytic solutions, they are not flexible enough to consider more
realistic situations encountered in the real world dynamics.
In order to overcome the shortcomings of analytic models, Bass (1969) proposed a model
for the diffusion of innovation, It took the form (Then, 2001):
dN/dt = (a + bNa) (Np - Na)
where Na = the number of adopters
N,= the number of potential adopters
a = coefficient of innovation
b = coefficient of imitation
The Bass model was based on the notion that potential adopters can be persuaded to
become adopters as a result of interactions either internally or externally to the network of
adopters. If a = 0 in this equation, it is as same as the logistics growth model and all
adoptions come from internal source of word-of-mouth. If b = 0, the exponential model is
in effect and all adoptions come from external source such as advertising.
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The Bass model has become one of the most popular models for diffusion of new
technology and is widely used in marketing, strategy, management of technology, and
other fields (Sterman, 2000). In addition, many extensions of the Bass model to include
more realistic conditions have been developed. Particularly, many extended versions of
the Bass model can be easily developed through the system dynamics modeling
methodology (Sterman, 2000).
Meanwhile, a general system dynamics model to simulate the technology diffusion has
been proposed by Lyneis. The Lyneis model attempts to produce the simulation results
that are consistent with several existing forecasting and assessment techniques for the
technology diffusion, including (1) ability to generate S-curve to demonstrate technology
progress; (2) cost-experience curves and their influence on pricing strategy; (3) price-
performance curves; (4) diffusion or product life cycle curves deploying the concept of
lead users to laggards; and (5) substitution curves developed consistent with the Fisher-
Pry model.
7.3 Causal Relationships for the Diffusion Dynamics of EDI in the
Container Shipping Industry
The analysis of diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry estimates an
S-shaped diffusion curve of EDI - i.e., the EDI diffusion rate by users, which is the
number of EDI users divided by the total players in the container shipping industry, is S-
shaped, starting from the early 1990s and saturating around 50% in the year of 2000
(Figure 7-1). Modeling the S-shaped diffusion curve of EDI could help understand the
dynamics of EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry.
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EDI Diffusion Rate by Users
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Figure 7-1 Real EDI Diffusion Rate in the Container Shipping Industry
(Source: Estimated from industry data and interviews, see the section 4.3.3)
Among the different models of technology diffusion, the Bass model is selected as a base
model to simulate the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry.
Specifically, a system dynamics version of the Bass model is developed for modeling the
diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry. Two main reasons drive
this decision: First, the Bass model is most widely used for modeling the technology
diffusion. Second, the system dynamics modeling methodology is more flexible than
other modeling tools so that more realistic assumptions can be easily implemented in the
model.
From a broader perspective, the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping
industry can be modeled with three important feedback loops: balancing "trading partners'
request" feedback loop, reinforcing "EDI benefits" feedback loop, and balancing
"competitive advantage" feedback loop. Figure 7-2 shows the causal loop diagrams for
the diffusion dynamics of EDI, and Table 7-1 provides the list of key variables used in the
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causal loop diagrams. Detailed explanations of each feedback loop are presented in the
following.
Average EDI
Transactions pe
EDI Users Total Transaction
Volume of Container
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Potential EDI Total ED
Users Transactions
EDI Users EDI Diffusion Rate by
Transaction Volume
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Figure 7-2 Causal Loop Diagrams for the Diffusion Dynamics of EDI in the
Container Shipping Industry
Table 7-1 List of
EDI
Variables in the Feedback Loops for the Diffusion Dynamics of
Key Variables Definition Dimension StatePotentianumberfEDIusersinVariable
Potential EDI Users Potential number of EDI users in Company Yesthe container shipping industry
EDI Users The number of active EDI users in Company Yes
the container shipping industry
Adoption Rate of EDI The number of companies that Company /
adopt EDI per year year
Adoption from Word-of- The number of companies that Company
Mouth adopt EDI per year by word-of- year
mouth process
A rate that total players interact
Contact Rate each other per year i.e., measured in 1 / year
company contacted per player per
time year
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State
Key Variables Definition Dimension Variable
A fraction that contacts between
Adoptability of EDI potential EDI users and EDI users Dimensionless
make potential EDI users become
active EDI users.
Attractiveness of EDI The extent that EDI is attractive to Dimensionlessthe potential EDI users
The extent of competitive advantage
Competitive Advantage of of EDI as a function of "EDI Dimensionless
EDI Users Diffusion Rate by Transaction
Volume"
EDI Diffusion Rate by A fraction that business transactions Dimensionless
Transaction Volume are executed by EDI
7.3.1 Balancing "Trading Partners' Request" Feedback Loop
In the early days of EDI diffusion, few companies were willing to adopt EDI technology
for their business purpose because EDI was little known to the industry players and
expensive to implement. The major driver of EDI diffusion in the early days was the
trading partners' request to adopt a new technology of EDI. Particularly, the large carriers
and shippers, who anticipated huge cost-savings from EDI-based transactions, were the
early adopters of EDI and actively urged their trading partners to join the EDI-based
business activities. However, once the EDI became more popular among the industry, the
impact of trading partners' requests to adopt EDI was relatively reduced because of the
word-of-mouth impact, which is the process of exchanging the information on the benefit
of EDI by interactions among potential EDI users and active EDI users.
This early dynamics of EDI diffusion can be explained by the balancing "trading partners
request" feedback loop (see Figure 7-3). If the potential EDI users, who are willing to
adopt EDI technology, are plentiful in the industry as in the early days of EDI diffusion,
they tend to request other trading partners to adopt EDI. The increased adoption of EDI
by the trading partners' request will then increase the adoption rate of EDI over time.
Finally, the increased adoption rate of EDI will decrease the potential EDI users because
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many potential EDI users become active EDI users, thereby constructing a balancing
feedback loop.
Potential EDI
Users
EDI Users
Adoption from Trading Adoption Rate
Partners' Request for EDI of EDI
Effectiveness of Trading
Partners' Request for
EDI
Figure 7-3 Balancing "Trading Partners' Request" Feedback Loop
7.3.2 Reinforcing "EDT Benefits" Feedback Loop
After passing the early slow diffusion of EDI, the container shipping industry saw a rapid
growth of EDI diffusion in the mid 1990s. The major driver of this rapid diffusion of EDI
was attributable to the better understanding of the benefits of EDI-based business
transactions. Because the EDI technology could provide better productivity, less clerical
errors, lower administrative costs, etc., the early adopters of EDI started to propagate the
benefits of EDI to the potential EDI users and support the adoption of EDI actively. In
other words, the reputation of EDI benefits let the adopters of EDI interact with potential
EDI users by either telephone, mail, business meeting, etc., and persuaded them into
adopting EDI. This process is so called "word-of-mouth" dynamics, where the adoption
of EDI increased rapidly as the number of active EDI users and the EDI benefits
increased.
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This word-of-mouth dynamics can be modeled by the reinforcing "EDI benefits" feedback
loop (see Figure 7-4). As the number of EDI users increases, the adoption of EDI from
word-of-mouth will increase, thereby increasing the number of EDI users. In addition, the
increased number of EDI users will increase the "EDI diffusion rate by transaction
volume," which is measured by "total EDI transactions" divided by the "total transaction
volume of container shipping." As more transactions in the container shipping industry
are done by EDI, more benefits of EDI will be provided because of the positive network
externality of EDI technology, and then the attractiveness of EDI will also improve. The
improved attractiveness of EDI will then increase the "adoptability of EDI," which is the
portion of contacts that are sufficiently persuasive to induce the potential EDI users to
adopt the EDI. Finally, the increased adoptability of EDI will increase the adoption of
EDI from word-of-mouth so that the number of EDI users will increase again, thereby
constituting a reinforcing feedback loop.
Average EDI
Transactions pe
EDI Users Total Transaction
Volume of Container
Shipping
Potential EDI Total EDI
Users Transactions
EDI Users EDI Diffusion Rate by
Transaction Volume
Adoption Rate
of EDI EDI Benefits
Adoption from Attractiveness
Word-of-Mouth )fEDI
Contact Rate Adoptability ofm*"""'
EDI
Figure 7-4 Reinforcing "EDT Benefits" Feedback Loop
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7.3.3 Balancing "Competitive Advantage" Feedback Loop
The diffusion of EDI in the container shipping industry shows that the EDI diffusion rate
by users, which is the ratio of active EDI users divided by potential EDI users, increases at
a decreasing rate after experiencing rapid adoption of EDI. This slow increase of EDI
diffusion rate was due to the decreasing competitive advantages from adopting EDI. In
other words, because many competitors in the container shipping industry had already
implemented the EDI technology, the relative competitive advantages of the late EDI
adopters became lower than that of the early adopters, thereby the adoption of EDI
became slower over time. The many small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the
container shipping industry, who were reluctant to adopt EDI due its high implementation
cost, accordingly did not adopt EDI, resulting in a slow increase in EDI diffusion rate by
users.
The dynamics can be modeled by the balancing "competitive advantage" feedback loop
(see Figure 7-5). As the number of EDI users increases, the "EDI diffusion rate by
transaction volume" increases. As more transactions are done through the EDI
technology, the potential competitive advantage of the EDI adopters becomes lower so
that the attractiveness of EDI decreases. This decreased attractiveness of EDI will
subsequently lower the adoptability of EDI, thereby decreasing the adoption from word-
of-mouth. Then, decreased adoption rate of word-of-mouth reduces the number of EDI
users to complete the balancing feedback loop.
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Figure 7-5 Balancing "Competitive Advantage" Feedback Loop
7.4 Model Structure
This section presents a formal description of a system dynamics model for the diffusion
dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry. The model is based on a system
dynamics version of the Bass model (Sterman, 2000); however, several updates of the
model structures were implemented to consider the causal relationships identified in
section 7.3.
7.4.1 Purpose and Boundary of the Model
The purpose of the model for the diffusion dynamics of EDI is to understand the internal
dynamics of EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry, and to simulate the
historical behaviors of EDI diffusion in the 1990s. The model will be used as a reference
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system to simulate the potential diffusion of e-business in the container shipping industry
in this research.
Table 7-2 shows the endogenous variables, the exogenous variables, and what is excluded
in the model.
Table 7-2 Model Boundary Chart for the Model for the Diffusion Dynamics of
EDI
Excluded in the
Endogenous Variables ExogenousParameters model
" Potential EDI users * . Total players * Growth in the size
* EDI users . Initial EDI users of total market
" Adoption rate of EDI 0 Contact rate
* Adoption of EDI from word- 0 Effectiveness of trading
of-mouth partners' demand
" Adoption of EDI from trading o Normal adoptability
partners' demand for EDI 0 Normal attractiveness
" Adoptability 0 Container shipping demand
" Attractiveness of EDI 0 Average transactions per
" Effect of attractiveness on container shipping demand
adoptability 0 Average EDI transactions per
" Effect of EDI benefits on EDI users
attractiveness
" Effect of relative competitive
advantage on attractiveness
* EDI diffusion rate by
transaction volume
* Total transactions
" Total EDI transactions
* EDI diffusion rate by users
" Initial potential EDI users
(*) The underlined variables are state variables in the model
For the purpose of presentation, the model is decomposed into two sectors: EDI diffusion
sector and adoptability sector. The EDI diffusion sector describes how potential EDI
users become active EDI users based on the adoption rate of EDI. The adoptability sector
represents how the level of EDI adoption rate by transaction volume could determine the
attractiveness of EDI, which then controls the adoptability of EDI.
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7.4.2 EDI Diffusion Sector
The EDI diffusion sector models the adoption of EDI by potential EDI users. Following
the Bass model, the adoption rate of EDI is assumed to be determined by two factors:
trading partners' demand for EDI as an external source and word-of-mouth effect as an
internal source. Figure 7-6 shows the stock and flow structure for the EDI diffusion
sector.
Container
Shipping Demana-- kh
Total Transactions
Average Transactions pe EDI Diffusion Rate byContainer Shipping Transaction VolumeDemand
<Total Players> Total EDI +
Transactions
Initial Potential EDI Diffusion Rate + +EDI Users by Users
Initial EDI Users + Average EDI
Transactions per EDI
SUsersPotential D7 EII UsersED Usersi 
-
Adoption Rate
of EDI
++
Adoption of EDI from
Trading Partners' Adoption of EDI .4 -Total Players
Demand from Word of Mouth
+
Effectiveness of <Adoptability>
Trading Partners'
Demand Contact Rate
Figure 7-6 Structure of EDI Diffusion Sector
The main input to this sector is adoptability, which is calculated from the adoptability
sector, and the exogenous parameters to this sector include total players, initial EDI users,
contact rate, effectiveness of trading partners' demand, container shipping demand,
average transactions per container shipping demand, and average EDI transactions per
EDI users. The output from this sector is the EDI diffusion rate by transaction volume,
which determines the effect of EDI benefits on attractiveness of EDI and the effect of
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relative competitive advantage on attractiveness of EDI in the adoptability sector. The
detailed equations are explained in the following.
(1) Potential EDI Users = INTEG ( - Adoption Rate of EDI, Initial Potential EDI
Users)
(2) EDI Users = INTEG (Adoption Rate of EDI, Initial EDI Users)
(3) Adoption Rate of EDI = Adoption of EDI from Trading Partners' Demand +
Adoption of EDI from Word of Mouth
(4) Adoption of EDI from Trading Partners' Demand = Potential EDI Users *
Effectiveness of Trading Partners' Demand
(5) Adoption of EDI from Word of Mouth = (Potential EDI Users * Contact Rate) *
(EDI Users / Total Players) * Adoptability
(6) Initial Potential EDI Users = Total Players - Initial EDI Users
(7) EDI Diffusion Rate by Users = EDI Users / Total Players
(8) EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume = Total EDI Transactions / Total
Transactions
(9) Total EDI Transactions = Average EDI Transactions per EDI Users * EDI Users
(10) Total Transactions = Average Transactions per Container Shipping Demand *
Container Shipping Demand
7.4.3 Adoptability Sector
The adoptability sector captures how adoptability of EDI is determined from the
attractiveness of EDI, which in turn is impacted by the EDI diffusion rate by transaction
volume. Figure 7-7 presents the structure of the adoptability sector.
The input to this sector is the EDI diffusion rate by transaction volume, which is estimated
from the EDI diffusion sector, and the exogenous parameters are normal attractiveness of
EDI and normal adoptability. The output from this sector is the adoptability, which is the
input to the EDI diffusion sector. Three nonlinear relationships are described in the table
functions of "TAB - EDI Benefits on Attractiveness," "TAB - Relative Competitive
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Advantage on Attractiveness," and "TAB - Attractiveness on Adoptability." The detailed
equations in the adoptability sector are shown in the following.
TAB - Attractiveness Relati
on Adoptability Attractivene
Normal Attractiveness Attractiv
of EDI of ED
TAB - EDI Benefits Effect of EDI Benefits
on Attractiveness on Attractiveness
<EDI Diffusi
Transaction
Figure 7-7
Effect of
Attractiveness on OAdoptability
Adoptability t4
Normal
Adoptability
Effect of Relative TAB - Relative
Competitive Advantage on - Competitive Advantage
Attractiveness on Attractiveness
on Rate by
Volume>
Structure of Adoptability Sector
(11) Adoptability = Normal Adoptability * Effect of Attractiveness of Adoptability
(12) Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability = "TAB - Attractiveness on
Adoptability"(Relative Attractiveness of EDI)
(13) Relative Attractiveness of EDI = Attractiveness of EDI / Normal Attractiveness of
EDI
(14) Attractiveness of EDI = Normal Attractiveness of EDI * Effect of EDI Benefits on
Attractiveness * Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness
(15) Effect of EDI Benefits on Attractiveness = "TAB - EDI Benefits on Attractiveness"
(EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume)
(16) Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness = "TAB - Relative
Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness" (EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction
Volume)
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7.5 Model Validation
As explained in the section of 6.5.1, a system dynamics model should satisfy the structure
validity and behavior validity. Given the fact that the model developed in this research for
diffusion dynamics of EDI is adapted from the Bass model, which is a widely accepted
model for the diffusion dynamics of new technology or product, the model can be
regarded as passing the structure validity test. There are no significant structural changes
in the model compared with the Bass model. Then, the next challenge is to ensure the
behavior validity of the model, or model calibration to the historical data, which is
explained in this section.
7.5.1 Parameter Estimation
In order to calibrate the model, exogenous parameters should be collected first. There are
nine exogenous parameters to be estimated, and they are presented in Table 7-3.
Table 7-3 Exogenous Parameters to the Model for Diffusion Dynamics of EDI
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
This is the approximate total number of carriers,
Total Players 1000 Company shippers, and intermediaries, which canpotentially impact the container shipping
industry, ignoring smaller players.
Initial EDI Users 50 Company Initial "EDI diffusion rate by users" is assumedto be 5% in the year of 1990.
A rate that total users interact each other during
a certain period, i.e., measured in company
Contact Rate 11 1 / Year contacted per potential EDI users per time
period, or [1/time]. It is estimated from the
calibration process.
Effectiveness of The fraction that potential EDI users become
Trading Partners' 0.02 1 / Year active EDI users due to the trading partners'
Demand demand. It is assumed to be 2% per year.
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Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
The fraction that contacts between potential EDI
Normal Adoptability 0.015 Dimensionless users and EDI users make potential EDI usersbecome active EDI users. It is assumed to be
around 1.5%.
Normal I Dimensionless Reference level of attractiveness in 1990. It is
Attractiveness set as unity for the simulation purpose.
Coniner Shipping m.n TEU / Year Drewry Shipping Consultants (1999)
Average It is assumed that on average twenty different
Transactions per Transaction / transactions are required to transport a container.
Container Shipping 20 TEU This is based on the number of EDI transaction
Demand sets to be used for container shipping (Sokol,1995)
Average EDI Transaction / This is the average EDI transactions per EDI
Transactions per 485,145 (Company * users. It is estimated by from the calibration
Users year) process.
7.5.2 Model Calibration and Simulation Results
After collecting the data for exogenous parameters, the model is calibrated to the real data
in order to ensure the behavior validity. For the calibration purpose, nonlinear least
squares estimation using Powell's (1969, 1972) optimization algorithm as implemented in
Vensim* is used in this research. The EDI diffusion rate by users is set as the variable for
objective function to be calibrated, and five variables are selected for constraints (Table
7-4). Three estimated nonlinear relationships for constraints from the calibration process
are shown in Figure 7-8, Figure 7-9, and Figure 7-10.
The simulation results are also shown in the following (Figure 7-11 ~ Figure 7-15), and
the summary statistics for the historical fit of the model to the real industry data are shown
in Table 7-5.
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Table 7-4 Objective Functions and Constraints for Calibration of the Model of
EDI Diffusion
Variables for Objective Functions Variables for Constraints
* EDI Diffusion Rate by Users * Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability
* Effect of EDI Benefits on Attractiveness
* Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on
Attractiveness
* Contact Rate
* Average EDI Transactions per EDI Users
Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability
60
30
U,
U,
C)
C
U
0
0
-30
-60
0 0.50 1 1.50
Relative Attractiveness of EDI
2
Figure 7-8 Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability of EDI
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Effect of EDI Benefits on Attractiveness
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EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction Vokume
Effect of EDI Benefits on Attractiveness of EDI
Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness
0.25 0.50 0.75
EDI DiThsion Rate by Transaction Volume
Figure 7-10 Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness of EDI
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Figure 7-11 EDI Diffusion Rate by Users
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Figure 7-12 EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume
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Adoption Rate of EDI
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Figure 7-13 Adoption Rate of EDI
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Figure 7-14 Potential EDI Users
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Figure 7-15 EDI Users
Table 7-5 Summary Statistics for the Model of EDI Diffusion
Theil's Inequality Statistics
Variabe Name Data R2  M P
Points Bias Unequal Unequal
Variation 'ovariance
EDI Diffusion Rate by 11 0.993 3.0% 0.007 0.018 0.975
Users
The simulation results confirm that the model tracks successfully the real data of EDI
diffusion in the container shipping industry, measured by the EDI diffusion rate by users,
which shows a S-shaped curve (Figure 7-11). The Mean Absolute Percent Error (MAPE)
for the EDI diffusion rate by users is just 3%, indicating a close fit of the model to the
actual behavior of EDI diffusion in the container shipping industry. Moreover, the low
bias and variation components of the Theil's inequality statistics confirm that errors are
unsystematic (Sterman, 1984, 2000).
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Meanwhile, the EDI diffusion rate by transaction volume increased quickly from 1990 to
1995 and started to stagnate from then on (Figure 7-12). Corresponding to the S-shaped
adoption of EDI by the 1990s, the adoption of EDI was faster by 1994 and then slower
after that (Figure 7-13). Accordingly, the potential EDI users have been decreasing over
time while the EDI users have been increasing in the 1990s with different growth rates
(Figure 7-14, Figure 7-15).
7.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
There are two parameters assumed in the model calibration - effectiveness of trading
partners' demand and normal adoptability. In order to ensure the confidence of the model
by testing the sensitivity of the system to these parameters, a batch of Monte-Carlo
simulations is performed. The two parameters are assumed to have a uniform distribution
around the values assumed, and the range is set to cover 25% of upper and lower of the
value. The simulations are run with the parameters estimated from the calibration process.
Figure 7-16 and Figure 7-17 show the results of sensitivity simulations with 50% and 95%
confidence bounds. Both the EDI diffusion rate by users and the EDI diffusion rate by
transaction volume are generally stable under the change of the two parameters -
effectiveness of trading partners' demand and normal adoptability - except the time
between 1993 and 1995 when EDI is actively adopted among the container shipping
industry. After the year of 1998 when the adoption rate of EDI started to be slow, the
confidence bounds of the EDI diffusion rate by users and the EDI diffusion rate by
transaction volume are narrow around the values in the base case.
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Figure 7-16 Sensitivity Analysis: EDI Diffusion Rate by Users
Figure 7-17 Sensitivity Analysis: EDI Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume
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7.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a system dynamics model for simulating the diffusion
dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry in the 1990s. The model is based on
the Bass model, which is widely used for modeling the diffusion of new technology or
product over time, ensuring the structure validity of the model. The calibration process
confirms that the model tracks the diffusion of EDI in the container shipping industry
quite well and is stable against the disturbance in the parameters assumed.
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Chapter 8 Model for the Impact of e-Business on the
Container Shipping Industry
8.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a study to analyze the potential impacts of e-business on the
container shipping industry by developing a system dynamics model. The model is
constructed by integrating the models explained in chapter 6 and chapter 7, supplementing
them with the additional dynamics that simulate the potential interactions between the
current strategic challenges of carriers and the promising e-business models.
The future base case, which models the future industry behaviors without considering any
impact of e-business activities, is first presented in section 8.2. Next, the integrated model
for analyzing the potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry is
explained in section 8.3. Then, section 8.4 provides the major findings from the
simulation of the integrated model. Finally, section 8.5 discusses the three findings on the
commoditization of the logistics service offering, followed by the conclusions in section
8.6.
8.2 Analysis of the Future Base Case
A first step to test the potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry is
to estimate the future base case. The future base case activates only the feedback loops
that have controlled the traditional dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container
shipping industry without considering any potential impact of the dynamics of LSO and e-
business activities. This future base case will be used as a reference system to measure
the potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry.
The model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the CSI as discussed in chapter 6 is
extended to the year of 2020 to make the future base case. In order to extend the time
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frame of the simulation, several assumptions are made to drive the simulation. Table 8-1
shows the assumptions made for the future base case.
Table 8-1 Assumptions for the Future Base Case
Variables Assumptions
Assuming the sine curve which follows the patterns of GDP growth
rate from 1985 to 2000. The parameters of the sine curve of GDP
growth are in the following:
GDP Growth Rate - Amplitude = 0.0082
- Period = 10.2 years
- Baseline offset = 3.29 %
See Figure 8-1 below for the graph of GDP growth rate assumed
In the 1990s, the fast growing trend of globalization must have
exaggerated the container shipping demand. However, the
globalization will be expected to be mature and slower over time so thatGDP Sensitivity on the GDP sensitivity on indicated demand will become decreased.
Indicated Demand Therefore, the future GDP sensitivity on indicated demand is assumed
to decrease by 5% of the current GDP sensitivity to reflect the slower
globalization and the maturing trend of the container shipping volume.
Average Voyages per Year It is assumed to be as same as in the 1990s - 6.8 voyages per year
Reference Utilization It is assumed to be as same as in the recent years - 75%
Capacity Adjustment Time It is assumed to be as same as in the recent years - 4 years
It is assumed that the effect of economy of scale on cost will beEffect of Economy of Scale decreasing at decreasing rate because the benefit of economy of scale
on Cost will be limited over time (Wijnolst, et al., 2000). See Figure 8-2
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Figure 8-2 Effect of Economy of Scale on Cost Assumed
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After setting the parameters assumed above, running the model for the dynamics of
supply-and-demand presents the future base case in the container shipping industry.
Below are the simulation results of the future base case, which covers the time period
from the year of 1990 to the year of 2020 (Figure 8-3 ~ Figure 8-8). Real industry data in
the 1990s are also drawn in dotted red line. The future base case provides several insights
into the future dynamics of the container shipping industry given that the industry
maintains the current practices of supply-and-demand of the container shipping service.
" Despite the decreased impact of GDP growth rate on the container shipping demand,
the demand is expected to grow on average 9% per year.
* The containership capacity will also increase substantially over time. However, the
orderbook of containerships will be more cyclical than in the 1990s.
" After being substantially depressed to lower than 60% by the end of 2002, the
utilization is estimated to be slightly improving afterwards. However, the overall
utilization will be trapped around 63%, which is 13% lower than the average
utilization in the 1990s.
* When the utilization goes down, the freight rate will also be substantially eroded and
then hardly improved. After maintaining around $ 1,047 / TEU in the 2000s, the
freight rate is expected to be stagnated around $ 966 / TEU in the 201 Os. The overall
average freight rate is around $ 1,007 / TEU, which is 29% lower than the average
freight rate in the 1990s.
* In accordance with the lowered utilization and freight rate, the future profitability will
be much lower and more cyclical than in the 1990s. The average profit margin of
carriers from the year of 2000 to 2020 is expected to be around 3.9%, which is 35%
lower than the average profitability in the 1990s
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In summary, without any change in the current dynamics of supply-and-demand in the
container shipping industry, the container shipping industry will be much more
commoditized over time: the utilization, freight rate, and profitability of carriers will be
substantially lowered and trapped in such a low level. Providing the container shipping
service with low 60% of utilization and as low as $ 1,000 / TEU of freight rate, generating
a profit margin of around 3.9%, is hardly sustainable and differentiable. In addition, the
cyclicality of the containership orderbook and profitability of carriers will become more
intense; hence, maintaining the sustainable operation of the container shipping service will
be much harder than ever. Carriers should implement new strategies to avoid this difficult
business environment.
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Demand
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Figure 8-3 The Future Base Case - "Demand"
Containership Capacity
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Figure 8-4 The Future Base Case - "Containership Capacity"
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Freight Rate
1994 1998 2002 2006
Time (year)
2010 2014 2018
Freight Rate : Future Base Case i i i
Freight Rate : Real CSI Data.-2.. 2. ..-..........-------- -. -
Figure 8-7 The Future Base Case - "Freight Rate"
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The Future Base Case - "Profitability"Figure 8-8
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8.3 Modeling the Impacts of e-Business on the Container Shipping
Industry - The Integrated Model
This section describes the integrated model that is developed for analyzing the impacts of
e-business on the container shipping industry. After reviewing the general structures of
the integrated model in section 8.3.1, section 8.3.2 and section 8.3.3 explain the causal
loop diagrams of the integrated model and the detailed model structures, respectively.
Next, section 8.3.4 presents the estimated values of the exogenous parameters used in the
integrated model, followed by the simulation results in section 8.3.5.
8.3.1 Overview of the Integrated Model for the Impacts of e-Business
In chapter 2, three major strategic challenges of carriers - logistics service offering,
control of asset management costs, and control of transaction costs - were analyzed based
on the current competitive drivers in the container shipping industry. In addition, two
promising e-business models - CTP in alliance with carrier-oriented portal and e-PSP -
were identified in chapter 5 by evaluating the success potential of the e-business models
with three different frameworks.
These strategic challenges of carriers and the promising e-business models will interact
with each other and the interactions will have multi-facets (see Figure 8-9). For example,
the CTPs will interact with the trend of logistics service offerings because the CTPs
provide the internet-based platforms that help carriers and shippers manage their logistics
needs more efficiently. Moreover, the CTPs can aid carriers in reducing the transaction
costs by lowering market research costs, documenting costs, and customer support costs,
etc. In addition, e-PSPs could interact with the trend of controlling the asset management
costs.
Among the potential interactions between the strategic challenges of carriers and the e-
business models, the interactions involved with the CTPs are expected to be more
immediate and substantial because the CTPs are the most promising e-business model.
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Furthermore, developing the logistics service offering is one of the most urgent tasks that
carriers should perform in order to be successful in the environment of ever eroding
profitability of the container shipping service. Accordingly, the potential impacts of e-
business on the container shipping industry could be dominated by the potential
interactions between the dynamics of logistics service offerings and the CTPs. Therefore,
the model for analyzing the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry in
this research will be focused on the interactions between the dynamics of logistics service
offering and the role of the CTPs in the container shipping industry.
Strategic Challenges Promising e-Business
of Carriers Models in the CSI
Logistics Service Offering Tsialanewt
(LSO)carrier-oriented Portal
Figure 8-9 Interactions between Strategic Challenges of Carriers and e-Business
Models
Based on the analysis above, a proposed system dynamics model for the impacts of e-
business on the container shipping industry is composed of three sub-sectors (see Figure
8-10): a sector for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the CSI, a sector for the
dynamics of logistics service offering, and a sector for the diffusion of e-business in the
container shipping industry. The first sector is adapted from the model discussed in
chapter 6 while the third sector is updated from the model of EDI diffusion in the
container shipping industry, which is described in chapter 7. The second sector will be
explained in this chapter. All sub-sectors are integrated in the end to test the impact of e-
business on the container shipping industry.
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The process of integrating the sub-sectors are performed gradually - the sector for the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the CSI is extended to the future without considering
any impact of the dynamics of LSO and e-business, providing the future base case as a
reference system for testing the additional impacts; the sector for the dynamics of logistics
service offering is then added onto the first sector to analyze the potential impacts of
logistics service offering in the container shipping industry; the sector for the diffusion
dynamics of e-business is further imposed on the model to delineate the impacts of e-
business on the container shipping industry in relation to the dynamics of logistics service
offering; and finally all subsectors are fully integrated to test the impacts of e-business on
the CSI.
The procedure of the model building is based on the assumption that carriers might have
three strategies to improve the logistics service offering: increasing the LSO capability by
adding more logistics salesforce without adopting e-business, or "vertical integration
strategy"; increasing the LSO capability by actively adopting e-business activities, or
"virtual integration strategy"; and combining the two strategies at a time, or "mixed
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integration strategy." Among the three sub-sectors, the second sub-sector that simulates
the dynamics of logistics service offering is driven by the vertical integration strategy and
the third sub-sector representing the diffusion dynamics of e-business is used for testing
the virtual integration strategy. The fully integrated model combining the three sub-
sectors all together is used for analyzing the mixed integration strategy.
The purpose of the integrated model is not to predict the future relating to the logistics
service offering and the e-business activities; Rather, through the model building process,
it is to decompose the complex potential dynamics of the interactions between the LSO
and e-business activities into several manageable sectors, understand the dynamic
behaviors of the system over time, and gain the insights into how to cope with the
strategic challenges posed by the logistics service and the e-business activities.
8.3.2 Causal Loop Diagrams for the Integrated Model
As Figure 8-10 represents, the causal loop diagram, on which the integrated model for
testing the impacts of e-business on the CSI is based, should be composed of three sub-
diagrams - the causal relationships for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the CSI,
those for the dynamics of logistics service offering, and those for the diffusion dynamics
of e-business.
The first causal relationships for the integrated model are for the dynamics of supply-and-
demand in the container shipping industry (see Figure 8-11). Two balancing loops and
one reinforcing loop are identified to connect the supply and demand of container
shipping service through the freight rate, utilization, and cost variables. The detailed
discussions on the role of each causal loop are already presented in section 6.3.
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Figure 8-11 Causal Loop Diagram for the Dynamics of Supply-and-Demand in the
Container Shipping Industry
The second component of causal relationships in the integrated model is for the dynamics
of logistics service offering in the container shipping industry (see Figure 8-12 and Table
8-2). The causal loops for the LSO dynamics are constructed by focusing on the factors
that might affect the level of carriers' LSO capability and their interactions with carriers'
profitability. The diagram is an integral part to explain the "vertical integration strategy"
of carriers, in which carriers develop their LSO capability by hiring additional salesforce.
There are three major parts in this causal loop diagram: The first part represents how
carriers hire salesforce to develop the LSO capability depending on the level of carriers'
profitability. The second part simulates the dynamics of carriers' market share of logistics
service, depending on the carriers' LSO capability and the level of carriers' commission
for the logistics service. The carriers' market share of logistics service and the carriers'
commission level determine the carriers' revenue from the logistics service. The third
part is to consider the competition between intermediaries, who have been the major
logistics service providers to shippers, and carriers, who attempt to offer the logistics
service to shippers by improving their LSO capability. Intermediaries are assumed to
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change their LSO commission level to compete against the improving carriers' LSO
capability in the model.
In total, twelve feedback loops are expected to govern the dynamics of LSO in the
container shipping industry. The detailed explanation of the causal relationships for the
LSO dynamics can be found in the Appendix.
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Figure 8-12 Causal Loop Diagram for the Dynamics of Logistics Service Offering
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Table 8-2 List of Variables in the Causal Loop Diagram for the LSO Dynamics
Key Variables Definition Dimension StateVariable
The level of carriers' capability of
Carriers LSO providing logistics service measured Year
in years of LSO experience
Average LSO The average experience of salesforce Year / People Yes
Experience of providing LSO service
Number of Salesforce The number of salesforce of carriers in People Yesthe container shipping industry
Carriers LSO The money that carriers charge per $ / TEU YesCommission TEU for their LSO service
Intermediaries LSO The money that intermediaries charge $ / TEU YesCommission per TEU for their LSO service
The average rate at which salesforce
gains the experience measured by
Rate of Learning LSO "years" per year; i.e., this is the (Year/People)/Year
average rate of learning by the
salesforce.
Hiring Rate The number of salesforce per year that People / year
carriers hire
Carriers Profitability The total operating margin per TEU Dimensionlessdivided by total revenue per TEU
Carriers' annual additional revenue
Unit Revenue Increase stream from LSO service, calculated TEUfrom LSO by "Carriers LSO Commission" times
"LSO Market Share of Carriers"
The total cost of shipping a container
Unit Cost and providing LSO, measured by $/ TEU
dollar per TEU
LSO Market Share of The carriers' market share in the LSO Dimensionless
Carriers market
Attractiveness of The extent that the carriers' LSO Dimensionless
Carriers LSO service is attractive to shippers
Attractiveness of The extent that the intermediaries' Dimensionless
Intermediaries LSO LSO service is attractive to shippers
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The last component of causal loop diagrams in the integrated model is to simulate the
potential diffusion dynamics of e-business in the container shipping industry (see Figure
8-13 and Table 8-3). An important assumption with the causal relationships for the e-
business diffusion in the integrated model is that the potential diffusion dynamics of e-
business in the container shipping industry is similar to the historical diffusion dynamics
of EDI in the container shipping industry. In other words, the diffusion rate of e-business
will show an S-shaped curve due to the interactions of three feedback loops, which were
found in the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the container shipping industry.
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Figure 8-13 Causal Loop Diagram for the Potential Diffusion Dynamics of e-
Business in the Container Shipping Industry
The reasoning behind this assumption is that EDI and e-business share the common
characteristics. Both EDI and e-business - particularly the CTP model, which is expected
to be most successful in the container shipping industry - have the characteristic of
network externality, which is the major cause of S-shaped diffusion dynamics. In
addition, although the extent of benefits might be different, the benefits of EDI and e-
business are very similar to each other. For example, because both technologies provide
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tools for efficient information management, they help the container shipping industry
reduce communication cost, reduce clerical errors, and improve productivity.
Therefore, the causal loop diagram for the potential diffusion dynamics of e-business is
adapted from the causal loop diagram for the EDI diffusion dynamics. Comparing the
causal loop diagram for the EDI diffusion dynamics as shown in Figure 7-2, the word of
"EDI" is replaced by the word of "e-Biz" in Figure 8-13. The diagram is a crucial part for
analyzing the "virtual integration strategy" of carriers, in which carriers develop their LSO
capability by actively adopting e-business.
Three feedback loops are identified in Figure 8-13: balancing "trading partners' request"
feedback loop, reinforcing "e-Business benefits" feedback loop, and balancing
"competitive advantage" feedback loop. These feedbacks are equivalent to the balancing
"trading partners' request" feedback loop, reinforcing "EDI benefits" feedback, and
balancing "competitive advantage" feedback loop, respectively, as explained in section
7.3.
Combining the three sub-sectors, the causal loop diagram for the integrated model can be
developed as shown in Figure 8-14. The three dynamics are interconnected each other.
The e-business diffusion dynamics and the dynamics of supply-and-demand are
interconnected by the demand; the LSO dynamics and the dynamics of supply-and-
demand are integrated with the carriers' profitability; and finally the diffusion rate of e-
business in the container shipping industry affects the rate of learning LSO and the unit
cost of carriers. Certain portions of the connections in the causal loop diagram are
activated or inactivated appropriately in analyzing the three different strategies of
developing the LSO - the vertical, virtual, and mixed integration strategies.
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Table 8-3 List of Variables in the Causal Loop Diagram for the Diffusion
Dynamics of e-Business
StateKey Variables Definition Dimension Variable
Potential e-Biz Users Potential number of e-business users in Company Yesthe container shipping industry
e-Biz Users The number of active e-business users in Company Yesthe container shipping industry
Adoption Rate of e-Biz The number of companies that adopt e- Company yearbusiness per year
Adoption from Word-of- The number of companies that adopt e-
Mouth business per year by word-of-mouth Company / yearprocess
A rate that total players interact each
Contact Rate other per year i.e., measured in company 1 / year
contacted per player per time year
A fraction that contacts between potential
Adoptability of e-Biz e-business users and e-business users Dimensionless
make potential e-business users become
active e-business users.
Attractiveness of e-Biz The extent that e-business is attractive to Dimensionlessthe potential e-business users
Competitive Advantage of The extent of competitive advantage of e-Ceitivse Adbusiness as a function of "e-Business Dimensionless
e-Biz Users Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume"
e-Biz Diffusion Rate by A fraction that business transactions are Dimensionless
Transaction Volume executed by e-business
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Figure 8-14 Causal Loop Diagram for the Integrated Model
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8.3.3 Model Structure
Based on the causal loop diagram for understanding the impacts of e-business on the
container shipping industry, the integrated model is developed. The relationships of (1),
(2), and (3) in Figure 8-10 are modeled. It is assumed in the model that the LSO
dynamics and the diffusion dynamics of e-business start to impact the container shipping
industry from the year of 2001.
One thing explicitly excluded in the integrated model is the financial strength of
intermediaries, which can impact the development of intermediaries' LSO capability and
their LSO commission level. Since the purpose of the integrated model is to simulate and
understand the impacts of the LSO dynamics and e-business on carriers' overall
performance from the carriers' perspective, the development of intermediaries' LSO
capability is exogenously input without considering the financial conditions of
intermediaries.
For the presentation purpose, the integrated model is decomposed into twelve sectors:
Four of them - the demand, freight rate, capacity, and cost sectors - come from the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. Among the
remaining eight sectors, six sectors - carriers LSO sector, intermediaries LSO sector,
salesforce sector, market share sector, LSO commission sector, and LSO revenue sector -
simulate the dynamics of developing the LSO. Finally, the remaining two sectors - e-
business diffusion sector and adoptability sector - represent the potential diffusion
dynamics of e-business in the container shipping industry. Section 6.4 explains the four
sectors related to the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry
while the Appendix presents the detailed descriptions of the remaining eight sectors.
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8.3.4 Estimation of the Exogenous Parameters
To make the integrated model work, it is necessary to estimate the exogenous parameters
that quantify the relationships among the variable. Four types of exogenous parameters
for the LSO dynamics - exogenous input variables, reference points for decision-making,
information delay time, and nonlinear relationships - are collected and used for the
simulation run. In addition, several exogenous input variables and nonlinear relationships
for the diffusion dynamics of e-business are also estimated for the simulation.
Unlike exogenous parameters of the model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in the
CSI and of the model for the diffusion dynamics of EDI in the CSI, those of the integrated
model are in general hard to acquire because the LSO activities and the e-business
diffusion in the container shipping industry are newly started and there have been very
few industry resources to follow up those dynamics in the CSI. Despite this difficulty, the
data are collected as much as possible from the industry resources and interviews with
industry veterans, and the best judgment for each variable is used in the model when the
data for the variables are not available at all. In order to supplement the uncertainty from
the exogenous variables assumed, extensive sensitivity analyses are performed at the
simulation stage. The exogenous parameters estimated to simulate the integrated model
are explained in the following.
Table 8-4 presents the exogenous variables for the LSO dynamics, which set the initial
condition of the model and draw the model boundary. All initial variables are set on the
year of 2001, when the LSO dynamics are assumed to impact the container shipping
industry. In addition, Table 8-5 explains the values of the reference points for the
decision-making in the LSO dynamics, and the data for the information delay time in the
LSO dynamics, which are needed for processing the managerial information, are shown in
Table 8-6.
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Table 8-4 Exogenous Input Variables for the LSO Dynamics
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Initial total experience of LSO of carriers. It
is estimated from [Initial Salesforce] times
[Initial Average Experience of LSO], where
* [Initial Salesforce] = 20,000
Initial Carriers LSO 20,000 Years * [Initial Average Experience of LSO]
= 1 year per salesforce
Look at the descriptions of the initial
salesforce and the initial average experience
of LSO for sources
Initial total experience of LSO of
intermediaries. It could be estimated from
[Salesforce per Intermediary] x [Number of
Intermediaries] x [Salesforce's Average
Experience of LSO], such that:
* [Salesforce per Intermediary] = 50
Initial Intermediaries 200,000 Years * [Number of Intermediaries] = 800
LSO (because 4,000 OTI (from FMC, 2001) x
20% (only considering top 20%) ), and
* [Salesforce's Average Experience of
LSO] = 5 years (Considering rapid
outsourcing of logistics function in the
1990s). THEREFORE => 200,000
Year
Assuming 100 container carriers with average
200 sales persons per carriers in 2001.
Sources: Peter Keller from NYK North
America said he had 60 - 80 salesforce in the
US (2/22/02 Interview), and assuming that
NYK has as same as salesforce in other
Initial Salesforce 20,000 People regions. In order to make the salesforce
unchanged until the year of 2000 (i.e., the
LSO dynamics start to impact from the year of
2001), the initial salesforce is set in the model
as [Average Hiring Rate] x [Time To Quit Or
Retire Salesforce], which guarantees the
equilibrium condition.
Average hiring rate of carriers in the 1990s. It
is estimated from [Initial Salesforce] / [Time
Average Hiring Rate 2,000 People / Year To Quit Or Retire Salesforce], where [Initial
Salesforce] = 20,000 people, and [Time To
Quit Or Retire Salesforce] = 10 years.
Time to Quit or Retire 10 Years Average time that a salesman serves at the
Salesforce carriers. It is assumed to be around 10 years.
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Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
The change of total cost due to the relative
Ctive S esforce 0.08 Dimensionless change of salesforce. Source: NYK NorthRelaive alesorceAmerica
Average experience of offering the logisticsAverage Experience of 1 Years service of newly hired salesforce - assuming
one year of experience
Initial Market Share of 0.1 Dimensionless Carriers' market share of offering the logistics
Carriers LSO service to shippers. It is assumed to be 10%.
Initial perceived rate of change of the LSOInitial Perceived LSO 0 1 / Year ratio to be used for estimating the trend ofRatio Change LSO ratio change. It is assumed to be zero.
The impact of relative improvements of LSO
Sensitivity of LSO capabilities on the indicated carriers
Ratio Change Trend on 0.28 Fraction * Year commission. It is assumed to be as same as
Indicated Carriers [Utilization Trend Sensitivity on Indicated
Commission Freight Rate], which is defined in the generic
model.
Sensitivity of LSO The impact of relative improvements of LSO
Ratio Change Trend on capabilities on the indicated intermediaries
Indicated Intermediaries -0.28 Fraction * Year commission. It is assumed to be as same as
Commission [Utilization Trend Sensitivity on IndicatedFreight Rate] in an opposite direction.
Average commission charged by carriers for
offering the logistics service. It is assumed toInitial Carners 80 $ / TEU be 20% lower than the [Initial intermediariesCommission Commission], reflecting the low initial LSO
capability of carriers.
Average commission charged by
Initial Intermediaries 100 $ / TEU intermediaries for offering the logistics
Commission service. Assuming that it is around $100 per
TEU.
Maximum Allowable Maximum allowable commission paid by
Commission by 200 $ / TEU shippers. Assuming that it is around $200 per
Shippers TEU.
249
- -1-- -.1-1
Model for the Impacts of e-Business on the CSIChapter 8
Table 8-5 Data of Reference Points for the Decision-making in the LSO
Dynamics
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Base increasing rate of the intermediaries'
Initial Development LSO due to its natural experience gain over
Rate of Intermediaries 0.07 Fraction / Year time. It is assumed that intermediaries can
LSO improve their LSO capability by 7% per year
at first and then decrease at a decreasing rate.
Annual Decay Rate of This is the control variable to test the different
Development Rate 0.03 Fraction / Year scenarios of the development ofIntermediaries LSO.
The rate that carriers increase the hiring to
improve the LSO; i.e., carriers should hiring
Hiring Increase Rate for 0 Dimensionless more to improve the LSO. This is the control
LSO variable to test the impacts of carriers'
decisions to adopt the different hiring rates per
year to develop the LSO.
0 for Future Base Case (i.e., no impact of
Switch for LSO Case of 0 or 1 Dimensionless profitability on Salesforce); 1 for LSO Case
Hiring (i.e., considering the impact of profitability on
Salesforce hiring policy)
Switch for LSO Case of 0 for Future Base Case (i.e., no impact of
Experience by 0 or Dimensionless learning on "Rate of Experience Gain); 1 for
Salesforce LSO Case (i.e., considering the impact oflearning on "Rate of Experience Gain")
Switch for Revenue 0 for OFF (i.e., no revenue increase from the
Increase from LSO 0 or 1 Dimensionless LSO); 1 for ON (i.e., considering the revenueincrease from the LSO)
Switch for the Case of 0 for OFF (i.e., Constant Commission for
Variable Commission 0 or 1 Dimensionless LSO), 1 for OFF (i.e., Variable Commissionfor LSO)
Switch for the Case of 0 for OFF (i.e., constant "Intermediaries
Variable Intermediaries 0 or 1 Dimensionless LSO") ; 1 for ON ( i.e., variable
LSO "Intermediaries LSO")
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Table 8-6 Data of the Information Delay Time in the LSO Dynamics
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Shippers' Carriers LSO 0.5 Years Time for shippers to perceive the level of
Perception Time carriers LSO. It is assumed to be 6 moths.
Time for shippers to perceive the level of
Shippers' Intermediaries 0.5 Years intermediaries LSO. It is assumed to be as
LSO Perception Time same as [Shippers' Carriers LSO Perception
Time].
Time to realize the hiring needs and prepareTime to Pceive Needs 0.5 Years the hiring process. It is assumed to be 6
Clea theHirng N dsmonths.
Average Time Interval Time periods that carriers and intermediaries
for Trend Estimation of 0.5 Years look at for estimating the change of LSO ratio.
LSO Ratio Change It is assumed to be 0.5 year.
Time for carriers and intermediaries to realize
Time to Perceive 0.5 Years the relative capability of their LSOs by
Relative LSO Ratio .5Ycomparing each other. It is assumed to be 6
months.
Time for carriers to change the commission
Time to Change I Years for the LSO. It is assumed that carriers in
Carriers Commission general change the price structure once every
year.
Time to Change Time for intermediaries to change the
Intermediaries 1 Years commission for the LSO. It is assumed to be
Commission as same as [Time to Change CarriersCommission].
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Furthermore, the table functions, which describe the six nonlinear relationships in the
LSO dynamics, are presented in Table 8-7 and Table 8-8, followed by the graphs for each
table function (Figure 8-15 ~ Figure 8-20).
Table 8-7 Nonlinear Relationships and Table Functions for the LSO Dynamics
Nonlinear Relationships Table Functions Input Variables
Effect of Relative Profitability TAB - Relative Profitability on Adjusted Relative Profitability
on Hiring Hiring
Average Rate of Learning by TAB - Relative Salesforce on Relative Salesforce
Salesforce Rate of Learning
Effect of Carriers LSO on TAB - Carriers LSO on
Attractiveness of Carriers Attractiveness of Carriers Relative Carriers LSO
Service Service
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on TAB - Intermediaries LSO on
Attractiveness of Intermediaries Attractiveness of Intermediaries Relative Intermediaries LSO
Service Service
Effect of Carriers Commission TAB - Carriers Commission on
on Attractiveness of Carriers Attractiveness of Carriers Relative Carriers Commission
Service Service
Effect of Intermediaries TAB - Intermediaries Relative Intermediaries
Commission on Attractiveness Commission on Attractiveness Commission
of Intermediaries Service of Intermediaries Service
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Table 8-8 Description of the Table Functions in the LSO Dynamics
Table Functions Comments Figures
TAB - Relative Profitability on Assuming that this is as same as "TAB -Relative Profitability on Order" in the Figure 8-15Hiring generic model
Assuming that this is the linear
TAB - Relative Salesforce on relationship at a rate of 50% increase of Figure 8-16Rate of Learning "Average Rate of Learning" given the
100% increase of "Salesforce".
The impact will increase at a decreasing
rate. It is assumed that (1) the impact willTAB - Carriers LSO on take off from the 20% increase of LSO;Attractiveness of Carriers (2) the impact will increase until the Figure 8-17
Service 500% increase of LSO; (3) and then the
impact will get saturated after that.
It is assumed that impact of relative
improvement of intermediaries LSO on
attractiveness is much less sensitive than
that of Carriers LSO on attractiveness
TAB - Intermediaries LSO on because the intermediaries LSO is more
Attractiveness of Intermediaries mature than the carriers LSO. So, the Figure 8-18
ricte s impact on attractiveness reaches twiceService when the Intermediaries LSO improves 5
times, whereas in the carriers LSO case
the impact is assumed to be 5 times when
the Carriers LSO improves 5 times. And,
the impact is leveling off thereafter.
Inverse proportional relationship is
assumed. It is further assume that (1)
there is relatively insensitive range of
impact around I of "Relative Carriers
TAB - Carriers Commission on Commission". The range is expected to
ABtr Carrierss Com missione on be plus & m inus 10% of 1; (2) m aximum
Atrace positive impact is 100% increase for the Figure 8-19Service free LSO service (i.e., 0 of "Relative
Carriers Commission); (3) maximum
negative impact is 100% decrease at
100% increase of "Relative Carriers
Commission and there after.
TAB - Intermediaries Assuming that this is as same as the
Commission on Attractiveness "TAB - Carriers Commission on Figure 8-20
of Intermediaries Service Attractiveness of Carriers Service."
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Meanwhile, the values of exogenous parameters for simulating the potential diffusion
dynamics of e-business are adapted from those of the exogenous parameters for the EDI
diffusion dynamics in the 1990s, which are shown in section 7.5.1. In other words, the
exogenous parameters for the diffusion dynamics of e-business are set in such a way that
the diffusion rate of e-business in the 2000s must be as same as that of EDI in the 1990s in
the container shipping industry, which is the basic assumption in analyzing the impacts of
e-business diffusion on the container shipping industry.
Table 8-9 presents the data for the exogenous parameters used in the e-business diffusion
dynamics, and the nonlinear relationships for modeling the e-business diffusion, which are
adapted from the EDI diffusion model, are provided in Figure 8-21, Figure 8-22, and
Figure 8-23.
Table 8-9 Data of the Exogenous Parameters for the Diffusion Dynamics of e-
Business
Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
This is the approximate total number of carriers,
shippers, and intermediaries, which canTotal Players 1000 Company potentially impact the container shipping
industry, ignoring smaller players.
Initial e-Biz Users 50 Company Initial "e-Biz diffusion rate by users" is assumedto be 5% in the year of 2001.
A rate that total users interact each other during
a certain period, i.e., measured in company
Contact Rate 11 1 / Year contacted per potential e-biz users per time
period, or [1/time]. The contact rate estimated
in the EDI diffusion model is used in this model.
Effectiveness of The fraction that potential e-biz users become
Trading Partners' 0.02 1 / Year active e-biz users due to the trading partners'
Demand demand. It is assumed to be 2% per year.
The fraction that contacts between potential e-
Normal Adoptability 0.015 Dimensionless biz users and e-biz users make potential e-biz
users become active e-biz users. It is assumed to
be around 1.5%.
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Variable Name Value Unit Descriptions and Source
Normal Reference level of attractiveness in 2001. It isAttractiveness of e- I Dimensionless set as unity for the simulation purpose.Biz
It is assumed that on average twenty differentAverage transactions are required to transport a container.Transactions per 20 Transaction / This is based on the number of EDI transactionContainer Shipping TEU sets to be used for container shipping (Sokol,Demand 1995)
This is the average e-biz transactions per e-biz
Average e-Biz Transaction / users. It is estimated by from the calibration
Transactions per 1,050,000 (Company * process that the shape of "e-biz diffusion rate by
Users year) users" in the 2000s is as same as that of "EDI
diffusion rate by users" in the 1990s.
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Figure 8-21 Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability of e-Business
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Figure 8-23 Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness of e-
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In addition, two new nonlinear relationships should be defined for analyzing the impacts
of e-business on the CSI: "effect of e-biz diffusion on carriers cost" and "average rate of
learning by e-biz." These nonlinear relationships explain how much the level of e-
business adoption in the container shipping industry affects the overall cost of carriers and
the rate of learning LSO by carriers' salesforce, respectively. Each nonlinear relationship
is determined by the table functions describing the nonlinear relationships among the
variables: The former is explained by the "TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Cost" while the latter
is characterized by the "TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Rate of LSO Learning." Both
relationships use the "e-biz diffusion rate by transaction volume" as an input variable.
The detailed descriptions of each table function are provided in Table 8-10, followed by
the figures of the table functions in Figure 8-24 and Figure 8-25.
Table 8-10 Description of the Table Functions in the Diffusion Dynamics of e-
Business
Table Functions Comments Figures
In the early stage of e-Biz diffusion, carriers
should pay relatively high cost for e-Biz.
However, the carriers' cost will decrease as more
carriers adopt e-biz at a decreasing rate, as the e-
biz market gets mature over time. It is assumed
that (1) carriers should spend 10% more on e-Biz
TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Cost until e-Biz diffusion is around 30%; (2) the cost Figure 8-24
starts to decrease from around 30% of e-Biz
adoption rate until 70%; (3) the cost impact
becomes unity from 50% of e-Biz diffusion; (4)
the cost will stabilize after 70% of e-Biz diffusion;
and (5) the final cost impact will stay around 2%
lower, or 98% of original cost level.
The assumption for the base case is the linear
TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Rate relationship at a rate of 50% increase of "Average Figure 8-25
of LSO Learning Rate of Learning by e-Biz" given the 100% of e-
Biz diffusion rate by transaction volume.
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261
1
Model for the Impacts of e-Business on the CSIChapter 8
8.3.5 Simulation Results of the Integrated Model
After setting the exogenous parameters, the integrated model is used for analyzing the
impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry. Three integration strategies of
carriers - the vertical, virtual, and mixed integration strategy - for developing the LSO, as
well as the future base case, in which carriers are assumed neither to develop the LSO nor
to adopt the e-business, are tested with the integrated model.
In order to simulate the future base case and the three integration strategies of developing
the LSO, seven control variables are used for activating or deactivating the specific
feedback loops constituting each scenario (see Table 8-11). In the future base case, all
control variables are set as zero so that there are no impacts from the logistics service in
simulating the future base case. In the vertical integration strategy, it is assumed that (1)
carriers increase the hiring rate by 50% more than the future base when the carriers'
profitability is higher than the reference profitability; (2) the LSO commissions of carriers
and intermediaries are changing depending on their levels of LSO capability; (3) and the
intermediaries' LSO capability improves over time as set by the exogenous input. On the
other hand, in the virtual integration strategy, carriers are assumed to improve their LSO
capability by adopting e-business while the LSO commissions of carriers and
intermediaries and the intermediaries' LSO capability improve over time as in the vertical
integration strategy. Finally, in the mixed integration strategy, all control variables are
turned on to reflect both the vertical and the virtual integration strategies at the same time,
so that carriers are assumed to increase their LSO capability by both hiring additional
salesforce and adopting e-business while the LSO commissions of carriers and
intermediaries and the intermediaries' LSO capability improve over time as in the vertical
integration strategy.
The model is simulated for each case for a time period from 1990 to 2020. The LSO
dynamics and the diffusion dynamics of e-business are assumed to activate from the year
of 2001. The simulation results of the integrated model are shown in the following.
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Table 8-11 Scenarios for the Simulation of the Integrated Model
Future Base Vertical Virtual MixedControl Variables rase Integration Integration IntegrationCase VE-4) (Vi-4) (MX-1)
Hiring Increase Rate for LSO 0 0.5 0 0.5
Switch for LSO Case of Hiring ( 0 1 0 1
Switch for LSO Case of 0 1 0 1Experience by Salesforce
Switch for Revenue Increase from 01 1 1LSO
Switch for LSO Case of 0 0 1 1Experience by eBiz
Switch for the Case of Variable 0 1 1 1Commission
Switch for the Case of Variable 0 1 1 1Intermediaries LSO
(*) For switch variables, 0 means being turned off and 1 means being turned on
Figure 8-26 presents the dynamic change of four important variables related to developing
the LSO: the LSO market share of carriers and intermediaries, and the LSO commission
levels of carriers and intermediaries. In general, the three strategies of developing the
LSO provide similar trends over time. The carriers' LSO market share is expected to
increase rapidly from 2001 to 2005 when carriers start to offer the logistics service,
whereas the intermediaries' LSO market share decreases substantially during the same
time period. After the year of 2005, however, the carriers' market share decreases slowly
while the intermediaries' market share recovers over time. Finally, in the long term, both
LSO market shares of carriers and intermediaries are expected to stabilize over time.
Overall, the carriers' LSO market share will increase from 10% in 2001 to 25% in 2020
while that of intermediaries decreases from 90% to 75% during the same period.
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Figure 8-26 Dynamics of Developing the LSO in Three Different Strategies
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Meanwhile, the LSO commission of carriers is expected to improve in the early days of
developing the LSO whereas that of intermediaries decreases during the same time period.
In the long term, both LSO commission levels of carriers and intermediaries stabilize over
time. Eventually, the carriers' LSO commission becomes higher than the intermediaries'
LSO commission.
Closely reviewing the causal relationships and the model structure, the behaviors of LSO
market share and commission level can be explained as follows: When carriers first start
to improve their LSO capability by hiring additional salesforce and increasing the quality
of logistics service with e-business, the increase rate of carriers' LSO capability is much
higher than that of intermediaries' LSO capability while the LSO commission levels are
similar, making the carriers' logistics service look more attractive to shippers than the
intermediaries' logistics service. Accordingly, the carriers' LSO market share will
increase faster in the early days of developing the LSO while the intermediaries' LSO
market share decreases. However, as carriers' logistics service improves, carriers tend to
raise their LSO commission level, reflecting their improved service and harvesting the
initial investment for developing the LSO. Meanwhile, realizing the erosion of LSO
market share, intermediaries will try to undercut the price of logistics service in order to
protect their LSO market share from the fast improving LSO capability of carriers. As
such, the LSO commission of carriers increases while that of intermediaries decreases in
the early days of LSO development.
On other hand, the increase rate of carriers' LSO capability will become slower over time.
Intermediaries will continue to improve their logistics service and to keep their LSO
commission level lower than the carriers', so that they can improve their LSO capability
and compete with carriers. Therefore, the carriers' LSO market share will start to
decrease slowly after reaching the highest market share whereas the intermediaries' LSO
market share will be slowly recovering over time. By the same token, the LSO
commission of carriers will decrease slowly while that of intermediaries will increase
slowly over time. Finally, in the long term, both the market shares and the commission
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levels of carriers and intermediaries are expected to be stabilized and to reach the
equilibrium points.
Figure 8-27 again confirms the dynamics of developing the LSO as explained above.
Although both the carriers' and the intermediaries' LSO capability generally improve over
time, the carriers' LSO capability increases faster than the intermediaries' in the early
days, and so does the attractiveness of carriers' logistics service, which explains the fast
improvement of carriers' market share in the early days of developing the LSO. In the
long term, however, the attractiveness of intermediaries' logistics service slowly increases
whereas that of carriers rather stabilizes, which supports the fact that both the LSO market
shares of carriers and intermediaries will reach the equilibrium levels.
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Figure 8-27 Improvement of the LSO Capabilities of Carriers and Intermediaries
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Meanwhile, the dynamics of developing the LSO should impact the generic dynamics of
supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. In fact, it is expected that the
improved market share of carriers in the logistics service market should provide additional
revenue to carriers and generate better profitability if the cost of offering the logistics
service is effectively controlled. This turns out to be true from the simulation results as
shown in Figure 8-28, which compares the cases of three integration strategies with the
future base case. Although the freight rate in cases of developing the LSO is similar to
that in the future base case, carriers make additional revenue from the logistics service
(the "unit revenue increase from LSO") while limiting the overall unit costs of offering
the logistics service similar to that of the future base case. Thus, the carriers' long-term
profitability is expected to be higher than the future base case.
One interesting behavior is the utilization data. The utilization in cases of developing the
LSO is much lower than that of the future base case. The main reason for this behavior is
that the improved profits from the logistics service are used for expanding the
containership capacity in the model. The detailed discussion on the behavior of utilization
is presented in section 8.4.4.
In addition to simulating the model for the three strategies of developing the LSO, a set of
sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the critical parameters for determining the
carriers' profitability. Furthermore, a batch of Monte-Carlo simulation, or multivariate
sensitivity analysis, is also performed to test the model's behavior responding to the
random inputs of the critical parameters, which are identified from the sensitivity analysis.
The detailed information on the sensitivity analysis and the Monte-Carlo simulation can
be found in section 8.4.1. Finally, based on the critical parameters identified from the
Monte-Carlo simulation, the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios - i.e., the scenario
analysis - are developed and tested with the integrated model. The scenario analysis and
the findings from the analysis are provided in detail in section 8.4.7.
267
Model for the Impacts of e-Business on the CSIChapter 8
Model for the Impacts of e-Business on the CSI
1,700
1,475
1,250
1,025
Freight Rate [$/TEU]
8001____ __-
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (year)
Unit Total Cost [$ITEU]
1,700
1,475
1,250
1,025
800
1
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (year)
Cumulative Unit Profit [($/TEU)*Year]
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (year)
40
30
20
10
Unit Revenue Increase from LSO [$/TEU]
190 1994 1998 '2002 2006 2610 2014 2018
Time (year)
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
Profitability [Fraction]
-- -----.-.-
-0.2
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (year)
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4 L
199
Utilization [Fraction]
1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Time (year)
1 1 1 ..... .
.-.-. .-. .-- - - - ---..
VE-4 -
Future Base Case
---- a-------3---------------------
--..--- 
--- ,---- , , -
-
- -
Figure 8-28 Impacts of Developing the LSO on the Supply-and-Demand Dynamics
in the CSI
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8.4 Major Findings from the Integrated Model on the Impacts of e-
Business on the CSI
Seven major findings on the impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry can
be drawn from the simulation of integrated model. Table 8-12 shows the summary of the
major findings. The detailed discussions of each finding are provided in the following.
Table 8-12 Findings from the Integrated Model on the Impacts of e-Business
1. There is no doubt that the strategies of developin2 the LSO could
improve the carriers' lon2-term profitability.
2. The improved profitability from the LSO mainly stems from the
efficient cost mana2ement compared to the revenue increase from the
LSO, i.e. controlling the costs is the most important factor.
3. Faster industry-wide diffusion of e-business, which helps carriers
lower the overall cost, will improve the carriers' long-term profitability.
4. However, the container shipping service will be further commoditized
despite the improved carriers' profitability.
5. Then, the key question is where to reinvest the improved profits - there
might be two choices of investment.
a. Investing in expanding the containership capacity
b. Investing in further developing the LSO capability
6. Depending on where to reinvest the improved profits from the LSO and
e-business, two scenarios of potential structural changes in the
container shipping industry are expected - carriers need to make a
strategic decision for their future business.
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8.4.1 Improved Long-term Profitability of Carriers by Offering the
LSO
The first finding from the simulation results is that offering the logistics service can
improve the carriers' long-term profitability substantially. Figure 8-29 shows that the
long-term profitability of carriers in developing the LSO is much higher than that of the
future base case, which does not provide the logistics service. Specifically, the carriers'
profitability after the year of 2007 is better than that of the future base case. In addition,
the cumulative unit profit, representing the carriers' cumulative profit per TEU over time,
also demonstrates that the strategies of developing the LSO are better than the future base
case. Among the three strategies of developing the LSO, the virtual integration strategy,
which purely utilizes the e-business to offer the logistics service, provides the best long-
term profitability.
However, in the short term, the profitability of developing the LSO is lower than that of
the future base case. The reason for this is that carriers must initially invest a significant
amount of money in developing the logistics service. Particularly, both the virtual and the
mixed integration strategies are more expensive in the early days of developing the LSO
than the vertical integration strategy, in which the profitability is always slightly higher
than the future base case.
Overall, the carriers' profitability in any case of developing the logistics service is
expected to be better in the long term than that of future base case, while carriers should
endure the initial loss due to the investment in developing the logistics service.
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7. Whatever the carriers' strategic decision may be, it is recommended that
carriers expand the containership capacity more wisely and
conservatively to be more profitable.
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Figure 8-29 The Profitability of Carriers in Developing the LSO
In order to ensure the claim that the LSO could provide better profitability to carriers, a
batch of Monte-Carlo simulations (or "multivariate sensitivity analysis") for each
integration strategy is performed. In other words, the system's sensitivity to a group of
important parameters is tested through the Monte-Carlo simulations.
The parameters used for the Monte-Carlo simulations are selected in two stages. First, a
set of simulations is performed varying the exogenous parameters (i.e., the "sensitivity
analysis"). The cumulative unit profit of carriers is used as the main indicator of the
system's performance and only one parameter is modified per simulation. The sensitivity
analysis provides the most critical parameters that are influential to the system's
performance.48 Next, among the critical parameters, only those that are controllable by
carriers are selected to be used for the Monte-Carlo simulations. Therefore, the Monte-
Carlo simulations are performed using a group of parameters, which are critical and
controllable by carriers.
48 The detailed results of the sensitivity analysis are discussed in the Appendix.
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The result of the Monte-Carlo simulations for the mixed integration strategy, which is the
most realistic option that carriers could take, is presented in the following. 49 Eight
parameters are selected for the Monte-Carlo simulations in the mixed integration strategy
(see Table 8-13 and Figure 8-30). The parameters can be divided into four categories
depending on their characteristics. Two of those parameters are related to the impact of
cost in developing the logistics service (parameter (2) and (8)); three of them are related to
controlling the level of diffusion rate of e-business (parameter (1), (4), and (7)); two of
them are relevant to the carriers' LSO capability (parameter (3) and (5)); and finally
parameter (6) is representing how much carriers would increase their salesforce to offer
the logistics service. These parameters are assumed to have a uniform distribution around
the values in the model, and the range is set to cover 25% of upper and lower of the value.
Randomly selected values of each parameter are used for the simulation and a total of 200
different simulations are performed.
Table 8-13 Parameters for the Monte-Carlo Simulations in the Mixed Integration
Strategy
Parameters
for the Monte-
Carlo
Simulation
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Effect of relative competitive advantage on attractiveness
Effect of e-business diffusion on cost
Effect of carriers LSO on attractiveness of carriers service
Effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness
Time to change carriers commission
Hiring increase rate for LSO
Contact rate
Cost sensitivity to relative salesforce
49 The Monte-Carlo simulations for other cases such as the vertical and the virtual integration strategy
provide the similar results to those of the mixed integration strategy.
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Figure 8-31 shows the sensitivity histogram of the cumulative unit profit at the year of
2020 in the mixed integration strategy. In other words, the figure presents the
distributions of the cumulative unit profit at the year of 2020 among the 200 different
simulations, which are performed with randomly selected combinations of eight
parameters. The range for the cumulative unit profit in the future base case, which is
1,636 [($/TEU)*Year], is also specified in the figure. The figure confirms that the
majority of the Monte-Carlo simulations provides better cumulative unit profit than that of
the future base case. More than 50% of the simulations generate the cumulative unit
profit in the range of 1,800 and 1,950 [($/TEU)*Year]. The average of the range, 1,875
[($/TEU)*Year], is around 15% higher than the cumulative unit profit in the future base
case.
In addition, Figure 8-32 shows the distribution of the cumulative unit profit over time with
50% and 95% confidence bounds and the cumulative unit profit in the future base case,
which is represented in a red dotted line. This figure also confirms that the long-term
cumulative unit profit in the mixed integration strategy with randomly selected
combinations of parameters is still higher than that of the future base case, even though
the early cumulative unit profit after developing the LSO is lower than that of the future
base case.
Meanwhile, Figure 8-33 presents the distribution of the carriers' profitability over time
with 50% and 95% confidence bounds and the carriers' profitability in the future base
case. Similar to the cumulative unit profit, the carriers' long-term profitability is expected
to be better than that of the future base case.
As such, the Monte-Carlo simulations clearly confirm that the strategies of developing the
LSO could improve the carriers' long-term profitability substantially. Therefore, if
carriers start to offer the logistics service to shippers by either hiring additional salesforce
(i.e., the vertical integration strategy) or adopting the e-business actively (i.e., the virtual
integration strategy), it is expected to provide better profitability to carriers in the long
term.
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Figure 8-31 Sensitivity Histogram of "Cumulative Unit Profit" in the Mixed
Integration Strategy
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Figure 8-32 Monte-Carlo Simulations - "Cumulative Unit Profit" in the Mixed
Integration Strategy
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8.4.2 Importance of Efficient Cost Management in Developing the LSO
The first finding that offering the logistics service could provide carriers with better
profitability leads to the next question - what makes the carriers' profitability improve by
offering the logistics service? In general, there are two factors that determine the carriers'
profitability: revenue and cost. Reviewing the simulation results and the sensitivity
analysis that helps identify the critical factors impacting the carriers' profitability, it is
concluded that, even though the LSO could provide additional revenue to carriers, the
efficient cost management in developing the LSO is the key to improving the carriers'
profitability. The detailed supporting evidences are explained in the following.
Let us first review the revenue side of the carriers' profitability. When carriers start to
offer the logistics service to shippers, carriers should have two sources of revenue: One is
the freight rate, which is the service charge for transporting a container from origin to
destination, and the other is the revenue from LSO (or the variable of "unit revenue
increase from LSO" in the model), which is the service charge per TEU for rendering the
logistics service to shippers. Both revenue sources are measured in a dollar per TEU term.
Figure 8-34 shows the freight rate and the unit revenue increase from LSO over time when
carriers offer the logistics service with three different integration strategies, as well as
those in the future base case. The figure confirms that the strategies of developing the
LSO can generate additional revenue from the logistics service while the future base case
provides no additional revenue to carriers. However, the freight rate in offering the
logistics service is similar to that of the future base case in the long term. Therefore, the
logistics service could be the major source of increased revenue to carriers if they start to
offer the logistics service.
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Figure 8-34 Revenue of Carriers in Developing the Logistics Service
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Although Figure 8-34 confirms that the LSO could improve the carriers' revenue, it does
not necessarily ensure that the carriers' profitability could also be improving. Rather, the
cost side of the profitability should be closely examined. In other words, even if the
revenue could increase due to the LSO, the cost of developing the LSO should be lower
than the level of revenue in order to improve the carriers' profitability. As such, Figure
8-35 presents the trend of the carriers' unit total cost, measured in a dollar per TEU term,
for the three integration strategies as well as the future base case. Notably, although
developing the LSO requires additional investment in the early days, the long-term unit
cost structure of offering the logistics service is similar to that of the future base case.
Particularly, the difference of the long-term unit cost between the LSO cases and the
future base is very limited compared with the unit revenue increase from the LSO in
Figure 8-34. Overall, the LSO cases in general could provide additional revenue to
carriers while limiting the additional unit cost similar to the future base. Accordingly, the
long-term profitability of carriers in cases of offering the logistics service is expected to
be better than that of the future base case and both revenue and cost side contribute to
improving the carriers' profitability from the LSO.
Meanwhile, although the simulation results confirm that both revenue and cost are
important to improving the carriers' profitability, it is not yet clear which of them is more
critical to the improvement of carriers' profitability. In other words, it is necessary to
know how the carriers' profitability could change if the parameters controlling the
revenue and cost of offering the logistics service vary from the base case - i.e., identifying
the critical parameters to the carriers' long-term profitability. For this purpose, the
sensitivity analysis should be performed and closely investigated.
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Figure 8-35 Unit Total Cost of Carriers in Developing the Logistics Service
Table 8-14 Critical Parameters for the Three Integration Strategies
Vertical Integration Virtual Integration Mixed Integration
1. Effect of Carriers LSO 1. Effect of Relative 1. Effect of Relative
Attractiveness on Carriers Competitive Advantage on Competitive Advantage on
Service Attractiveness Attractiveness
2. Time to Change Carriers 2. Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on 2. Effect of e-Biz Benefits on
Commission Carriers Cost Attractiveness
3. Sensitivity of LSO Ratio 3. Effect of Carriers LSO 3. Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on
Change Trend on Indicated Attractiveness on Carriers Carriers Cost
Carriers Commission Service 4. Effect of Carriers LSO
4. Initial Development Rate 4. Effect of e-Biz Benefits on Attractiveness on Carriers
of Intermediaries LSO Attractiveness Service
5. Hiring Increase Rate 5. Time to Change Carriers 5. Time to Change Carriers
6. Cost Sensitivity of Commission Commission
Relative Salesforce 6. Initial Development Rate of 6. Initial Development Rate of
Intermediaries LSO Intermediaries LSO
7. Hiring Increase Rate
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Setting the cumulative unit profit of carriers as the main indicator of performance, the
sensitivity of the model is tested by changing the exogenous parameters. The parameters
used for the sensitivity analysis are chosen based on the criteria that (1) the values of
parameters were assumed in the simulation due to the lack of available data so that many
uncertainties were assumed to be included in the parameters; or (2) the parameters are
expected to impact the system's performance substantially from a point of the model
structure. Each of the selected parameters is varied 25% and only one parameter is
modified per simulation.
While the detailed results and discussion of the sensitivity analysis can be found in the
Appendix, Table 8-14 summarizes the critical parameters by the order of importance for
the three integration strategies of developing the LSO identified from the sensitivity
analysis. It can be found that the critical parameters for the three strategies are similar.
The critical parameters in the mixed integration strategy, which is the most realistic case,
are apparently the sum of those in the vertical and the virtual integration strategies.
To illustrate the critical parameters more clearly, Figure 8-36 presents the maximum
percentage change of the cumulative unit profit due to the variation of each parameter in
the mixed integration strategy. The figure shows that some parameters, which are in the
upper part of the figure, change the system's performance substantially, while a couple of
parameters, which are in the lower part of the figure, provide the limited impacts on the
system's performance. Table 8-15 summarizes the critical parameters and the
insignificant parameters identified from the sensitivity analysis.
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Figure 8-36 Sensitivity Chart for the Mixed Integration Strategy
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Table 8-15 Summary of Sensitivity Analysis - Critical and Insignificant
Parameters for the Carriers' Profitability in the Integrated Model
e-Business
Diffusion
Related
Parameters
Carriers-
related Critical
Parameters
" Effect of Relative Competitive
Advantage on Attractiveness
* Effect of e-Biz Benefits on
Attractiveness
* Contact Rate
* Effect of Trading Partners' Demand
0 Cost Sensitivity to Relative Salesforce
0 Hiring Increase Rate for LSO
Factors that help improve the
adoptability of e-business improve the
carriers' profitability most
substantially.
Managing the cost of hiring additional
salesforce is the most important to
improve the carriers' profitability.
The benefit of cost savings from
Effect of e-Business Diffusion on Cost adopting the e-business helps carriersincrease their profitability
substantially.
* Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness Increasing the effect improves the
of Carriers Service carriers' profitability.
" Time to Change Carriers Commission
* Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend
on Indicated Carriers Commission
Quicker change of the carriers LSO
commission level is desirable.
Intermediaries- Initial Development Rate of Faster improvement of the
related Critical mIntiae Rto interm diaries' LSO capability
ParametersIntermediaries LSO decreases the carriers' profitability.
Advertising the improvement of the
.Shippers Carriers LSO Perception Time carriers' LSO capability is not effective in increasing the carriers'
profitability.
. AImproving the experience of selling
* Average Rate of Learning by e-Biz LSO through e-business or
Insignificant interactions among salesforce is not
Parameters 0 Average Rate of Learning by Salesforce effective in increasing the carriers'profitability.
The change of nonlinear relationship
between the attractiveness of e-
* Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability business service and its adoptability
does not vary the cumulative profit of
carriers substantially.
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Summarizing the sensitivity analysis, there are four ways of improving the carriers'
profitability from the LSO:
(A) Controlling the cost with developing the LSO effectively
(B) Diffusing the e-business faster in the container shipping industry through the
word-of-mouth process
(C) Increasing the impact of carriers' LSO capability on the attractiveness of carriers'
LSO service
(D)Changing quickly the carriers' LSO commission level depending on the level of
carriers' LSO capability
The marked relationships in Figure 8-37 present the four ways of improving the carriers'
profitability from the LSO.
Among the four ways of improving the carriers' profitability identified from the
sensitivity analysis, the freshest insight, which is counter-intuitive, is the first one -
controlling the cost in developing the LSO effectively. The sensitivity analysis shows that
the less hiring of the salesforce, the better the carriers' profitability. Intuitively speaking,
it is reasonable that hiring additional salesforce could improve the carriers' profitability
because more salesforce will increase the carriers' LSO capability and the attractiveness
of carriers' logistics service, thereby improving the unit revenue increase from the LSO.
However, it turns out that the balancing dynamics relating to hiring additional salesforce,
in which more salesforce will increase the cost of offering the logistics service to shippers,
offset the additional revenue gain from the increased number of salesforce, so that the
carriers' profitability in case of hiring additional salesforce decreases. In other words, the
cost side of developing the LSO is more important than the revenue side of the LSO in
order to improve the carriers' profitability.
In addition, the sensitivity analysis shows that the more cost savings from the e-business,
the better the carriers' profitability. In the integrated model, the e-business is assumed to
provide two benefits to carriers in developing the LSO as the diffusion rate of e-business
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increases over time: (1) reducing the overall unit total cost of carriers and (2) improving
the carriers' LSO capability by making the carriers' salesforce be more experienced and
sophisticated through utilizing e-business. The sensitivity analysis shows that, between
the two benefits, the benefit of reducing the unit total cost is critical to the cumulative unit
profit of carriers (i.e., the sensitivity of the parameter of "effect of e-business diffusion on
cost" in Figure 8-36) while the benefit of improving the carriers' LSO capability is rather
insignificant to the system's performance (i.e., the sensitivity of the parameter of "average
rate of learning by e-biz" in Figure 8-36).
In summary, the second finding from simulating the integrated model is that the efficient
cost management in developing the LSO is the key to improving the carriers' profitability.
It is therefore recommended that carriers should focus more on the cost aspect in
developing the logistics service, rather than just generating the additional revenue from
the LSO without considering the cost associated with it. Unless the cost of providing the
logistics service is properly managed, the potential improvement of carriers' profitability
from the LSO could be elusive.
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Figure 8-37 Critical Parameters in the Mixed Integration Strategy
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8.4.3 Faster Industry-wide Diffusion of e-Business to Improve the
Carriers' Long-term Profitability
The third finding from the simulation is that the faster industry-wide diffusion of e-
business will improve the carriers' long-term profitability substantially. Particularly,
among the two processes of diffusing the e-business - the trading partners' request and the
word-of-mouth process (see Chapter 7 for the details) - the word-of-mouth process turned
out to be more influential to changing the rate of e-business diffusion in the container
shipping industry. The faster the e-business is diffused in the container shipping industry
through the word-of-mouth process, the better the long-term profitability of carriers. The
supporting evidence for this finding is as follows.
As discussed in section 8.4.2, diffusing e-business faster in container shipping through the
word-of-mouth process is identified as one of the four ways of improving the carriers'
profitability from the LSO. The sensitivity chart for the mixed integration strategy (see
Figure 8-36) clearly confirms that the parameters that are related to the word-of-mouth
process - "effect of relative competitive advantage on attractiveness" and "effect of e-biz
benefits on attractiveness" - are the first and second important factors of changing the
carriers' cumulative unit profit. In addition, the sensitivity of e-business diffusion rate to
several exogenous parameters (see Appendix for the details) shows that those two
parameters are expected to be most influential to changing the diffusion rate of e-business
over time.
Furthermore, it should be noted that carriers could expect to lower the overall unit total
cost as the e-business diffusion rate increases, and the impact of cost savings from the
adoption of e-business also helps improve the carriers' long-term profitability, as
discussed in section 8.4.2. In fact, the sensitivity chart for the mixed integration strategy
(see Figure 8-36) shows that the parameter of "effect of e-business diffusion on cost,"
which determines the amount of cost savings as the diffusion rate of e-business increases,
is identified as the third critical factor to improve the carriers' long-term profitability. In
summary, the more diffusion of e-business due to the more active word-of-mouth process,
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the more cost savings of carriers is expected, thereby, improving the carriers' long-term
profitability. Therefore, this evidence corroborates the third finding that faster industry-
wide diffusion of e-business through the word-of-mouth process, which helps carriers
lower the overall unit cost, will improve the carriers' long-term profitability.
8.4.4 Further Commoditization of the Container Shipping Service
The fourth finding from the modeling is that despite the improved carriers' profitability,
the container shipping service is expected to be further commoditized in the future. This
finding is counter-intuitive and surprising because the original purpose of developing the
LSO is to reverse the trend of commoditization of the container shipping service by
providing the value-added service to shippers (see section 2.6 for the details on the
purpose of LSO). Although the LSO could improve the carriers' overall profitability by
generating additional revenue from the logistics service, the simulation results show that
the freight rate of container shipping service is expected to be further depressed and the
problem of overcapacity could be more serious than the future base case. This finding is
one of surprising findings from the system dynamics modeling in this research - It is not
until the simulation results of the integrated model are closely reviewed that it is realized
that the LSO could aggravate the commoditization of the container shipper service.
Figure 8-38 shows the freight rate and utilization in cases of developing the LSO,
comparing with those in the future base case. The freight rate in cases of developing the
LSO is in general lower than that of the future base. Furthermore, the utilization for the
LSO cases is estimated to be much lower than that of the future base case. Compared
with the trend of carriers' profitability (see Figure 8-29), it is clear that, despite the
improved carriers' long-term profitability, offering the logistics service lowers the freight
rate and the utilization relative to the future base case. In fact, the freight rate in cases of
developing the LSO decreases at such a low level in the long term, getting closer to the
variable cost of container shipping service after the year of 2012. Therefore, although the
difference of utilization in the mixed integration strategy and that in the future base case
becomes substantial after 2012, the freight rates after 2012 in two cases rather remains
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depressed and hardly recover. In summary, the container shipping service itself could be
further commoditized over time in cases of offering the logistics service to shippers.
Then, what is the reason for this surprising behavior related to the commoditization of the
container shipping service? The main reason for the further commoditization is that
carriers are assumed in the model to maintain the current ways of investing in the
containership capacity. In other words, as the carriers' profitability increases due to
offering the logistics service with e-business, carriers have additional cash that should be
reinvested. If carriers continue to use the same strategy as they have been doing - or
"growing fast with bigger ships" when the market looks promising, they would like to
reinvest the cash in acquiring additional containerships to drive down the unit cost and
increase the market share: i.e., without differentiating the LSO-generating profits from the
profits generated by the container shipping service, carriers, which stick to the traditional
strategy of "growing fast with bigger ships," are supposed to add up the profits from the
LSO and those from the container shipping service and to expand the containership
capacity more aggressively using the improved profits from the LSO. Accordingly, there
could be a substantial amount of excess capacity in the long term so that the utilization of
the containership capacity would decrease further. Therefore, the freight rate would be
further depressed and tight control of overall cost becomes more important. This outcome
is contradictory to the original purpose of developing the LSO, in which carriers try to
fight against falling profitability, utilization, and freight rate of the container shipping
service.
Figure 8-39 presents the causal relationship (the red bold line) that drives the further
commoditization of the container shipping service over time. This figure clearly explains
that the increased profits from the logistics service are expected to improve the carriers'
financial strengths, which makes carriers reinvest the increased profits in the containership
capacity further.
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Figure 8-38 Freight Rate and Utilization in Developing the LSO
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Figure 8-39 The Causal Relationship Driving the Further Commoditization
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8.4.5 Two Choices of Investment Using the Improved Profits
The fourth finding above presents an important strategic question to carriers - where to
reinvest the improved profits from the logistics service. There might be two choices of
investment in general. This is the fifth finding from the simulation.
The first option is to reinvest the improved profits in expanding the containership capacity
further, just as they have been doing so far. This option might be a natural decision to
carriers, whose core competence has been to transport the containers efficiently from port
to port. By acquiring the bigger containerships which are also technologically more
advanced than the older containerships, carriers could move more containers, more
economically and much faster. However, as shown in the simulation results, unless
carriers increase the containership capacity more wisely, this choice could further
commoditize the container shipping service over time.
The second option of reinvesting the improved profits is to develop the carriers' LSO
capability further, rather than expanding the containership capacity. In other words,
noting that the container shipping service itself could be commoditized over time even
without the logistics service (see section 8.2), carriers would focus more on the logistics
service, letting the container shipping service be commoditized as it is. This option could
provide better profitability to carriers than the first option as shown from the simulation
results. However, taking this option means that carriers should change the focus of their
business model, from the container-transporting service providers to the logistics
management service providers. Therefore, changing the business focus could entail huge
unknown risks to carriers.
Depending on which option carriers choose, potential structural changes in the container
shipping industry are expected, as discussed in the next section.
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8.4.6 Two Scenarios of Potential Structural Changes from the LSO and
e-Business
Based on the carriers' choice in response to reinvesting the improved profits from the
LSO and e-business, there could be two scenarios of potential structural changes in the
container shipping industry. To some degree, both scenarios are expected to change the
current business dynamics in the container shipping industry. Carriers are therefore
required to prepare themselves for the potential structural changes whatever their choice
would be.
The first scenario is to reinvest the improved profits in expanding the containership
capacity. As the simulation results show, this choice is highly likely to commoditize the
container shipping service further, mainly because of the huge excess capacity driven by
the faster expansion of containership capacity. The huge excess capacity will lower the
utilization of containership capacity, and the freight rate could be further decreased over
time. A tighter control of cost will become more important and the price-based
competition for transporting the containers could be more emphasized. In a word, this
scenario of reinvesting the profits in increasing the containership capacity could make the
container shipping service more commoditized over time.
In addition, if the problem of overcapacity persists and freight rates stay depressed, it is
possible that carriers would focus more on chartering the containerships from the
independent containership owners and operating them efficiently - rather than owning and
operating the containerships simultaneously - in order to relieve themselves from the
financial burden of maintaining the containerships. That is, further commoditization of
the container shipping service could decouple the containership operators, or carriers,
from the containership owners. This phenomenon is the current common practice in the
airline industry, which share many common characteristics 50 with the container shipping
industry. In the airline industry, the major airplane owners are the asset investors, such as
50 Like the container shipping industry, the current airline industry, particularly the passenger transportation
industry, is also a high fixed cost, network based, and highly commoditized industry.
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GE Capital, which just own the airplanes for the financial purpose only, and most of the
airline carriers charter the airplanes from the investors and operate the airplanes to provide
the transportation service more cheaply. Therefore, like the airline industry, if the
container shipping service continues to be commoditized by the accelerated expansion of
containership capacity due to the LSO and e-business, the carriers' strategy of owning the
containerships could be potentially changed and the role of asset investors could be more
important in the container shipping industry. At the same time such an approach could
allow carriers to drop uneconomical routes when the ship leases expired. In conclusion,
the first scenario will force carriers to become more efficient containership operators in
order to survive the highly commoditized competitive environments.
Meanwhile, the second scenario of potential structural change by the LSO and e-business
is to reinvest the improved profits in developing the carriers' LSO capability further,
rather than in expanding the containership capacity. In other words, this scenario means
that carriers would try to become the logistics service provider, as opposed to being just
the efficient containership operators in the first scenario. This choice could possibly
improve the carriers' profitability further because the increased carriers' LSO capability
helps to generate additional revenue from the logistics service as proven in the simulation
results. However, to be more profitable by focusing more on the LSO, the external
factors, which potentially impact the profitability from the LSO, must be closely
examined in implementing this strategy. In particular, the intermediaries' competitive
response of increasing their own LSO capability, which is identified as a critical factor
determining the carriers' profitability from the sensitivity analysis (see Table 8-15), might
be influential to determining the potential improvement of the carriers' profitability from
this second scenario.
Besides the potential improvement of profitability, the second scenario could potentially
restructure the container shipping industry in such a way that the basic business model of
carriers changes from the container-transporting service providers to the logistics
management providers. It is therefore highly expected that carriers' new focus on the
logistics service in the second scenario will ignite a new front of competition between
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carriers and intermediaries in the container shipping industry. Particularly, a recent
strategic trend of intermediaries5 1 to become a subsidiary of large logistics management
service providers, such as UPS and Federal Express, could produce the direct competition
between these large logistics management service providers and carriers, who would try to
develop the logistics service to shippers. In other words, the container shipping service
could become more and more a part of larger logistics management initiative, such as
supply chain management, and carriers should prepare themselves for a new competitive
playing field where they have less experience.
This change of carriers' business focus, however, could pose a huge strategic question to
carriers - could carriers successfully remodel themselves as logistics service providers?
This task would be by no means an easy job for carriers, who have traditionally been
focusing on transporting containers from port to port (or door to door), rather than
managing the overall logistics for shippers. In order to be competitive logistics service
providers, carriers should re-evaluate the current business relationships, develop a new
capability of efficient logistics management service, and reorganize the internal business
structures. These are the challenging tasks for carriers, and carriers should overcome the
huge risks associated with transforming themselves for the new playing field successfully.
In summary, whatever the carriers' choice would be in reinvesting the improved profits
from the LSO and e-business, either expanding the containership capacity or developing
the LSO capability further, both choices are expected to derive tough business
environments for carriers - therefore, carriers should make a strategic decision depending
on their current strengths and weaknesses. If carriers continue to expand their
containership capacity with the improved profits, they should be more efficient container-
transporting service providers than they have been, and survive the more harshly
commoditized competitive environments. Carriers should also develop new strategic
relationships with asset investors, who might enter into the container shipping industry as
containership owners. Meanwhile, although the option of focusing more on the logistics
service could improve the carriers' profitability, carriers should carefully remodel
51 For example, one of large ocean freight forwarders, Fritz, became a subsidiary of UPS in 2002.
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themselves to be successful logistics service providers. Table 8-16 summarizes the
potential structural changes in the container shipping industry depending on the carriers'
choice of where to invest the improved profits from the LSO and e-business.
Table 8-16 Summary of Potential Structural
Business
Changes from the LSO and e-
Scenario 1 - Reinvesting in Capacity Scenario 2 - Reinvesting in LSO
* Further commoditization 0 Possible further improvement of the
* Huge excess capacity carriers' profitability
Freight rate could be further decreased * Intermediaries' competitive responsee Frigh rae culdbe frthr dcresedwill be influential
* Possible decoupling of the containership Potential restructuring of the container
operators from the containership owners shipping industry
like in the airline industry
0 However, could carriers be successfully
remodel themselves as logistics service
providers?
8.4.7 Importance of Smart Expansion of Containership Capacity
Realizing that there are two strategic choices of investment and that neither choice is easy
to implement, the scenario analysis is then performed to understand the impacts of each
strategic choice. In other words, the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for each strategic
choice are developed and tested with the integrated model. The critical parameters, which
are identified from the sensitivity analysis, are changed to develop the optimistic and
pessimistic scenarios. In conclusion, the scenario analysis shows that, whatever the
carriers' strategic choice may be, it is recommended that carriers expand the containership
capacity more wisely and conservatively to be more profitable - i.e., a smart expansion of
containership capacity is needed for the industry to be successful. The supporting
evidence of this analysis is explained in the following.
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Because the first strategic choice is to reinvest the improved profits in expanding the
containership capacity, it is necessary to identify the critical parameters for improving the
carriers' profitability in the supply-and-demand dynamics. A sensitivity analysis for the
supply-and-demand dynamics is therefore performed - i.e., the sensitivity of the future
base case, in which carriers continue to focus on transporting the containers without
developing the logistics service, to a set of important parameters are tested.
As same as the sensitivity analysis for developing the LSO explained in 8.4.2, the
cumulative unit profit of carriers is selected as the main indicator of performance, and the
parameters, which are highly uncertain and are expected to be sensitive to the system's
performance, are chosen for this sensitivity analysis.5 2 The analysis identifies two critical
parameters that substantially impact the carriers' cumulative profits: "planning horizon"
and "reference utilization."
The planning horizon is the number of years that carriers consider when they estimate the
desired containership capacity in the future, and the reference utilization is the target
utilization on which carriers decide to increase or decrease the freight rate and invest in
new containership capacity.5 3 The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the shorter the
planning horizon and the higher the reference utilization, the better the carriers'
profitability. In other words, if carriers consider a shorter time frame in the future when
ordering the containerships, it would provide better profitability because it could reduce
the speculative capacity ordering and limit the fast increase of the containership capacity,
thereby increasing the utilization and the carriers' profitability. In addition, if the
reference utilization becomes higher, the freight rate could be lower in the short term,
which prevents carriers from expanding the containership capacity fast, so that the long-
term profitability of carriers would rather increase over time. In summary, the effective
control of expanding the containership capacity should help carriers improve their long-
term profitability.
52 The detailed information on the sensitivity analysis for the supply-and-demand dynamics is provided in
the Appendix.
5 The detailed description of these parameters can be found in Table 6-3 and Table 6-7 in Chapter 6.
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Based on the critical parameters for the supply-and-demand dynamics, it is now possible
to develop the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios and test the model behaviors for each
scenario. For the first strategic choice of carriers, or reinvesting the improved profits from
the LSO in expanding the containership capacity, the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios
can be developed using the two critical parameters identified above as follows (see Table
8-17).
Table 8-17 The Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenario for the First Strategic Choice
- "Expanding the Containership Capacity"
Carriers will reduce the planning horizon for ordering new containerships by
25% - i.e., the planning horizon decreases from 14years to 11 years. This is
possible by active fortification of the carriers' alliances, which can collectively
Optimistic add or withdraw the containership capacity in the market. In addition, the
Scenario - I potential increase of asset players, who just own the containerships to generateprofits by leasing them to carriers, will also help carriers reduce the planning
horizon. Meanwhile, by pooling the containership capacity through the
alliance, carriers can increase the reference utilization by 10%, or from 75% to
83%, which is the level in the mid 1990s.
Utilizing the improved profits from the LSO, each carrier would continue to
expand the containership capacity actively, which renders carriers to increase
the planning horizon by 25% from 14 years to 18 years. The improved carriers'
Pessimistic profits from LSO, the cultural difference and geographic distribution of carriers,
Scenario - I limit the improvement of the carriers' alliances; therefore, each carrier 
further
increases the investment in new containership capacity individually. In
addition, this active expansion of containership capacity will increase the
impact of economy of scale by deploying larger containership, helping carriers
reduce the reference utilization by 10% from 75% to 67.5%.
By the same token, the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios can be imagined for the
second strategic choice of carriers - i.e., reinvesting the improved profits from LSO in
developing the LSO further - by considering the critical parameters identified from the
sensitivity analysis (see Figure 8-36 and Table 8-15). The first nine critical parameters in
Figure 8-36 are used to perform the scenario analysis. Table 8-18 describes the optimistic
and pessimistic scenarios for the second strategic choice of carriers, and Table 8-19
presents the values of the critical parameters corresponding to the optimistic and
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pessimistic scenarios. Among the critical parameters in Table 8-19, the nonlinear
relationships are assumed to change 10% from the base values while the remaining
parameters are set to vary 25% from the base values, in order to ensure the reality of
each parameter.
Table 8-18 The Optimistic and Pessimistic Scenario for the Second Strategic
Choice - "Further Developing the LSO Capability"
Optimistic
Scenario - 2
The e-business is successfully diffused in the container shipping industry faster
than the diffusion of EDI, thanks to the greater benefits from e-business and the
low adoption cost of e-business, than those of EDI. Accordingly, carriers can
further reduce the overall cost as the diffusion rate of e-business increases. In
addition, carriers would hire additional salesforce for the logistics service more
cautiously and cost-sensitively so that the cost of hiring additional salesforce is
effectively controlled. Moreover, carriers would change their LSO commission
level more frequently to reflect the market conditions. Finally, the
intermediaries' LSO capability is expected to improve slower than the base case
due to their financial constraints.
The e-business is diffused in the container shipping industry slower than the
diffusion of EDI, because of the low standardization process and the
organizational strains in adopting e-business. As such, the cost savings from the
Pessimistic e-business is rather elusive and limited. In addition, carriers are overly
excessive in hiring additional salesforce for developing the LSO to increase theScenario - 2 unit cost more than expected. Furthermore, carriers' LSO commission level is
changed infrequently due to the slow decision-making process. Finally, the
intermediaries improve their LSO capability much faster than expected in order
to counter the carriers' improving logistics service.
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Table 8-19 The Values of the Critical Parameters of the Optimistic and
Pessimistic Scenario for the Second Strategic Choice
Base Value Simulation Value
(MX-1) Optimistic Pessimistic
Scenario - 2 Scenario - 2
Effect of Relative TAB - Relative
Competitive Advantage Competitive Advantage 0.9 1.1
on Attractiveness on Attractiveness *
Effect of e-Biz Benefits TAB - eBiz Benefits on 1.1 0.9
on Attractiveness Attractiveness * 10% Change of
Effect of e-Biz Diffusion TAB - eBiz Diffusion 1.1 0.9 Value
on Carriers Cost on Cost *
Effect of Carriers LSO TAB - Carriers LSO on
on Attractiveness of Attractiveness of 1.1 0.9
Carriers Service Carriers Service *
Time to Change Carriers 1 Years 0.75 1.25Commission
Initial Development Rate 0.07 Fraction/Year 0.0525 0.0875
of Intermediaries LSO
25% Change of
Hiring Increase Rate 0.5 Dimensionless 0.375 0.625 Value
Contact Rate 11 Fraction/Year 13.75 8.25
Relt ive Satesfo ce 0.08 Dimensionless 0.06 0.1
(*) There are the table functions representing each nonlinear relationship respectively.
Figure 8-40 presents the simulation results of the scenario analysis for the first strategic
choice of carriers - reinvesting the improved profits in expanding the containership
capacity. Overall, the simulation results confirm that, if carriers could manage to expand
the containership capacity in a wiser and conservative way, the payoff might be
substantial in the long term. The optimistic scenario-1, in which carriers expand the
containership capacity more wisely and conservatively, provides higher profitability than
the mixed integration strategy and the future base case. The main reason for the improved
profitability in the optimistic scenario- 1 is that the shorter planning horizon and the higher
reference utilization make the containership capacity increase slower, thereby increasing
the utilization faster and improving the freight rate. Therefore, the better revenue from the
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higher freight rate can increase the carriers' long-term profitability. Meanwhile, the
pessimistic scenario-i generates lower profitability than the mixed integration strategy.
Moreover, the utilization in the pessimistic scenario-1 is far lower than that of the mixed
integration strategy, because carriers in the pessimistic scenario-I are supposed to expand
their containership capacity aggressively utilizing the improved profits from the logistics
service. However, the profitability in the pessimistic scenario-1 is still higher than the
future base case because the revenue from the logistics service can provide additional
profits to carriers.
In addition, the scenario analysis for the second strategic choice of carriers - further
developing the carriers' LSO capability - is shown in Figure 8-41. Similar to the scenario
analysis for the first strategic choice, the optimistic scenario-2 presents higher long-term
profitability of carriers than the mixed integration strategy and the future base case, while
the pessimistic scenario-2 provides lower long-term profitability of carriers than the mixed
integration strategy. Also, the improved revenue from the logistics service allows the
pessimistic scenario-2 to maintain still higher profitability than the future base case.
However, the improved profitability in the optimistic scenario-2 lowers the utilization
substantially, mainly because carriers in the second strategic choice let the investment
decision on the containership capacity be the same as in the past, which makes
containership capacity increase faster due to the improved profits from the LSO. In fact,
the utilization trend for the optimistic scenario-2 is as bad as that of the pessimistic
scenario-1. Accordingly, the freight rate in the optimistic scenario-2 decreases faster due
to the lowering utilization trend, further commoditizing the container shipping service. In
summary, although the further development of carriers' LSO capability ensures the
improved long-term profitability of carriers - even in the pessimistic scenario - than the
future base case, the containership service itself will be further commoditized over time as
carriers focus more on the logistics service without improving the traditional supply-and-
demand dynamics in the container shipping industry.
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Figure 8-40 The Scenario Analysis for the First Strategic Choice of Carriers
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Figure 8-41 The Scenario Analysis for the Second Strategic Choice of Carriers
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Next, in order to compare the two optimistic scenarios, the simulation results of the
optimistic scenario-1 and the optimistic scenario-2 are shown together in Figure 8-42.
The simulation results demonstrate that the optimistic scenario-1, despite the higher unit
cost, generates better long-term profitability of carriers than the optimistic scenario-2.
The main reason for this is the higher utilization in the optimistic scenario- 1, which drives
the higher freight rate and provides better profitability to carriers. Furthermore, because
the overall percentage of the LSO revenue in total carriers' revenue is relatively low and
the revenue from freight rate is still substantial even in cases of offering the logistics
service, the optimistic scenario-1, which deals with the revenue from freight rate, could
provide more profits than the optimistic scenario-2, which is the best case in offering the
logistics service. Therefore, the conservative approach of expanding the containership
capacity utilizing the improved profits from the LSO could provide better long-term
payoff than focusing only on developing the LSO without considering the traditional
supply-and-demand dynamics.
Then, the next challenge is how carriers could coordinate the LSO improvement and the
expansion of containership capacity. In other words, given that the conservative approach
of expanding the containership capacity utilizing the improved profits from the LSO helps
carriers increase the profitability further, the best choice of carriers might be to implement
the strategy of smart expansion of containership capacity while continuously improving
the logistics service to shippers. In order to test this best choice of carriers, the optimistic
scenario-3 is developed and simulated as follows (Table 8-20).
In the optimistic scenario-3, carriers are supposed to improve their LSO capability as they
do in the optimistic scenario-2, while, at the same time, implementing a new strategy of
conservatively expanding the containership capacity - i.e., "cutting the order of
containership capacity in half when the utilization is below 63%." This new strategy of
expanding the containership capacity is based on the reasoning that smart carriers would
reduce the order rate of containership capacity substantially when the utilization of
containership capacity is very low. In other words, if carriers have higher profitability
from the LSO while the utilization of containership capacity is very low, a smart choice of
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carriers might be to retain the improved profits without investing further in the
containership capacity and to wait until the utilization could pick up. In this way, carriers
could prevent the fast increase of containership capacity triggered by the improved profits
from the LSO, thereby maintaining higher utilization and freight rate of the container
shipping service.
Table 8-20 The Description of Optimistic Scenario-3
In order to improve the logistics service:
The e-business is successfully diffused in the container shipping industry
faster than the diffusion of EDI, thanks to the greater benefits from e-business
and the lower adoption cost of e-business, than those of EDI. Accordingly,
carriers can further reduce the overall cost as the diffusion rate of e-business
increases. In addition, carriers would hire additional salesforce for the
logistics service more cautiously and cost-sensitively so that the cost of hiring
Optimistic additional salesforce is effectively controlled. Moreover, carriers would
Scenario - 3 change their LSO commission level more frequently to reflect the market
conditions. Finally, the intermediaries' LSO capability is expected to
improve slower than the base case due to their financial constraints.
At the same time, in order to expand the containership capacity
conservatively:
Carriers cut the order of containership capacity in half when the utilization of
containership capacity is below 63%.
Figure 8-43 compares the simulation results of three optimistic scenarios with the mixed
integration strategy and the future base case. The optimistic scenario-3, which both
improves the logistics service and controls the expansion of containership capacity
conservatively, provides the most desirable outcomes to carriers: better freight rate due to
the improved and less cyclical utilization, additional revenue from the LSO, lower unit
total cost structure, and thereby better and sustainable profitability of carriers. Therefore,
the optimistic scenario-3 could delay the commoditization of the container shipping
service through the smart expansion of containership capacity while successfully
generating additional profits from the logistics service.
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Summarizing the scenario analysis above, the effective and smart control of expanding the
containership capacity is more critical to improving the carriers' profitability and delaying
the commoditization of container shipping service than just focusing more on developing
the logistics service - i.e., whatever the carriers' choice may be, carriers should try to
expand the containership capacity more wisely and conservatively to be more profitable.
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8.5 Findings on the Commoditization of the Logistics Service
Offering
Every new innovation or service is commoditized over time, as the container shipping
service has been and will be commoditized substantially. The logistics service offering,
which will be a new innovation in the container shipping industry, cannot be an exception.
The LSO will be commoditized as it becomes more widely accepted by carriers and
shippers. Then, the questions regarding the commoditization of LSO are how LSO will be
commoditized, how long it will take, and how to respond to this commoditization process
of LSO.
In this respect, this section discusses the findings on the commoditization of LSO. Three
findings are derived by closely reviewing the behaviors of LSO dynamics in the integrated
model and the historical technological innovations in the container shipping industry as
shown in Chapter 3 and 4. First, the commoditization cycle of new innovation in the
container shipping industry is identified from the LSO dynamics in section 8.5.1. Then, a
notable characteristic of the commoditization cycle - i.e., longer time frame of the
commoditization cycle - in the container shipping industry is discussed in section 8.5.2.
Finally, section 8.5.3 recommends the "business portfolio strategy" for better profitability
from the innovation in the container shipping industry.
8.5.1 Commoditization Cycle of New Innovation in the CSI
A close review of the historical technological innovations in the CSI and the simulation
results of the LSO in the integrated model present the commoditization cycle of new
innovation in the CSI. The commoditization cycle can be divided into four phases
depending on the behaviors of revenue and profitability of the new innovation (see Table
8-21).
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Table 8-21 Commoditization Cycle of New Innovation in the Container Shipping
Industry
" Phase 1 - "Introduction of New Innovation"
o Slow increase of revenue
o Lower profitability due to the early investment in the innovation
" Phase 2 - "Development of the Market"
o Fast increase of revenue
o Substantial increase of profitability from the new service
* Phase 3 - "Saturation of the Market"
o Flattening of the revenue
o Reaching the maximum and stable profitability
" Phase 4 - "Waning of the Market"
o Decreasing of the revenue
o Declining of the profitability
In the first phase of the "introduction of new innovation," a new innovation or service is
newly introduced into the industry and is beginning to be accepted by the industry. The
revenue from the new innovation increases slowly in this phase and the profitability of the
new innovation is also very low, sometimes negative, due to the early investment in the
innovation. After experiencing the early adoption process, the market of the new
innovation starts to develop so that the revenue from the innovation increases fast and the
profitability from the new service improves substantially (Phase 2). Then, the market
developed from the new innovation becomes saturated over time in phase 3. The revenue
from the innovation is flattening and the profitability, reaching the maximum point, is
stabilizing afterwards. Finally, the innovation will be further commoditized and start to
wane over time. The revenue from the innovation decreases substantially and the
profitability of the innovation declines fast.
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Figure 8-44 Commoditization Cycle of the Logistics Service Offering 54
The simulation results of the LSO in the integrated model confirm the commoditization
cycle of new innovation in the container shipping industry (see Figure 8-44). The revenue
and profitability of the LSO show that, after undergoing the early slow increase of revenue
and the loss making, both revenue and profitability increase substantially. Then, the
revenue and profitability reach the saturated point and begin to slowly decline over time.
8.5.2 Longer Time Frame of the Commoditization Cycle in the CSI
One notable characteristic of the commoditization process of LSO is that the LSO is
expected to be commoditized over a long period of time. In fact, Figure 8-44 shows that it
takes about 15 years for the LSO innovation to reach the phase 4 of the commoditization
cycle. In addition, the analysis of historical technological innovations in Chapter 3 and 4
- e.g., containerization, intermodalism, the double stack train system, and the EDI - also
54 The profitability of LSO is unusually high at some points in the graph. The reason for this is that, due to
the limited data available regarding the cost of offering the LSO, the profitability of LSO cannot be
precisely tracked in the integrated model. In addition, only the combined effect of developing the LSO on
the overall cost structure of carriers is calculated in the model. Therefore, the profitability of LSO in Figure
8-44 has to be estimated separately from the model, which makes the profitability of LSO higher than the
normal business environment. However, the graph clearly shows the characteristics of the commoditization
cycle of new innovation.
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confirms that the technological innovations in the CSI have normally taken more than 10
years to be matured.
Several reasons might delay the commoditization process of the innovation in the CSI.
First, the fast increase of the container shipping demand has prevented the new innovation
or technology from being accepted fast. In other words, the container shipping demand,
which has been increased at a rate of about 8% per year for the past 20 years, has been
large enough to allow the current players and the potential competitors in the container
shipping industry to generate sufficient profits without being pressured to implement new
innovation or service to make additional revenue. Secondly, the container shipping
industry has been traditionally technology-averse, or reluctant to adopting and developing
a new technology or service. Thirdly, many different stakeholders - such as ocean
carriers, truckers, railway companies, port authorities, freight forwarders, and diverse
shippers, as discussed in chapter 2 - are involved in transporting the containers door to
door, so that it could take longer time for a newly introduced innovation to be adopted and
implemented in the container shipping industry.
8.5.3 The "Business Portfolio Strategy"
Given that any new innovation or service in the container shipping industry will
eventually commoditize over time even though the commoditization takes relatively
longer time, the next challenge is then what carriers should do with regard to this
commoditization process of innovation? One strategy might be to develop new
innovations and services continuously to maintain or improve the revenue and
profitability. In other words, carriers should keep adding new services, such as logistics
service, port terminal operating service, etc., through innovations over time, thereby
maintaining a set of business portfolio on top of the container shipping service - i.e., the
"business portfolio strategy" is recommended to carriers.
The business portfolio strategy could increase the unit revenue and profitability of
carriers, just as the LSO together with the container shipping service will provide
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additional revenue and profits to carriers. The logic behind the business portfolio strategy
can be explained as follows.
Two graphs in Figure 8-45 show the potential change of unit revenue of carriers if they
successfully adopt a series of new innovations on top of the traditional container shipping
service. Without any innovation or in the pre-innovation stage, the revenue per TEU will
continuously decline over time because of the commoditization of the container shipping
service. However, if carriers successfully implement a new service with innovation-i at
some point, carriers can generate additional revenue from the new service, so that total
revenue per TEU increases over time and carriers should maintain two different sources of
revenue. Meanwhile, unless carriers introduce a new innovation after adopting the
innovation-1, then the revenue from innovation-i will also commoditize, making unit
revenue decrease over time. Accordingly, the total revenue per TEU might increase at a
decreasing rate over time. On the other hand, if carriers, noting the commoditization of
innovation-1, find an additional new innovation-2 and subsequently implement a new
service, carriers could add new revenue from innovation-2 and continue to improve the
total revenue per TEU over time. At this point, carriers should effectively manage the
business portfolio comprising three sources of revenue: the traditional container shipping
service, the service from innovation-1, and the other service from innovation-2. In the
same way, the unit revenue of carriers could further increase if carriers successfully
introduce the innovation-3 afterwards. Therefore, after integrating a series of innovations
on top of the container shipping service, carriers could complement the declining revenue
from the container shipping service and continuously improve the total revenue per TEU
over time.
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Figure 8-45 The "Business Portfolio Strategy" - Improving the Unit Revenue
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Meanwhile, following the trend of increasing unit revenue, the profitability of carriers will
also in general increase over time when carriers successfully implement a series of
innovations (see Figure 8-46). After adopting the innovation-1, the profitability could
initially decrease due to the early investment in the innovation-1, but it will increase as the
additional revenue from innovation-1 outweighs the cost associated with the investment.
However, as the innovation-1 becomes further commoditized over time, the profitability
will rather decline slowly until carriers successively introduce the new innovation-2. By
the same token, the new innovation-2 could also improve the profitability over time.
Therefore, the profitability of carriers, who successfully adopt a series of innovations and
manage to provide the business portfolio with the traditional container shipping service,
could maintain at least the increasing trend over time despite the commoditization
process.
Profitability
A k
= - - -
A
No innovation-3
No innovation-2
\No innovation- I
Time
Innovation - 2 Innovation - 3
Figure 8-46 The "Business Portfolio Strategy" - Improving the Profitability
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In fact, the business portfolio strategy with regard to the commoditization of new
innovation or service is not at all a new idea - it has been successfully implemented in
other industries. For example, IBM, who pioneered the mainframe computing business in
the 1950s and 1960s, added the computer software business in the 1970s and the early
1980s after realizing the margin of selling the mainframe computers declining due to the
strong competition by microcomputer makers such as Digital Equipment, thereby
maintaining or improving the unit revenue and profitability. In addition, IBM also
integrated the computer consulting service business in its business portfolio in the 1990s
in order to supplement the further declining profit margin from the mainframe computer
and software business, and it has been successful for the past 10 years. Furthermore,
realizing that the computer consulting service could also become commoditized and
mature eventually, IBM recently tries to develop the grid computing technology, which
potentially makes the use of computing power as easy as using electrical power by
plugging the cords in the electricity outlet on the wall. To summarize, IBM, which has
expertise in selling the computing power, has successfully integrated the new innovations
or services on top of the computer hardware business and improved, or at least maintained
the revenue and profitability over time. The IBM case confirms that the business portfolio
strategy, supplementing the declining revenue and profits due to the commoditization of
innovation, could be helpful for carriers to counteract the commoditization trend of the
container shipping service. Thus, it is strongly recommended that carriers successfully
implement the business portfolio strategy over time.
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter has presented a system dynamics model for simulating the potential impacts
of e-business on the container shipping industry. After estimating the future base case,
where carriers do not develop any logistics service and only provide the container
shipping service as usual, three strategies of developing the logistics service that carriers
might take - the vertical integration, the virtual integration, and the mixed integration
strategy - are modeled and tested by integrating the system dynamics models discussed in
chapter 6 and chapter 7. A batch of sensitivity analysis, the Monte-Carlo simulation, and
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the scenario analysis are subsequently performed to better understand the model
behaviors.
The analyses provide seven major findings on the potential impacts of e-business on the
container shipping industry. The findings can be summarized as follows: The strategies of
developing the LSO by either hiring additional salesforce or adopting e-business could
improve the carriers' long-term profitability. Interestingly, the efficient cost management
in offering the logistics service is more important than focusing only on the revenue
increase from the logistics service. In this context, faster industry-wide diffusion of e-
business, which helps carriers lower the unit cost, is crucial in improving the carriers'
profitability. However, despite the improved carriers' profitability from the LSO, the
container shipping service will be further commoditized over time if carriers maintain the
current ways of expanding the containership capacity. Therefore, there could be two
strategic choices of carriers in using the improved profits from the LSO: reinvesting them
in expanding the containership capacity or in further developing the LSO capability. Each
strategic choice is expected to derive the structural changes in the container shipping
industry, which generates risks and challenges that carriers should endure in developing
the LSO and adopting e-business. Finally, whatever the carriers' strategic decision may
be, carriers are advised to expand the containership capacity more wisely and
conservatively in order to be profitable in the long term.
In addition to the major findings from the simulation results, the analysis on the
commoditization of LSO is also discussed in this chapter. The analysis presents that the
commoditization cycle of new innovation or service in the CSI, which is in general
composed of four phases, takes a relatively long period of time - at least 10 years or more.
Given the commoditization of new innovation, it is highly recommended that carriers
choose the "business portfolio strategy" in order to continuously improve the unit revenue
and profitability despite the commoditization process.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and Future Research
9.1 Introduction
This chapter summarizes the overall findings from this research and makes the managerial
recommendations for carriers in order to respond to the impacts of e-business on the
containers shipping industry. Finally, potential future research areas that can be pursued
on top of this research are also discussed.
9.2 Summary of Overall Findings
The purposes of this research are to understand the impacts of the e-business activities on
the container shipping industry and to help carriers develop sound strategies to cope with
these new challenges. In addition to the analysis of historical impacts of new
technological innovations on the container shipping industry, a system dynamics model
simulating the potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry is
developed and used to derive the managerial recommendations for carriers responding to
the impacts of e-business.
The analysis of historical impacts of new technological innovations is provided from
chapter 2 to chapter 5. Chapter 2 first analyzes the general business dynamics in the
container shipping industry and identifies the strategic challenges to carriers - one of
which is to develop the logistics service offerings (LSO). In chapter 3, the historical
impacts of four technological innovations - i.e., containerization, intermodalism, the
double stack train system, and EDI connections - are reviewed based on the framework of
technological evolution. Noticing that EDI is the most recent technological innovation in
the CSI and similar to the internet technology, which is the main focus of this research,
the evolution of EDI in the container shipping industry is closely discussed in chapter 4.
Finally, the characteristics of six e-business models in the CSI are evaluated in chapter 5
using the three frameworks, which are originally developed in this research to analyze the
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technology strategies of internet-based new enterprises, concluding that the interactions
between the strategic challenge of carriers, i.e., the LSO development, and the most
promising e-business model, or the CTP (Collaborative Tool Provider), will be the key
areas of potential impacts of e-business on the container shipping industry.
On top of the analysis on the historical impacts of new technologies on the CSI, a system
dynamics modeling approach is undertaken from chapter 6 to chapter 8 in order to
understand the potential impacts of e-business on the CSI more clearly. The traditional
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping are modeled in chapter 6,
simulating the industry dynamics in the 1990s successfully. Then, a system dynamics
model for the diffusion dynamics of EDI is developed and calibrated to the 1990s'
industry data in chapter 7. Finally, the integrated model simulating the potential impacts
of e-business on the CSI is derived by combining the models developed in the previous
chapters, and the potential impacts of e-business are closely investigated using the
integrated model.
In conclusion, this research identifies several findings on the potential impacts of e-
business on the CSI. These findings can be summarized as four major impacts of e-
business on the container shipping industry: First, the most promising e-business model,
the CTP, will be closely interacting with the logistics service offering, which is one of the
strategic challenges of carriers facing these days. Second, the profitability of carriers will
be improved if they successfully develop the LSO capability with e-business in a cost
efficient way. Third, despite the improved profitability from the LSO and e-business, the
container shipping service could be commoditized further unless changes are made to the
current practice of expanding the containership capacity - or "growing fast with bigger
ships." Finally, whatever the carriers' choice may be for investing the improved profits,
the LSO and e-business could drive the structural changes in the container shipping
industry.
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9.3 Recommendations for Carriers with Regard to e-Business
Paraphrasing the findings from the simulation of integrated model, several action items
can be recommended with regard to the impacts of e-business on the container shipping
industry as follows (see Table 9-1):
Table 9-1 Recommended Action Items for Carriers Regarding the Impacts of e-
Business
Recommendations for Carriers Reasons
1. Developing the logistics service and In order to improve the carriers' long-term
adopting the e-business actively profitability
2. Focusing more on the efficient cost The carriers' profitability is more sensitive to
management in developing the LSO and the cost of developing the LSO and e-
adopting the e-business business
3. Driving faster adoption of e-business in the The more diffusion of e-business, the more
CS' cost savings of carriers is expected; thereby,
improving the carriers' long-term
profitability
4. Preparing for the further commoditization The improved profits from LSO and e-
of the container shipping service business will expedite the commoditization
of the container shipping service
5. Positioning themselves clearly either as In order to cope with the potential structural
containership operators or logistics service changes of industry due to the LSO and e-
providers business
6. Expanding the containership capacity more Revenue from the freight rate is still more
wisely and conservatively substantial to carriers and influential to the
profitability of carriers than that from the
LSO
7. Continuing to add the new services on top In order to counter the commoditization of
of the container shipping service - new innovation and to improve the
"Business Portfolio Strategy" profitability in the long term
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9.4 Future Research Areas
The findings and limitations of this research lead to research agendas that can be
addressed in the future. Two main research areas might be considered: One is to extend
the system dynamics model further for the container shipping industry, and the other is to
leverage the research methodologies adopted in this research to the issues in other similar
industries (see Table 9-2).
The first research area, extending the system dynamics model for the container shipping
industry, could have three research topics: First, the integrated model developed in this
research can be further used to explore the best way of implementing the strategies
recommended in this research. For example, noting that the effective control of
expanding the containership capacity is crucial for the better profitability of carriers, the
integrated model might be used for identifying the efficient policies to manage the
expansion of containership capacity. Second, the integrated model should be further
refined and developed as e-business becomes more adopted in the CSI over time. For
instance, data used for the simulation must be carefully updated to reflect the changing
development of the e-business market and further analysis should be carried out in the
future. Third, the integrated model could be updated into a management simulator, which
can be used as a learning tool for managers in the CSI to help them be familiarized with
the industry dynamics.
The other research area is to apply the research methodologies used in this research to
other similar industries. Three research topics can be pursued in the future: First, the three
frameworks for evaluating the success potential of e-business models as discussed in
chapter 5 could be used for analyzing the e-business activities in other similar industries,
such as the airline industry. Second, this research has explored the interactions between
the technological innovations, e.g., the internet technology, and the commoditization of
traditional service, e.g., the container shipping service, in the high fixed cost industry of
the CSI. The same issues could be analyzed in other industries with high fixed cost
structure - for instance, the energy, the telecommunication, or the chemical industry, etc.
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- can be analyzed and compared using the methodologies adopted in this research.
Finally, the generic model for the supply-and-demand dynamics in the CSI as explained in
chapter 6 can be augmented to simulate and analyze the supply-and-demand dynamics in
other shipping industries, such as the dry bulk shipping, or the oil shipping industry, etc.
Table 9-2 The Future Research Areas
Research Topics
1. Tackling the issues of implementing
the recommended strategies
Examples
* How to effectively control the
expansion of containership capacity?
* How to expedite the adoption of e-
business in the CSI?
2. Refining and developing the 0 Data updating as the e-business
integrated model further market develops
0 Adding the more realistic
competitive dynamics of
intermediaries
3. Developing a management simulator
to help managers in the CSI be
familiarized with the industry
dynamics
I *
4. Applying the three frameworks of
evaluating the e-business models to
the cases in other industries
* "Learning-by-Simulation" training
exercises
* Evaluating the e-business models in
the airline industry
5. Analyzing and comparing the 0 Energy industry
technological innovation and its
commoditization in other high fixed I Telecommunication industry
cost industries * Chemical industry
6. Developing a system dynamics
model for the supply-and-demand
dynamics in other shipping industries
U
" Dry bulk shipping industry
" Oil shipping industry
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A.1 Introduction
The appendix is prepared to present the detailed simulation results of the integrated
model, which are not fully covered in chapter 8. Starting with the detailed explanation on
the causal loop diagram for the LSO dynamics in section A.2, the structures of integrated
model except those on the supply-and-demand dynamics that are described in detail in
chapter 6 are discussed in section A.3. Finally, the sensitivity analyses are explained in
section A.4.
A.2 Causal Loop Diagram for the LSO Dynamics
The feedback loops for the dynamics of LSO are constructed by focusing on the factors
that might affect the level of carriers' LSO capability and its interactions with carriers'
profitability. Competition between intermediaries and carriers to provide the logistics
service to shippers is also considered. Twelve feedback loops are expected to govern the
dynamics of LSO in the container shipping industry (see Figure A.2-1 and Table A.2-1).
In the following sections are presented the detailed explanations of each feedback loop for
the dynamics of LSO in the container shipping industry.
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Figure A.2-1 Causal Loop Diagrams for the Dynamics of Logistics Service Offering
Table A.2-1 List of Variables in the Feedback Loops of Dynamics of LSO
State
Key Variables Definition Dimension Variable
The level of carriers' capability of
Carriers LSO providing logistics service measured Year
in years of LSO experience
Average LSO The average experience of salesforce Year / People Yes
Experience of providing LSO service
Number of Salesforce The number of salesforce of carriers in People Yes
the container shipping industry
Carriers LSO The money that carriers charge per $ / TEU Yes
Commission TEU for their LSO service
Intermediaries LSO The money that intermediaries charge $/ TEU Yes
Commission per TEU for their LSO service
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StateKey Variables Definition Dimension Variable
The average rate at which salesforce
gains the experience measured by
Rate of Learning LSO "years" per year; i.e., this is the (Year/People)/Year
average rate of learning by the
salesforce.
Hiring Rate The number of salesforce per year that People / year
carriers hire
Carriers Profitability The total operating margin per TEU Dimensionlessdivided by total revenue per TEU
Carriers' annual additional revenue
Unit Revenue Increase stream from LSO service, calculated $ TEUfrom LSO by "Carriers LSO Commission" times
"LSO Market Share of Carriers"
The total cost of shipping a container
Unit Cost and providing LSO, measured by $/ TEU
dollar per TEU
LSO Market Share of The carriers' market share in the LSO Dimensionless
Carriers market
Attractiveness of The extent that the carriers' LSO Dimensionless
Carriers LSO service is attractive to shippers
Attractiveness of The extent that the intermediaries' Dimensionless
Intermediaries LSO LSO service is attractive to shippers
A.2.1 Reinforcing "Salesforce" Feedback Loop-1 (LSO-RI)
The first impact of improved carriers' LSO capability is the increased profitability of
carriers by collecting additional revenue for providing the logistics service to shippers.
The improved profitability will allow carriers to hire more salesforce that will be staffed
to provide better logistics service - e.g., carriers could provide more personalized one-stop
service to shippers by retaining a growing number of salesforce. More salesforce can
therefore improve the carriers' LSO capability. Hence, these causal relationships become
a reinforcing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-2).
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Figure A.2-2 Reinforcing "Salesforce" Feedback Loop (LSO-R1)
A.2.2 Reinforcing "LSO Experience" Feedback Loop (LSO-R2)
Carriers' LSO capability is also impacted by the average LSO experience of carriers'
salesforce. As the number of salesforce increases, the average LSO experience of carriers
will increase by a faster rate of learning LSO among the salesforce, so that the carriers'
LSO capability will be improved. The improved carriers' LSO capability will
subsequently increase the revenue and profitability of carriers, and the increased
profitability will help carriers recruit more salesforce to improve the average LSO
experience again. These dynamics therefore constitute another reinforcing feedback loop
with regard to the carriers' LSO capability (see Figure A.2-3).
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Figure A.2-3 Reinforcing "LSO Experience" Feedback Loop (LSO-R2)
A.2.3 Balancing "Diluted LSO Experience" Feedback Loop (LSO-
B1)
Hiring new salesforce does not always improve the carriers' LSO capability; however,
new salesforce could deteriorate the carriers' LSO capability by lowering the average
LSO experience of carriers. In other words, a newly hired salesforce is generally less
experienced in logistics service so that the average LSO experience will tend to be diluted
due to the increased hiring rate. The decreased carriers' LSO capability will accordingly
reduce the revenue and profitability of carriers, and carriers should decrease the hiring
rate. Therefore, these relationships form a balancing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-4).
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Figure A.2-4 Balancing "Diluted LSO Experience" Feedback Loop (LSO-B1)
A.2.4 Balancing "Cost" Feedback Loop (LSO-B2)
Hiring new salesforce to improve the carriers' LSO capability cannot be achieved free -
Carriers must pay the cost for it. As the number of salesforce increases, the administrative
cost of carriers should increase, which in turn lowers the profitability. The decreased
profitability will make carriers reduce the hiring rate; then, the number of salesforce
should decrease, which therefore constitutes a balancing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-5).
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Figure A.2-5 Balancing "Cost" Feedback Loop (LSO-B2)
A.2.5 Balancing "Carriers' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop
(LSO-B3)
The increased cost due to the increasing number of salesforce for improving the LSO
capability of carriers also makes another balancing loop connected with the carriers' LSO
commission, which is the charge that carriers receive from shippers for providing the
logistics service. The increased cost will push carriers to raise the LSO commission to
cover the cost associated with providing the logistics service. Because of the increased
LSO commission of carriers, the attractiveness of carriers' LSO service and its market
share will decrease, so that the revenue and profitability of carriers will reduce. Then, the
reduced profitability will make carriers cut back the hiring rate and the number of
salesforce, thereby decreasing the cost of carriers; therefore, these dynamics make a
balancing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-6).
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Figure A.2-6 Balancing "Carriers' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop (LSO-B3)
A.2.6 Reinforcing "Carriers' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop
(LSO-R3)
In addition to the balancing feedback loop, the increased carriers' LSO commission can
make a reinforcing feedback loop. The increased unit cost of carriers will increase the
carriers' LSO commission, and the increased LSO commission will also increase the
revenue and profitability of carriers subsequently. The increased profitability will allow
carriers to hire more salesforce, so that the cots of carriers again increase. Therefore, this
makes another reinforcing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-7).
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Figure A.2-7 Reinforcing "Carriers' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop (LSO-R3)
A.2.7 Balancing "Intermediaries' LSO Commission" Feedback
Loop (LSO-B4)
The LSO market in the container shipping industry has been dominated by intermediaries;
consequently, it is important to consider the intermediaries' competitive actions
responding to the improvement of carriers' LSO capability. In this research, two variables
are considered for the competitive actions of intermediaries: intermediaries' LSO
commission and intermediaries' LSO capability. The former is endogenously generated
in the model while the latter is exogenously input. In other words, it is assumed that
intermediaries will change their LSO commission to react to the competitive challenges
from carriers whereas the intermediaries' LSO capability improves regardless of the
change of carriers' LSO capability. Only the intermediaries' LSO commission is
therefore used to construct the feedback loops.
The improved carriers' LSO capability will force intermediaries to reduce their LSO
commission to improve the attractiveness of their LSO service. Then, the LSO market
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share of carriers will tend to decrease because of the improved attractiveness of
intermediaries' LSO service, and so do the revenue and profitability of carriers. The
decreased profitability of carriers will make carriers reduce the hiring rate and the number
of salesforce, so that the carriers' LSO capability will rather decrease. Therefore, these
dynamics provide a balancing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-8).
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Figure A.2-8 Balancing "Intermediaries' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop (LSO-
B4)
A.2.8 Reinforcing "Intermediaries' LSO Commission" Feedback
Loop (LSO-R4)
The change of intermediaries' LSO commission can also make a reinforcing feedback
loop. The reduced intermediaries' LSO commission responding to the improved carriers'
LSO capability will eventually decrease the profitability and hiring rate of carriers
because of the same relationships above. Then, the decreased hiring rate will help
increase the average LSO experience of carriers by hiring less sales people who are less
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experienced in the logistics service. The increased average LSO experience of carriers
therefore improves the carriers' LSO capability again, thereby constituting a reinforcing
feedback loop (see Figure A.2-9).
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Figure A.2-9 Reinforcing "Intermediaries' LSO Commission" Feedback Loop
(LSO-R4)
A.2.9 Balancing "Carriers' Commission - LSO" Feedback Loop
(LSO-B5; LSO-B6)
Carriers' LSO commission can be impacted, not only by the cost to the carriers to provide
the LSO service, but also by the carriers' LSO capability. As the carriers' LSO capability
increases, the carriers' LSO commission will tend to increase, and vice versa. This
change of carriers' LSO commission due to the change of carriers' LSO capability brings
two balancing feedback loops. The first balancing loop comes from the relationship with
the carriers' LSO commission and the revenue of carriers (see Figure A.2-10). Once the
carriers' LSO commission increases due to the improved carriers' LSO capability, the
336
Appendix
revenue and profitability of carriers will increase accordingly, and so does the hiring rate
of salesforce. The increased hiring rate in turn reduces the average LSO experience of
carriers so that the carriers' LSO capability also decreases, thereby forming a balancing
feedback loop.
The second balancing feedback loop comes from the dynamics of the carriers' LSO
commission and the attractiveness of carriers' LSO service (see Figure A.2-l 1). The
increased LSO commission of carriers will lower the attractiveness of carriers' LSO
service and reduce the market share of carriers' LSO service. Accordingly, the revenue
and profitability of carriers will decrease, and so does the number of salesforce due to the
decreased hiring rate. The decreased number of salesforce will therefore reduce the
carriers' LSO capability and the carriers' LSO commission. As such, these dynamics
make another balancing feedback loop.
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Figure A.2-10 Balancing "Carriers' Commission - LSO" Feedback Loop 1 (LSO-B5)
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Figure A.2-11 Balancing "Carriers' Commission - LSO" Feedback Loop 2 (LSO-B6)
A.2.10 Reinforcing "Carriers' Commission - LSO" Feedback
Loop (LSO-R5; LSO-R6)
Meanwhile, the relationship between the carriers' LSO capability and carriers' LSO
commission brings two combinations of reinforcing feedback loops. The increasing
carriers' LSO commission due to the carriers' increased LSO capability will increase the
revenue and profitability of carriers, and subsequently increase the hiring rate and the
number of salesforce. Then, the increased number of salesforce will again improve the
carriers' LSO capability, thereby constructing a reinforcing feedback loop (see Figure
A.2-12).
In addition, the linkage of the carriers' LSO commission and the attractiveness of carriers'
LSO service also derives another reinforcing feedback loop (see Figure A.2-13). The
improved carriers' LSO capability will increase the carriers' LSO commission, which will
also decrease the attractiveness of carriers' LSO service and its market share. The
decreased market share of carriers' LSO service will then reduce the revenue and
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profitability of carriers, and consequently the hiring rate of salesforce. The decreased
hiring rate, however, will increase the average LSO experience of carriers, thereby
improving the carriers' LSO capability. Therefore, these dynamics form another
reinforcing feedback loop.
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Figure A.2-12 Reinforcing "Carriers Commission - LOS" Feedback Loop 1 (LSO-
R5)
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Figure A.2-13 Reinforcing "Carriers' Commission - LSO" Feedback Loop 2 (LSO-
R6)
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A.3 Model Structure
As explained in section 8.3.3, eight sectors regarding the dynamics of LSO and the
diffusion dynamics of e-business are described in this section. Section A.3.1 and A.3.2
describe how the LSO capabilities of carriers and intermediaries are developed
respectively. Since the model is constructed from the carriers' perspective, only the
carriers LSO is endogenously determined while the intermediaries LSO is exogenously
input. The next section represents the dynamics of changing number of salesforce in the
carriers and the average experience of LSO of the salesforce over time (section A.3.3).
Then, the market share sector for simulating the competition between carriers and
intermediaries is explained in section A.3.4, and the dynamics of controlling the
commission for the LSO service is described in the LSO commission sector (section
A.3.5). A way of calculating the carriers' revenue increase from the LSO service is
presented in the LSO revenue sector (section A.3.6). Finally, two sectors governing the
diffusion dynamics of e-business are explained in section A.3.7 and section A.3.8.
A.3.1 Carriers LSO Sector
The carriers LSO sector models the development of the carriers' capability of providing
the LSO to shippers. The carriers LSO is assumed to be the total years of salesforce's
experience of providing the logistics service. In other words, the carriers' LSO is
estimated by the number of salesforce multiplied by the average experience of LSO per
salesforce of the carriers.
This approach is based on the previous research (Oliva, 1996) in which the production
function in a high-contact service environment is best represented by a Leontief
production function where the amount of output is limited by the resource with minimum
availability. In general, the Leontief production function is defined as follows:
SC = a min (L/i, K)
341
Appendix
where SC = Service Capacity
a: Productivity of production factors
L: Labor
K: Capital
i: average labor intensity
Meanwhile, the logistics service in the container shipping industry, according to the
service process matrix (Schmenner, 1986), can be classified as a "professional service"
requiring high degree of labor intensity and high degree of interaction and customization:
i.e., the quality of labor delivering the high-contact professional service is more important
than other factors. Therefore, it is further assumed that, in the case of providing the
logistics service to shippers, the labor is the critical factor limiting the level of service
capacity. Only the labor can be used as a production factor determining the level of
service capacity in the carriers' logistics service by carriers. Accordingly, the service
capacity of providing the logistics service, or the carriers LSO, can be defined as follows:
Carriers LSO = aL
In this formulation, the productivity of production factors (a) is assumed to be the average
experience of providing the logistics service because the more experienced, the more
productive the labor is.
Figure A.3-1 shows the stock and flow structure for the carriers LSO sector. The main
inputs to this sector from other sectors are salesforce and average experience of LSO,
which are derived from the salesforce sector, and the output from this sector is the relative
carriers LSO, which is the input to the market share sector. The exogenous parameters are
the initial carriers LSO and the shippers' perception time of carriers LSO. The detailed
equations are explained in the following.
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Figure A.3-1 Structure of Carriers LSO Sector
(1) Carriers LSO = Salesforce * Average Experience of LSO
(2) Normal Carriers LSO = Initial Carriers LSO
(3) Perceived Carriers LSO by Shippers = SMOOTH (Carriers LSO, Shippers' Carriers
LSO Perception Time)
(4) Relative Carriers LSO = Perceived Carriers LSO by Shippers / Normal Carriers
LSO
A.3.2 Intermediaries LSO Sector
The intermediaries LSO sector captures the potential development of the intermediaries'
capability of providing the LSO to shippers. In this model, the competitive actions by the
intermediaries to improve their LSO capability are assumed to be the exogenous variables
in order to focus more on the strategic challenges of carriers. The growth rate of
intermediaries' LSO capability is assumed to decay exponentially over time. Figure A.3-2
shows the structure of the intermediaries LSO sector.
The exogenous parameters to this sector include the initial intermediaries LSO, the initial
development rate of intermediaries LSO, the annual decay rate of development rate of
intermediaries LSO, and the shipper's perception time of intermediaries LSO. The output
from this sector is the relative intermediaries LSO, which is used for the input to the
market share sector. The detailed equations in the intermediaries LSO sector are shown in
the following.
343
Appendix
Initial , Normal
Intermediaries LSO Intermediaries LSO
PerceivedIntermediaries I ntreire S yRelative
Growth of LSO s Intermediaries LSO by-Internediries LSO
Intermediaries Shippers
Shippers'
Switch for the Case of Growth Rate of Intermediaries LSO
Variable Intermediaries Intermediaries LSO Perception Time
LSO
<lime>
Initial Development Rate Aanual Decay Rate of
of Intermediaries LSO Development Rate
Figure A.3-2 Structure of Intermediaries LSO Sector
(5) Intermediaries LSO = INTEG ( Growth of Intermediaries LSO, Initial
Intermediaries LSO)
(6) Growth of Intermediaries LSO Growth Rate of Intermediaries LSO *
Intermediaries LSO
(7) Growth Rate of Intermediaries LSO = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, 0, IF THEN
ELSE ( Switch for the Case of Variable Intermediaries LSO = 1, Initial
Development Rate of Intermediaries LSO*EXP(-Annual Decay Rate of
Development Rate*(Time - 2001)), 0) )
(8) Perceived Intermediaries LSO by Shippers = SMOOTH ( Intermediaries LSO,
Shippers' Intermediaries LSO Perception Time)
(9) Normal Intermediaries LSO = Initial Intermediaries LSO
(10) Relative Intermediaries LSO = Perceived Intermediaries LSO by Shippers / Normal
Intermediaries LSO
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A.3.3 Salesforce Sector
The salesforce sector simulates the development of carriers' salesforce and the average
experience of LSO over time. The co-flow structure (Sterman, 2000) is used for
integrating the salesforce with the average experience of LSO. Figure A.3-3 presents the
structure of the salesforce sector.
The input to this sector is relative profitability, which is calculated from the model for the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the container shipping industry. It is assumed that if
carriers' profitability improves, carriers would hire more salesforce in order to provide
better logistics service to shippers. The exogenous parameters to this sector are switch for
LSO case of hiring, time to perceive and clear the hiring needs, average hiring rate, hiring
increase rate for LSO, initial salesforce, time to quit or retire salesforce, average
experience of LSO on new hire, initial average experience of LSO, switch for LSO case of
experience by salesforce, and cost sensitivity to relative salesforce. Two table functions,
"TAB - Relative Profitability on Hiring" and "TAB - Relative salesforce on Rate of
Learning," are provided to control the nonlinear relationships among the variables. The
output from this sector is the effect of relative salesforce on cost, which is the input to the
cost sector in the model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand. The detailed equations
of this sector are provided below.
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Figure A.3-3 Structure of Salesforce Sector in the LSO Dynamics
(11) Salesforce = INTEG ( Hiring - Attrition, Initial Salesforce)
(12) Hiring = MAX ( Minimum Hiring, Indicated Hiring)
(13) Minimum Hiring = Attrition
(14) Indicated Hiring = SMOOTH (Normal Hiring*Effect of Relative Profitability on
Hiring, Time to Perceive and Clear the Hiring Needs)
(15) Normal Hiring = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, Average Hiring Rate, Average
Hiring Rate*(1 +Hiring Increase Rate for LSO) )
(16) Effect of Relative Profitability on Hiring = "TAB - Relative Profitability on
Hiring"(Adjusted Relative Profitability)
(17) Attrition = Salesforce/Time To Quit Or Retire Salesforce
(18) Average Experience of LSO = INTEG ( Change in Average Experience + Rate of
Experience Gain, Initial Average Experience of LSO )
(19) Change in Average Experience = (Average Experience of LSO on New Hire -
Average Experience of LSO) / Experience dilution time
(20) Experience Dilution Time = Salesforce / Hiring
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(21) Rate of Experience Gain = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, 0, "Adj. Average Rate
of Learning")
(22) Adj. Average Rate of Learning = Average Rate of Learning by Salesforce
(23) Average Rate of Learning by Salesforce = Switch for LSO Case of Experience by
Salesforce*"TAB - Relative Salesforce on Rate of Learning"(Relative Salesforce)
(24) Relative Salesforce = Salesforce / Initial Salesforce
(25) Effect of Relative Salesforce on Cost = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, 0, Cost
Sensitivity to Relative Salesforce * (Relative Salesforce - 1))
A.3.4 Market Share Sector
The market share sector determines the market share of carriers and intermediaries for the
logistics service. It is assumed that the market share is determined by the attractiveness of
the logistics service provided by the carriers and intermediaries and the attractiveness is
controlled by the level of LSO capability and the level of commission charged for
providing the logistics service. Figure A.3-4 shows the structure of the market share
sector.
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Figure A.3-4 Structure of Market Share Sector
The main inputs to this sector are the relative LSOs of carriers and intermediaries, which
are estimated from the carriers LSO sector and the intermediaries LSO sector respectively,
and the relative commissions of carriers and intermediaries, which are calculated from the
LSO commission sector. The exogenous parameter to this sector is the initial market
share of carriers LSO. The output from this sector is the carriers market share, which is
used for estimating the unit revenue increase from the LSO in the LSO revenue sector.
The nonlinear relationships connecting the relative LSO, the relative commission, and the
attractiveness of LSO service are described by the four table functions: "TAB - Carriers
LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers Service," "TAB - Intermediaries LSO on
Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service," "TAB - Carriers Commission on Attractiveness
of Carriers Service," and "TAB - Intermediaries Commission on Attractiveness of
Intermediaries Service." The detailed equations are explained in the following
(26) Carriers Market Share = Attractiveness of Carriers Service / Total Attractiveness
(27) Intermediaries Market Share = Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service / Total
Attractiveness
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(28) Total Attractiveness = Attractiveness of Carriers Service + Attractiveness of
Intermediaries Service
(29) Attractiveness of Carriers Service = Normal Attractiveness of Carriers
Service*Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers Service*Effect of
Carriers Commission on Attractiveness of Carriers Service
(30) Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service = Normal Attractiveness of Intermediaries
Service * Effect of Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of Intermediaries
Service*Effect of Intermediaries Commission on Attractiveness of Intermediaries
Service
(31) Normal Attractiveness of Carriers Service = 100*Initial Market Share of Carriers
LSO
(32) Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers Service = "TAB - Carriers
LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers Service"(Relative Carriers LSO)
(33) Effect of Carriers Commission on Attractiveness of Carriers Service = "TAB -
Carriers Commission on Attractiveness of Carriers Service"(Relative Carriers
Commission)
(34) Normal Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service = 100 * (1 - Initial Market Share
of Carriers LSO )
(35) Effect of Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service = "TAB -
Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service"(Relative
Intermediaries LSO)
(36) Effect of Intermediaries Commission on Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service =
"TAB - Intermediaries Commission on Attractiveness of Intermediaries
Service"(Relative Intermediaries Commission)
A.3.5 LSO Commission Sector
The LSO commission sector captures the level of commission charged by carriers and
intermediaries for providing the logistics service. It is formulated that relative
improvement of the LSO service by carriers and intermediaries determines the level of
LSO commission. Figure A.3-5 presents the structure of the LSO commission sector.
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Figure A.3-5 Structure of LSO Commission Sector
The major inputs to this sector are the levels of LSO (carriers / intermediaries LSO), the
effect of relative salesforce on cost, which comes from the salesforce sector, and the unit
total cost, which is the output from the model for the dynamics of supply-and-demand in
the CSI. The exogenous parameters to this sector include the switch for the case of
variable commission, average time interval for trend estimation of LSO ratio change,
initial perceived LSO ratio change, time to perceive relative LSO ratio, sensitivity of LSO
ratio change trend on indicated carriers commission, sensitivity of LSO ratio change trend
on indicated intermediaries commission, time to change carriers commission, time to
change intermediaries commission, initial carriers commission, initial intermediaries
commission, and the maximum allowable commission by shippers. The output from this
sector is the relative carriers commission and the relative intermediaries commission,
which are used for the inputs to the market share sector. The detailed equations are
provided in the following.
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(37) Carriers Commission = INTEG (Change in Carriers Commission, Initial Carriers
Commission)
(38) Intermediaries Commission = INTEG (Change in Intermediaries Commission,
Initial Intermediaries Commission)
(39) Change in Carriers Commission = Switch for the Case of Variable Commission *
((Indicated Carriers Commission - Carriers Commission) / Time to Change Carriers
Commission)
(40) Indicated Carriers Commission = MIN ( Maximum Allowable Commission by
Shippers, MAX (Minimum Carriers Commission, Carriers Commission*Effect of
Relative LSO Ratio on Indicated Carriers Commission) )
(41) Minimum Carriers Commission = MAX ( 0, Unit Total Cost * Effect of Relative
Salesforce on Cost )
(42) Effect of Relative LSO Ratio on Indicated Carriers Commission = 1+ Perceived
LSO Ratio Change * Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on Indicated Carriers
Commission
(43) Perceived Relative LSO Ratio Change = SMOOTH (LSO Ratio Change Trend,
Time to Perceive Relative LSO Ratio)
(44) LSO Ratio Change Trend = TREND( "LSO Ratio of Carriers vs. Intermediaries",
Average Time Interval for Trend Estimation of LSO Ratio Change , Initial
Perceived LSO Ratio Change)
(45) LSO Ratio of Carriers vs. Intermediaries = Carriers LSO/Intermediaries LSO
(46) Change in Intermediaries Commission = Switch for the Case of Variable
Commission*((Indicated Intermediaries Commission - Intermediaries Commission)
/ Time to Change Intermediaries Commission)
(47) Indicated Intermediaries Commission = MIN ( Maximum Allowable Commission
by Shippers, MAX ( Minimum Carriers Commission, Intermediaries
Commission*Effect of Relative LSO Ratio on Indicated Intermediaries
Commission ) )
(48) Effect of Relative LSO Ratio on Indicated Intermediaries Commission = 1 +
Perceived LSO Ratio Change * Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on
Indicated Intermediaries Commission
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(49) Relative Carriers Commission = Carriers Commission / Maximum Allowable
Commission by Shippers
(50) Relative Intermediaries Commission = Intermediaries Commission / Maximum
Allowable Commission by Shippers
A.3.6 LSO Revenue Sector
The LSO revenue sector calculates the unit revenue increase of carriers from the logistics
service offerings. Figure A.3-6 shows the structure of the LSO revenue sector.
<Carriers
Switch for Revenue Commission> <Time>
Increase from LSO
<Carriers Market Carriers Revenue, Unit Revenue
Share> from LSO Increase from LSO
<Demand>
Figure A.3-6 Structure of LSO Revenue Sector
The inputs to this sector are the carriers market share of the logistics service, the carriers
commission of the LSO, and the demand, which is the output from the model for the
dynamics of supply-and-demand in the CSI. The exogenous parameter of this sector is the
switch for revenue increase from LSO, which is used for analyzing the different scenarios.
The output from this sector is the unit revenue increase from the LSO, which is used for
estimating the profitability of carriers in the model for the dynamics of supply-and-
demand in the CSI. The detailed equations are provided in the following.
(51) Carriers Revenue from LSO = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, 0, Switch for
Revenue Increase from LSO * ( Demand*Carriers Market Share*Carriers
Commission ) )
(52) Unit Revenue Increase from LSO = Carriers Revenue from LSO / Demand
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A.3.7 E-Business Diffusion Sector
The e-business diffusion sector models the adoption of e-business by potential e-business
users. Just as same as the EDI diffusion sector explained in section 7.4.2, the adoption
rate of e-business is simulated using the Bass model, in which two factors determine the
adoption rate of e-business: trading partners' demand for e-business as an external source
and word-of-mouth effect as an internal source. Figure A.3-7 shows the stock and flow
structure for the e-business diffusion sector.
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Figure A.3-7 Structure of e-Business Diffusion Sector
The main input to this sector is adoptability, which is calculated from the adoptability
sector, and the exogenous parameters to this sector include total players, initial e-business
users, contact rate, effectiveness of trading partners' demand, container shipping demand,
average transactions per container shipping demand, and average e-business transactions
per e-business users. There are three outputs from this sector: "e-biz diffusion rate by
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transaction volume," which determines the effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness
of e-business and the effect of relative competitive advantage on attractiveness of e-
business in the adoptability sector; "effect of e-biz diffusion on carriers cost," which
controls the change of carriers' operating cost due to the level of e-business adoption rate;
and "average rate of learning by e-biz," which determines the average rate of learning
LSO in the salesforce sector. The detailed equations are explained in the following.
(53) Potential e-Biz Users = INTEG ( - Adoption Rate of e-Biz, Initial Potential e-Biz
Users)
(54) e-Biz Users = INTEG (Adoption Rate of e-Biz, Initial e-Biz Users)
(55) Adoption Rate of e-Biz = Adoption of e-Biz from Trading Partners' Demand +
Adoption of e-Biz from Word of Mouth
(56) Adoption of e-Biz from Trading Partners' Demand = Potential e-Biz Users *
Effectiveness of Trading Partners' Demand
(57) Adoption of e-Biz from Word of Mouth = (Potential e-Biz Users * Contact Rate) *
(e-Biz Users / Total Players) * Adoptability
(58) Initial Potential e-Biz Users Total Players - Initial e-Biz Users
(59) e-Biz Diffusion Rate by Users = e-Biz Users / Total Players
(60) e-Biz Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume = Total e-Biz Transactions / Total
Transactions
(61) Total e-Biz Transactions = Average e-Biz Transactions per e-Biz Users * e-Biz
Users
(62) Total Transactions = Average Transactions per Container Shipping Demand *
Container Shipping Demand
(63) Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on Carriers Cost = IF THEN ELSE ( Time < 2001, 1,
"TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Cost"("e-Biz Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume") )
(64) Average Rate of Learning by e-Biz = Switch for LSO Case of Experience by eBiz *
"TAB - eBiz Diffusion on Rate of LSO Learning"("e-Biz Diffusion Rate by
Transaction Volume")
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A.3.8 Adoptability Sector
The adoptability sector captures how adoptability of e-business is determined from the
attractiveness of e-business, which in turn is impacted by the "e-biz diffusion rate by
transaction volume." Figure A.3-8 presents the structure of the adoptability sector, which
is basically as same as that of the adoptability sector in the EDI diffusion model.
The input to this sector is the "e-biz diffusion rate by transaction volume," which is
estimated from the e-business diffusion sector, and the exogenous parameters are normal
attractiveness of e-biz and normal adoptability. The output from this sector is the
adoptability, which is the input to the e-business diffusion sector. Three nonlinear
relationships are described in the table functions of "TAB - eBiz Benefits on
Attractiveness," "TAB - Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness," and "TAB -
Attractiveness on Adoptability." The detailed equations in the adoptability sector are
shown in the following.
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Figure A.3-8 Structure of Adoptability Sector
(65) Adoptability = Normal Adoptability * Effect of Attractiveness of Adoptability
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(66) Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability = "TAB - Attractiveness on
Adoptability"(Relative Attractiveness of e-Biz)
(67) Relative Attractiveness of e-Biz = Attractiveness of e-Biz / Normal Attractiveness
of e-Biz
(68) Attractiveness of e-Biz = Normal Attractiveness of e-Biz * Effect of e-Biz Benefits
on Attractiveness * Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness
(69) Effect of e-Biz Benefits on Attractiveness = "TAB - eBiz Benefits on
Attractiveness" (e-Biz Diffusion Rate by Transaction Volume)
(70) Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness = "TAB - Relative
Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness" (e-Biz Diffusion Rate by Transaction
Volume)
A.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In order to test the significance of the different elements in the integrated model, a set of
sensitivity analyses is performed for each case - i.e., the future base case, the vertical
integration strategy, the virtual integration strategy, and the mixed integration strategy -
varying the exogenous parameters. The parameters used for the sensitivity analysis are
chosen among the exogenous parameters based on the criteria that (1) the values of
parameters were assumed in the simulation due to the lack of available data so that many
uncertainties were assumed to be included in the parameters; or (2) the parameters are
expected to impact the system's performance substantially from a point of the model
structure. To test the sensitivity of the system to each parameter, only one parameter is
modified per simulation. Meanwhile, the cumulative unit profit of carriers is used as the
main indicator of performance comparison.
A.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis for the Future Base Case
Table A.4-1 presents the percentage change in cumulative unit profit as each of the
selected parameters is varied. Six parameters are selected for the sensitivity analysis of
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the future base case. Each parameter is changed from 10% to 25% to ensure the
practicality of the parameters. Figure A.4-1 shows the maximum change of cumulative
unit profit relative to the variation of each parameter. Two parameters - reference
utilization and planning horizon - are identified as most influential to the cumulative unit
profit of carriers.
The most sensitive parameters are the reference utilization, which impacts the level of
freight rate by comparing the actual utilization level (SensFB-6 in Table A.4-1): The
higher the reference utilization, the better the cumulative unit profit. In other words, if
carriers increase the reference utilization, the relative utilization, which is the ratio of
actual utilization and reference utilization, become lower so that the freight rate tends to
decrease. Then, the carriers' revenue and profitability should decline due to the decreased
freight rate and carriers should cut back the investment in containership capacity because
of declining profitability.
Table A.4-1 Sensitivity Analysis of the Future Base Case - Impact of Parameter
Change on the Cumulative Unit Profit
% Change in Cumulative
Unit Profit
PRMTRRun BaeVleLower Higher
PARAMETER Name Base Value Case Value Case
Demand Sector
Globalization Offset Factor SensFB-1 0.95 Dimensionless 6.4% -2.7%
Capacity Sector
Planning Horizon SensFB-2 14.44 Year 34.7% -9.0%
Capacity Adjustment Time SensFB-3 4 Year -3.1% 3.7%
Target Profitability SensFB-4 6.42 Dimensionless -8.0% 12.4%
Effect of Relative Profitability on SensFB-5 TAB - Relative 2.4% N/A
Order Profitability on Order
Freight Rate Sector
Reference Utilization SensFB-6 0.75 Dimensionless 1.7% 18.5%
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The second most sensitive parameter is the planning horizon, which is the time frame that
carriers consider when ordering the containership capacity (SensFB-2 in Table A.4-1).
The shorter the planning horizon, the better the cumulative unit profit in the long term.
The reason for this is that, if carriers reduce the planning horizon, they tend to increase the
containership capacity only to meet the short-term demand increase with little
consideration of the long-term demand increase, so that the containership capacity can
increase slowly. Accordingly, the slow increase of containership capacity will increase
the utilization of containership capacity; thereby improving the freight rate and the
profitability of carriers in the long term.
Maximum Relative Change of Cum. Profit to the Change of Variable
0% 40% 80% 120% 160% 200%
Referece Utilization
Planning Horizon
E Target Profitability
M Capacity Adjustment
Globalization Offset
Factor
Effect of Relative
Profitability on Order
Figure A.4-1 Maximum Relative Sensitivity of the Variables in the Vertical
Integration Strategy
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A.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis for the Vertical Integration Strategy
Table A.4-2 shows the percentage change in cumulative unit profit as each of the selected
parameters is varied 25%. Fifteen parameters are selected for the sensitivity analysis.
Figure A.4-2 presents the maximum percentage change of the cumulative unit profit due
to the 25% variation of each parameter in Table A.4-2.
The most sensitive parameter is the "effect of carriers LSO on attractiveness of carriers
service," which controls the impact of relative improvement of the carriers' LSO
capability on the attractiveness of carriers logistics service (Sens-12 in Table A.4-2).
Lowering the impact of carriers' LSO capability on the attractiveness of carriers' logistics
service by 25% decreases the cumulative unit profit by 2.8% while increasing the impact
by 25% improves the cumulative unit profit by 2.5%.
The second most sensitive parameter is the "time to change carriers commission," in
which if carriers change the LSO commission level more frequently - "time to change
carriers commission" is lower than the base value - they can enjoy the better cumulative
unit profit from the LSO, and vice versa (Sens-9 in Table A.4-2). If carriers change the
level of LSO commission level faster depending on the LSO ratio change than the base
case, it will help them generate better profit from the LSO. In addition, this relationship is
compatible with the result of sensitivity analysis on the "sensitivity of LSO ratio change
trend on indicted carriers commission" (Sens-2 in Table A.4-2). The more sensitive the
LSO commission is to the LSO ratio change - the LSO commission changes substantially
depending on the LSO ratio change - the more unit profit can carriers make. In summary,
quicker change of the LSO commission level might be helpful to carriers.
The "initial development rate of intermediaries LSO" is also expected to impact the
overall performance of carriers' profit (Sens-5 in Table A.4-2); the lower the development
rate of intermediaries LSO, the better the cumulative unit profit is. In other words, the
potential profitability of carriers from the LSO is dependent upon the relative
improvement of intermediaries' LSO capability.
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The next sensitive parameter is the "hiring increase rate for LSO," which is the carriers'
policy to develop the number of salesforce for improving the LSO capability (Sens-7 in
Table A.4-2). Interestingly, this sensitivity is counter-intuitive: the higher the hiring
increase rate for LSO, the lower the cumulative unit profit is - i.e., if carriers try to hire
more salespeople serving for the logistics service, carriers could be less profitable. The
reason for this is as follows: When carriers hire more salespeople, total carriers' revenue
might increase due to the improved carriers' LSO capability. However, hiring more
salespeople could make carriers increase the total costs associated with offering the
logistics service. In fact, the cost increase from hiring more salespeople is higher than the
revenue increase from the improved LSO capability, so that carriers could be less
profitable by hiring more salespeople. In other words, the higher the hiring increase rate
for LSO, the lower the cumulative profit of carriers, because the costs associated with the
additional salespeople outnumber the unit revenue increase from the LSO. This analysis
shows that the cost impact of hiring additional salespeople is important in developing the
LSO through the vertical integration strategy. This reasoning can be confirmed by
investigating the sensitivity of the model to the cost factor, which is explained in the
following.
The LSO model is also expected to be sensitive to the parameter of "cost sensitivity to
relative salesforce," which determines the cost associated with developing the logistics
service of carriers (Sens-1 in Table A.4-2). Lowering the cost sensitivity by 25%
increases the cumulative unit profit by 1.2% whereas increasing the cost sensitivity by
25% rather decreases the cumulative unit profit by 1.2%. Lowering the costs associated
with recruiting additional salesforce can therefore improve the profitability of carriers
directly. This analysis shows that it is necessary to carefully manage the costs of hiring
more salesforce developing the LSO capability while not compromising the quality of
salesforce.
Finally, the change of the "effect of intermediaries commission on attractiveness of
intermediaries service" (Sens-15 in Table A.4-2) impacts the system's performance. The
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lower the "effect of intermediaries commission on attractiveness of intermediaries
service," the better off is the carriers' profitability.
Meanwhile, two parameters are expected to hardly impact the profitability of carriers in
the LSO dynamics. First, the change of "average rate of learning by salesforece," which
represents that more salesforce will be likely to expedite the rate of learning of the
logistics service among salespeople, provides negligible impact on carriers' cumulative
unit profit (Sens-1 1 in Table A.4-2). In other words, for example, even though carriers
introduce the policy of expediting the sharing of the experience of selling logistics service
among the salesforce, it might not improve the carriers' overall profitability from the LSO
as desired. The second parameter is the "shippers' carriers LSO perception time," which
models how fast shippers recognize the improvement of the carriers' LSO capability
(Sens-8 in Table A.4-2). Even if shippers realize the change of carriers' LSO capability
faster, the improvement of carriers' profitability is expected to be minimal. That is, the
carriers' marketing efforts of advertising the improvement of their LSO capability might
not be effective enough to generate better profitability.
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Table A.4-2 Sensitivity Analysis of the Vertical Integration Strategy - Impact of
Parameter Change on the Cumulative Unit Profit
% Change in Cumulative
Unit Profit
PARAMETER Run Base Value 0.75 * Base 1.25 * BasePARA ETE Name BaeVleValue Value
Exogenous Input Variables
Cost Sensitivity to Relative Sens-1 0.08 Dimensionless 1.2% 
-1.2%Salesforce,
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated Carriers Sens-2 0.28 Fraction * Year -1.3% 1.3%
Commission
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated Sens-3 -0.28 Fraction * Year 0.3% -0.5%
Intermediaries Commission
om io y Shippers Sens-4 200 $ / TEU -0.4% 0.1%
Reference Points for Decision-making
Initial Development Rate of Sens-5 0.07 Fraction / Year 1.3% -1.3%Intermediaries LSO
Annual Decay Rate of Sens-6 0.03 Fraction / Year -0.3% 0.2%Development Rate ____ ___________ _____
Hiring Increase Rate for LSO Sens-7 0.5 Dimensionless 1.3% -1.3%
Information Delay Time
Shippers' Carriers LSO Sens-8 0.5 Years 0.1% -0.1%Perception Time
Time to Change Carriers Sens-9 1 Years 1.7% -1.0%Commission
Nonlinear Relationships
Effect of Relative Profitability on Sens-10 TAB - Relative Profitability 
-0.5% 0.4%Hiring on Hiring
Average Rate of Learning by Sens-1 1 TAB - Relative Salesforce 
-0.1% 0.1%Salesforce on Rate of Learning
Effect of Carriers LSO on TAB - Carriers LSO on
Attractiveness of Carriers Sens-12 Attractiveness of Carriers -2.8% 2.5%
Service Service
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on TAB - Intermediaries LSO
Attractiveness of Intermediaries Sens-13 on Attractiveness of 0.7% -0.6%
Service Intermediaries Service
Effect of Carriers Commission TAB - Relative LSO Ratio
on Attractiveness of Carriers Sens-14 on Indicated Carriers -0.7% 0.5%
Service Commission
Effect of Intermediaries TAB - Relative LSO Ratio
Commission on Attractiveness of Sens-15 on Indicated Intermediaries 1.1% -1.0%
Intermediaries Service Commission
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Variable Name 0.0
Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers
ServiceI
Time to Change Carriers Commission
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on
Indicated Carriers Commission
Initial Development Rate of Intermediaries LSO
Hiring Increase Rate
Cost Sensitivity to Relative Salesforce
Effect of Intermediaries Commission on
Attractiveness of Intermediaries Service
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of
Intermediaries Service
Effect of Carriers Commission on Attractiveness of
Carriers Service
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on
Indicated Intermediaries Commission
Effect of Relative Profitability on Hiring
Maximum Allowable Commission by Shippers
Annual Decay Rate of Development Rate
Shippers' Carriers LSO Perception Time
Average Rate of Leaming by Salesforce
Figure A.4-2 Maximum Sensitivity of the Variables
Strategy
Max. Sensitivity
% 0.8% 1.6% 2.4% 3.2% 4.0%
in the Vertical Integration
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A.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis for the Virtual Integration Strategy
Table A.4-3 shows the percentage change in cumulative unit profit as each of the selected
parameters is varied +25%. Eighteen parameters are selected for the sensitivity analysis.
The parameters that are related to increasing the number of salesforce are excluded for
testing the sensitivity of the e-business model, and the parameters, which are related to the
e-business diffusion dynamics, are added for the sensitivity analysis of the e-business
model. To test the sensitivity of the system to each parameter, only one parameter is
modified per simulation. The tests can be used to detect the policies with greater leverage.
Figure A.4-3 presents the maximum percentage change of the cumulative unit profit due
to the +25% variation of each parameter in Table A.4-3. In addition, the percentage
changes of e-business diffusion rate corresponding to the change of e-business related
parameters are also shown in Table A.4-4 to understand how much the diffusion rate of e-
business is impacted by the variation of parameters.
The most sensitive parameter in case of virtual integration strategy is the "effect of
relative competitive advantage on attractiveness," which makes the adoption of e-business
slower as the diffusion rate of e-busmess increases (SensVi- 17 in Table A.4-3). Lowering
the effect of relative competitive advantage by 25% increases the cumulative unit profit by
7.6% and also the e-business diffusion rate by 21%. Meanwhile, increasing the effect of
relative competitive advantage by 25% rather decreases the cumulative unit profit by 5.8%
and the e-business diffusion rate by 14.8%. This sensitivity of the model to the effect of
relative competitive advantage can be explained by the fact that the lowered effect of
relative competitive advantage reduces the impact of balancing "competitive advantage"
feedback loop (see section 7.3.3) so that the diffusion rate of e-business could rather
increase, and vice versa. In other words, if the competitive advantage of adopting the e-
business maintains even in higher level of e-business diffusion rate, the adoption rate of e-
business could increase substantially, which therefore makes carriers more profitable in
the end. On the other hand, if the competitive advantage of joining the e-business
activities erodes quickly when the diffusion rate of e-business becomes high, the adoption
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rate of e-business could decrease fast so that carriers' profitability becomes lower in the
long term.
The second most sensitive parameter is the "effect of e-business diffusion on cost," which
determines the cost associated with developing the logistics service by adopting e-
business activities (SensVi-9 in Table A.4-3). Lowering the cost impact by 25%
decreases the cumulative unit profit by 2.8% whereas increasing the cost impact by 25%
rather increases the cumulative unit profit by 7.1%. In other words, if the long-term cost
savings from adopting e-business become more substantial than the base case, i.e.,
increasing the cost impact, then the cumulative unit profit of carriers is expected to be
better than the base case, and vice versa. This analysis shows that the benefit of cost
savings from adopting e-business for the logistics service is crucial to determining the
long-term profitability of carriers.
The next sensitive parameter is the "effect of carriers LSO on attractiveness of carriers
service," which controls the impact of relative improvement of carriers LSO capability on
the attractiveness of carriers logistics service (SensVi-10 in Table A.4-3). Lowering the
impact of carriers' LSO capability on the attractiveness of carriers' logistics service by
25% decreases the cumulative unit profit by 4.9% while increasing the impact by 25%
improves the cumulative unit profit by 5.2%.
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Table A.4-3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Virtual Integration Strategy- Impact of
Parameter Change on the Cumulative Unit Profit
% Change in Cumulative
Unit Profit
PARAMETER Run Name Base Value 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base
Exogenous Input Variables
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated Carriers SensVi-1 0.28 Fraction * Year -1.6% 1.9%
Commission
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated SensVi-2 -0.28 Fraction * Year 0.4% -0.4%
Intermediaries Commission
Maximum Allowable SensVi-3 200 TEU 
-0.2% 0.3%Commission by Shippers
Reference Points for Decision-making
Initial Development Rate of SensVi-4 0.07 Fraction / Year 2.6% -2.5%
Intermediaries LSO
Annual Decay Rate of SensVi-5 0.03 Fraction / Year -0.5% 0.4%Development Rate
Information Delay Time
Shippers' Carriers LSO SensVi-6 0.5 Years 0.2% 
-0.2%
Perception Time
Time to Change Carriers SensVi-7 1 Years 3.3% -1.6%Commission
Nonlinear Relationships
Average rate of Learning by e- SensVi-8 TAB - eBiz Diffusion on -0.3% 0.3%
Biz Rate of LSO Learning
Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on SensVi-9 TAB - eBiz Diffusion on -2.8% 7.1%Carriers Cost Cost
Effect of Carriers LSO on TAB - Carriers LSO on
Attractiveness of Carriers SensVi-10 Attractiveness of Carriers -4.9% 5.2%
Service Service
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on TAB - Intermediaries
Attractiveness of Intermediaries SensVi-1 1 LSO on Attractiveness of 1.5% -1.4%
Service Intermediaries Service
Effect of Carriers Commission TAB - Relative LSO
on Attractiveness of Carriers SensVi-12 Ratio on Indicated -0.7% 0.4%
Service Carriers Commission
. . TAB - Relative LSO
Effect of Intermediaries Ratio on Indicated 1%1
Commission on Attractiveness of SensVi-13 Intermediaries 1.2% -1.3%
Intermediaries Service Commission
e-Biz Diffusion Related Variables
Effect of Trading Partners' SensVi-14 0.02 Fraction / Year -0.5% 0.1%
Demand
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% Change iT Cumulative
Unit Profit
PARA ETERRun~me Bse Vlue0.75 * Base 1.25 * BasePARMETR Rn ameBas VaueValue Value
Contact Rate SensVi- 15 11 Fraction / Year -0.5% 1.2%
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on SensVi-16 TAB - eBiz Benefits on -4.9% 4.7%
Attractiveness Attractiveness
Effect of Relative Competitive SensVi-17 Competitive Advantage 7.6% -5.8%
Advantage on Attractiveness on Attractiveness
Effect of Attractiveness on SensVi-18 TAB - Attractiveness on 0.8% -0.2%
Adoptability Adoptability
Table A.4-4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Virtual Integration Strategy - Impact of
Parameter Change on the e-Business Diffusion Rate
Efe Change in e-Biz % Chang in e-Biz
Diffusion by Users in Diffusion by Transaction
2020 Volumne in 2020
e-Biz Diffusion Related Run Name 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base
Variables Value Value Value Value
Effect of Trading Partners' SensVi-14 -0.3% 0.3% -0.3% 0.3%
Demand
Contact Rate SensVi-15 -2.4% 1.7% -2.4%l 1.7%
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on SensVi- 16 -14.5% 13.5% -14.5% 13.5%
Attractiveness
Effect of Relative Competitive SensVi-17 21.1% -14.8% 21.1% 
-14.8%
Advantage on Attractiveness1 i
Effect of Attractiveness on SensVi -18 -0.1% 0.3% -0.1% 0.3%
AdoptabilityI
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Variable Name 0.
Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on
Attractiveness
Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on Carriers Cost
Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers
Service
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on Attractiveness
Time to Change Carriers Commission
Initial Development Rate of Intermediaries LSO
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on Indicated
Carriers Commission
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of
Intermediaries Service
Effect of Intermediaries Comnission on Attractiveness
of Intermediaries Service
Contact Rate
Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability
Effect of Carriers Commission on Attractiveness of
Carriers Service
Annual Decay Rate of Development Rate
Effect of Trading Partners' Dermand
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on Indicated
Intermediaries Commission
Maxirnum Allow able Commission by Shippers
Average Rate of Learning by e-Biz
Shippers' Carriers LSO Perception Time
Max. Sensitivity
0% 2.0% 4.0% 6.0%
I
8.0% 10.0%
Figure A.4-3 Maximum Sensitivity of the Variables in the Virtual Integration
Strategy
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The "effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness," which explains the increasing
adoption rate of e-business as the benefits of e-business increases (see section 7.3.2 and
7.4.3), is also expected to impact the overall performance of carriers' profit (SensVi- 16 in
Table A.4-3); the higher the effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness of e-business,
the higher the diffusion rate of e-business and the carriers' profitability in the end.
Compared with the base case, lowering the effect by 25% decreases the diffusion rate of
e-business in 2020 by 14.5% and the cumulative unit profit by 4.9%, whereas increasing
the effect by 25% rather increases the diffusion rate of e-business in 2020 by 13.5% and
the cumulative unit profit by 4.7%.
In addition, the next sensitive parameter is the "time to change carriers commission," in
which if carriers change the LSO commission level more frequently - "time to change
carriers commission" is lower than the base value - they can enjoy the better cumulative
profit from the LSO, and vice versa (SensVi-7 in Table A.4-3). If carriers change the
level of LSO commission level faster depending on the LSO ratio change than the base
case, it will help them generate better profit from the LSO. Furthermore, this relationship
is compatible with the result of sensitivity analysis on the "sensitivity of LSO ratio change
trend on indicted carriers commission" (SensVi-I in Table A.4-3). The more sensitive the
LSO commission is to the LSO ratio change - the LSO commission changes substantially
depending on the LSO ratio change - the more unit profit can carriers make. In summary,
quicker change of the LSO commission level might be helpful to carriers.
Finally, the "initial development rate of intermediaries LSO" is also expected to impact
the overall performance of carriers' profit (SensVi-4 in Table A.4-3); the lower the
development rate of intermediaries LSO, the better the cumulative unit profit is. In other
words, the potential profitability of carriers from the LSO is dependent upon the relative
improvement of intermediaries' LSO capability.
Meanwhile, two parameters are expected to hardly impact the profitability of carriers in
the LSO dynamics. First, the change of "average rate of learning by e-Biz," which
represents that higher diffusion rate of e-business will be likely to expedite the rate of
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learning of the logistics service among salespeople, provides negligible impact on
carriers' cumulative unit profit (SensVi-8 in Table A.4-3). In other words, the benefit of
increasing the LSO capability by adopting e-business activities is less effective in
generating the profit of carriers from the logistics service. The second parameter is the
"shippers' carriers LSO perception time," which models how fast shippers recognize the
improvement of the carriers' LSO capability (SensVi-6 in Table A.4-3). Even if shippers
realize the change of carriers' LSO capability faster, the improvement of carriers'
profitability is expected to be minimal. That is, the carriers' marketing efforts of
advertising the improvement of their LSO capability might not be effective enough to
generate better profitability.
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A.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis for the Mixed Integration Strategy
In order to test the significance of the different elements in the integrated model, a set of
simulations is performed varying the exogenous parameters. The simulations are
compared using the cumulative unit profit of carriers as the main indicator of
performance. The simulation result of the MX- 1 scenario is used as the base simulation
Table A.4-5 shows the percentage change in cumulative unit profit as each of the selected
parameters is varied E25%. Combining the parameters that were used for the sensitivity
analyses for the vertical and virtual integration strategies, twenty-two parameters are
selected for the sensitivity analysis of the integrated model. To test the sensitivity of the
system to each parameter, only one parameter is modified per simulation. Figure A.4-4
presents the maximum percentage change of the cumulative unit profit due to the 25%
variation of each parameter in Table A.4-5. In addition, the percentage changes of e-
business diffusion rate corresponding to the change of e-business related parameters are
also shown in Table A.4-6 to understand how much the diffusion rate of e-business is
impacted by the variation of parameters.
The sensitivity analysis shows that two e-business related parameters are the most
influential to the system's performance. The most sensitive parameter in case of mixed
integration strategy is the "effect of relative competitive advantage on attractiveness,"
which makes the adoption of e-business slower as the diffusion rate of e-business
increases (SensMX-21 in Table A.4-5). Lowering the effect of relative competitive
advantage by 25% increases the cumulative unit profit by 4% and also the e-business
diffusion rate by 21%. Meanwhile, increasing the effect of relative competitive advantage
by 25% rather decreases the cumulative unit profit by 3.6% and the e-business diffusion
rate by 14.8%. In addition, the "effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness," which
explains the increasing adoption rate of e-business as the benefits of e-business increases
(see section 7.3.2 and 7.4.3), is expected to be the second most sensitive parameter
(SensMX-20 in Table A.4-5); the higher the effect of e-business benefits on attractiveness
of e-business, the higher the diffusion rate of e-business and the carriers' profitability in
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the end. Compared with the base case, lowering the effect by 25% decreases the
cumulative unit profit by 3.1% and the diffusion rate of e-business in 2020 by 14.5%,
whereas increasing the effect by 25% rather increases the cumulative unit profit by 2.7%
and the diffusion rate of e-business in 2020 by 13.5%.
Next, the "effect of e-business diffusion on cost," which determines the cost associated
with developing the logistics service by adopting e-business activities, also impacts the
overall performance of the cumulative unit profit (SensMX-13 in Table A.4-5). In
particular, increasing the cost impact of e-business changes the cumulative unit profit
substantially than the case of decreasing the cost impact: Increasing the cost impact by
25% increases the cumulative unit profit by 3% whereas lowering the cost impact by 25%
decreases the cumulative unit profit by 0.6% only. Besides the cost impact from the
virtual integration strategy, the integrated model is also expected to be sensitive to the cost
parameter of the vertical integration strategy - "cost sensitivity to relative salesforce,"
which determines the cost associated with developing the logistics service of carriers
through the vertical integration strategy (SensMX-1 in Table A.4-5). Lowering the cost
sensitivity by 25% increases the cumulative unit profit by 1.1% whereas increasing the
cost sensitivity by 25% rather decreases the cumulative unit profit by 0.9%. Lowering the
costs of recruiting additional salesforce can therefore improve the profitability of carriers
directly. This analysis shows that it is necessary to carefully manage the costs of hiring
more salesforce developing the LSO capability while not compromising the quality of
salesforce. This conclusion is also confirmed by the sensitivity analysis for the "hiring
increase rate for LSO," which is explained below.
The next sensitive parameter is the "effect of carriers LSO on attractiveness of carriers
service," which controls the impact of relative improvement of carriers' LSO capability on
the attractiveness of carriers logistics service (SensMX-14 in Table A.4-5). Lowering the
impact of carriers' LSO capability on the attractiveness of carriers' logistics service by
25% decreases the cumulative unit profit by 2.8% while increasing the impact by 25%
improves the cumulative unit profit by 2.7%.
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In addition, the next sensitive parameter is the "time to change carriers commission," in
which if carriers change the LSO commission level more frequently - "time to change
carriers commission" is lower than the base value - they can enjoy the better cumulative
profit from the LSO, and vice versa (SensMX-9 in Table A.4-5). If carriers change the
level of LSO commission level faster depending on the LSO ratio change than the base
case, it will help them generate better profit from the LSO. Moreover, this relationship is
compatible with the result of sensitivity analysis on the "sensitivity of LSO ratio change
trend on indicted carriers commission" (SensMX-2 in Table A.4-5). The more sensitive
the LSO commission is to the LSO ratio change - the LSO commission changes
substantially depending on the LSO ratio change - the more unit profit can carriers make.
In summary, as in the VE-4 and Vi-4 scenarios, quicker change of the LSO commission
level might be helpful to carriers in the mixed integration strategy.
The "initial development rate of intermediaries LSO," which models how fast
intermediaries would improve their LSO capability, is also expected to impact the overall
performance of carriers' profit (SensMX-5 in Table A.4-5); the lower the development
rate of intermediaries LSO, the better cumulative unit profit does carriers achieve. In
other words, the potential profitability of carriers from the LSO is dependent upon the
relative improvement of intermediaries' LSO capability.
Furthermore, the next sensitive parameter is the "hiring increase rate for LSO," which is
the carriers' policy to develop the number of salesforce for improving the LSO capability
(SensMX-7 in Table A.4-5). Similar to the vertical integration strategy (see Table A.4-5),
this sensitivity is counter-intuitive: the higher the hiring increase rate for LSO, the lower
the cumulative unit profit is - i.e., if carriers try to hire more salespeople serving for the
logistics service, carriers could be less profitable. The reason for this is as follows: When
carriers hire more salespeople, total carriers' revenue might increase due to the improved
carriers' LSO capability. However, hiring more salespeople could make carriers increase
the total costs associated with offering the logistics service. In fact, the cost increase from
hiring more salespeople is higher than the revenue increase from the improved LSO
capability, so that carriers could be less profitable by hiring more salespeople. In other
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words, the higher the hiring increase rate for LSO, the lower the cumulative profit of
carriers, because the costs associated with the additional salespeople outnumber the unit
revenue increase from the LSO. This analysis shows that the cost impact of hiring
additional salespeople is important in developing the LSO through the mixed integration
strategy.
Finally, two parameters affecting the adoption rate of e-business are expected to impact
the performance of cumulative unit profit: the "contact rate" and the "effect of trading
partners' demand." (SensMX-18 and SensMX-19 in Table A.4-5). Increasing these
parameters improves the cumulative unit profit whereas decreasing them rather lowers the
profitability. However, it is worth mentioning that, even though increasing those
parameters does not change substantially the cumulative unit profit, the impact of
decreasing them is relatively more substantial. Therefore, carriers' profitability might be
worse unless the container shipping industry maintains the current levels of the "contact
rate" and the "effect of trading partners' demand."
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Table A.4-5 Sensitivity Analysis of the Mixed Integration Strategy - Impact of
Parameter Change on the Cumulative Unit Profit
% Change in Cumulative
Unit Profit
PARAMETER Run Name Base Value 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base
Exogenous Input Variables
Cost Sensitivity to Relative SensMX-1 0.08 Dimensionless 1.1% -0.9%Salesforce
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated Carriers SensMX-2 0.28 Fraction * Year -0.6% 1.0%
Commission
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change
Trend on Indicated SensMX-3 -0.28 Fraction * Year 0.3% -0.2%
Intermediaries Commission
Maximum Allowable SensMX-4 200 $ / TEU -0.1% 0.2%
Commission by Shippers
Reference Points for Decision-making
Initial Development Rate of SensMX-5 0.07 Fraction / Year 1.4% -1.3%
Intermediaries LSO
Annual Decay Rate of SensMX-6 0.03 Fraction / Year 
-0.2% 0.3%
Development Rate
Hiring Increase Rate SensMX-7 0.5 Dimensionless 1.3% -1.1%
Information Delay Time
Shippers' Carriers LSO SensMX-8 0.5 Years 0.2% -0.1%
Perception Time
Time to Change Carriers SensMX-9 1 Years 1.8% -0.8%
Commission
Nonlinear Relationships
Effect of Relative Profitability on SensMX- TAB - Relative 
-0.7% 0.4%
Hiring 10 Profitability on Hiring
TAB - Relative
Average Rate of Learning by SensMX- Salesforce on Rate of 0.1% 0.1%
Salesforce 11 Learning
Average rate of Learning by e- SensMX- TAB - eBiz Diffusion on -0.1% 0.2%
Biz 12 Rate of LSO Learning
Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on SensMX- TAB - eBiz Diffusion on -0.6% 3.0%
Carriers Cost 13 Cost
Effect of Carriers LSO on SensMX- TAB - Carriers LSO on
Attractiveness of Carriers sM Attractiveness of Carriers -2.8% 2.7%
Service Service
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on SensMX- TAB - Intermediaries
Attractiveness of Intermediaries 1s LSO on Attractiveness of 0.8% -0.7%
Service 15 Intermediaries Service
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% Change in Cumulative
Unit Profit
PARAMETER Run Name Base Value 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base
Effect of Carriers Commission SensMX- TAB - Relative LSO
on Attractiveness of Carriers 16 Ratio on Indicated -0.3% -0.1%
Service Carriers Commission
Effect of Intermediaries TAB - Relative LSO
Commission on Attractiveness of SensMX- Ratio on Indicated 0.3% -0.6%
Intermediaries Service Co s ntemdiaines
e-Biz Diffusion Related Variables
Effect of Trading Partners' SensMX- 0.02 Fraction / Year -1.0% 0.3%Demand 18
Contact Rate SensMX- 11 Fraction / Year -1.3% 0.6%
19
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on SensMX- TAB - eBiz Benefits on -3.1% 2.7%Attractiveness 20 Attractiveness
Effect of Relative Competitive SensMX- TAB - Relative
Advantage on Attractiveness 21 Competitive Advantage 4.0% -3.6%
on Attractiveness
Effect of Attractiveness on SensMX- TAB - Attractiveness on -0.1% 0.2%Adoptability 22 Adoptability
Table A.4-6 Sensitivity Analysis of the Mixed Integration Strategy - Impact of
Parameter Change on the e-Business Diffusion Rate
% Chang in e-Biz % Chang in e-Biz
Diffusion by Users in Diffusion by Transaction
2020 Volume in 2020
e-Biz Diffusion Related Run Name 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base 0.75 * Base 1.25 * Base
Variables Value Value Value Value
Effect of Trading Partners' SensMX- 
-0.3% 0.3% -0.3% 0.3%Demand 18
Contact Rate SensM4X- -2.4% 1.7% -2.4% 1.7%
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on SensMX- 
-14.5% 13.5% 
-14.5% 13.5%1
Attractiveness 20
Effect of Relative Competitive SensMIX~ 21.1% 
-14.8% 21.1% 
-14.8%Advantage on Attractiveness 21
Effect of Attractiveness on SensMX- -0.1% 0.3% -0.1% 0.3%
Adoptability 2211
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0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 3.0% 4.0%
Effect of Relative Competitive Advantage on Attractiveness
Effect of e-Biz Benefits on Attractiveness
Effect of e-Biz Diffusion on Carriers Cost
Effect of Carriers LSO on Attractiveness of Carriers Service
Timeto Change Carriers Comnission
Initial Development Rate of Intermediaries LSO
hiring Increase Rate
Contact Rate
Cost Sensitivity to Relative Salesforce
Effect of Trading Partners' Demand
Sensitivityof LSO Ratio ChangeTrend on Indicated Carriers
Commission
Effect of Intermediaries LSO on Attractiveness of Intermediaries
Service
Effect of Relative Profitability on hiring
Effect of Intermediaries Comnission on Attractiveness of
Intermediaries Service
Effect of Carriers Conmission on Attractiveness of Carriers
Service
Annual Decay Rate of Development Rate
Sensitivity of LSO Ratio Change Trend on Indicated Intermediaries
Commission
M aximumAllowable Commission by Shippers
Shippers' Carriers LSO Perception Time
Average Rate of Learning by e-Biz
Effect of Attractiveness on Adoptability
Average Rate of Learning by Salesforce
I
I 
;1 I I-R
Figure A.4-4 Maximum Sensitivity of the Variables in the Mixed Integration
Strategy
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Abbreviation
Abbreviation
3PL
A-CA
CSI
CTP
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3rd Party Logistics Company
Appropriability - Complimentary Assets
Container Shipping Industry
Collaborative Tool Provider
Internet-based Business
e-Chartering Service Provider
Electronic Data Interchange
e-Procurement Service Provider
Logistics Service Offering
Market Type - Customer Focus
Network Externality - Customer Lock-in
Ocean Shipping Reform Act
e-business
e-CSP
EDI
e-PSP
LSO
MT-CF
NE-CL
OSRA
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